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In this dissertation I argue that political representatives have duties to be re-
sponsive to public opinion in their policy decisions. The existence of this duty, I
claim, is a basic requirement of a truly democratic system of government. In chapter
2, I show that several standard versions of democratic legitimacy require political
representatives to “respect” public opinion. However, I argue that a particular ver-
sion of political legitimacy, based upon popular sovereignty and the importance of
self-governance, provides an especially useful background for understanding what
this “respect” must mean. In chapter 3, I argue that respecting public opinion
requires political representatives to integrate public opinion information into their
policy decisions. According to one of the standard views of political representation,
the liberal conception, representatives deciding between policy alternatives should
balance what they believe to be in the interests of the public against public opinion.
I argue that this is the only adequate theory of political representation. Although
this view of political representation is often discussed in the literature, it is less
often given a mathematically precise form. Therefore, I present a formal model
of such a balancing procedure, and this reveals several important formal require-
ments that a conception of public opinion must satisfy; most importantly, it must
account for instability in the expression of public opinion, individual differences in
opinion strength, and it must be representable along a cardinal scale. Standard
measures of public opinion do not satisfy these requirements. I argue that if such a
model of public opinion cannot be formulated, then the liberal conception of polit-
ical representation is incoherent. In chapters 4 and 5, I present a model of public
opinion based upon Thurstonian scaling techniques that fulfills the necessary for-
mal requirements. Finally, in chapter 6, I discuss several important implications
this model has for the measurement of public opinion, the use of public opinion by
political representatives in policy deliberation, and other problems in social choice
theory.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Political representatives in modern democracies take many considerations into
account when making policy decisions. Some are pragmatic, such as how a given
legislative vote will be interpreted and evaluated by their constituents, most loyal
voters, party leadership, and most likely campaign donors. These people greatly
influence a representative’s ability to be reelected and progress up the legislative
hierarchy, and so it is reasonable to expect a representative to keep all of these
individuals in mind when she is deciding upon which public policies to support.
Other considerations arise from representatives’ beliefs about what is best for their
constituents, or what advances the common good. Finally, some considerations
arise from their role as representatives who are responsive to the policy judgments
of their constituents. Although all of these considerations are likely relevant for
explaining the behavior of political representatives, and so are of great interest to
political scientists, only a few are relevant to the representatives’ proper role in a
representative democracy. In other words, only some considerations that influence
political representatives are required by democratic theory, while others may actually
be excluded by it. In this dissertation I will explore the subset of the considerations
that I think democratic theory requires political representatives to include in their
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deliberations about what policy actions they should take. More specifically, I will
argue that democratic theory requires that political representatives weigh public
opinion against their estimations of what is in the common good when they make
policy decisions. The bulk of this dissertation will be spent showing how such a
model of political representation can be made coherent given a number of possibly
devastating problems with such a conception of representation.
An examination of any major policy decision quickly reveals the diversity of
considerations that representatives must often weigh in their decisions. One decision
of particular interest in this regard was the 2010 passage of the health care reform
legislation in the United States called the Affordable Care Act (ACA); I will use an
example modeled after this piece of legislation throughout this dissertation, because
I think it provides particularly salient examples of the weighing procedure between
different considerations that I take to be central to the legislative actions of political
representatives. A hint of this problem is easily apparent. In the spring of 2010, for
instance, Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party after substantial election
victories in the 2008 election. The health insurance provisions of the sort provided
by the ACA had long been a goal of many members of the Democratic Party,
and the legislation was seen by them as being in the common good. Passage also
seemed to be supported by what many considered a significant electoral mandate
that resulted from the 2008 national elections, which featured health care reforms
similar to those in the ACA on the electoral platform of both the Democratic Party
and its Presidential nominee Barack Obama. However, these considerations in favor
of passage of the ACA were in conflict with some measures of public opinion at the
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time. The ACA was very controversial, with opinion polls showing that a majority of
Americans were against its passage, with the so called “individual mandate” that all
individuals buy health insurance being particularly divisive.1 Legislators faced these
many conflicting considerations when deciding how to vote. Of particular interest
to my project is the set of considerations bearing on their roles as legislators and
representatives; situations such as the passage of the ACA make it unclear how
political representatives should balance these conflicting considerations so that that
they can best perform their role as representatives.
There is nothing unique about the decision process that representatives faced
when developing the ACA; the question of how political representatives should deal
with conflicting considerations is important for understanding how political repre-
sentatives should act generally. In this dissertation I will examine the way in which
political representatives should integrate different considerations into their policy
decision process. In particular, I am interested in how representatives should in-
tegrate public opinion into their decisions and how this might be balanced against
their estimates of what is in the common good. I will argue that political repre-
sentatives are in a position of leadership, such that they should often use their own
judgment about which policies will be for the best of the community at large, but
they must also be receptive to the policy judgments of their constituents; I will refer
to these judgments as the public opinion. In fact, I will argue that political represen-
tatives have a duty to integrate public opinion into their policy decisions. However,
1There was intensive public opinion polling during the passage of the ACA. For instance see
the CNN Opinion Research poll released on March 22, 2010.
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as I will show, any precise decision process that abides by those two principles must
be capable of using measures of public good that have enough information content
such that a weighing between the representative’s estimates of the common good
and public opinion is possible; it will turn out that this requires that public opinion
be representable using cardinal (or numeric) values. Such a model of public opinion
will face a number of difficult conceptual and technical challenges that will occupy
much of the dissertation. For instance, a suitable balancing is only possible if public
opinion is capable of being represented cardinally, something that many claim is im-
possible. I present a method by which public opinion can be represented cardinally,
thus showing how political representatives can fulfill their duties to respect public
opinion. By the end of the dissertation, I will be in a position to provide a coherent
model of policy decision that is able to account for the integration of the diverse
considerations political representatives face when making complex policy decisions.
In chapter 2, I show that a duty of responsiveness to public opinion is implied
by a number of popular theories of democratic legitimacy, including the minimal-
ist democratic tradition (Schumpeter, 1950; Dahl, 1991), deliberative democracy
(Habermas, 1992; Cohen and Sabel, 1997; Pettit, 1997), and those theories derived
from popular sovereignty. I then argue that a basis for democratic legitimacy in
popular sovereignty, inspired by that of Rousseau, should be preferred. In democra-
cies, because the people are sovereign, political representatives must respect public
opinion or otherwise they violate the rights of members of the public to govern them-
selves — this right is a species of the right to personal autonomy. I show that the
existence of a right of self-governance implies the existence of a corresponding duty
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of some set of political officials to be responsive to public opinion; such officials are
typically called political representatives. This theory also provides reasons for polit-
ical representatives to use their best judgment about what is in the public interest,
and not just public opinion, when making policy decisions. Therefore, the duty to
respect public opinion requires political representatives to balance these two criteria
when making decisions. This is similar to the “liberal” conception of democratic
political representation, which originates from Pitkin’s (1967) conceptual analysis
of political representation in the western context. According to this view, a political
representative must balance her “mandate” (public opinion about what should be
done) with her “independence” (what she thinks is in the best interests of her con-
stituents). I argue that representation so conceived allows political representatives
to use their superior knowledge of policy issues and position within a small deliber-
ative body to make decisions that better track the public good, while at the same
time respecting the rights of the public to govern themselves.
I spend the rest of the dissertation responding to the worry that the liberal
conception of political representation is incoherent. In chapter 3, I develop a formal
model of policy choice that explicates this possible incoherence. This model shows
that a mismatch between the levels of measurement of public opinion and measures
of the common good is one important source of this supposed incoherence. When
one balances one decision criterion against another, that balancing procedure must
be sensitive to both differences in weights between those criteria as well as differences
in scale magnitudes between the various alternatives. For instance, assuming that
two criteria are weighed equally, if one criterion places some alternative x on a scale
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well above another alternative y and the other criterion places y very slightly above
x, then the resultant decision should somehow be sensitive to these differences (and
likely rank x above y). Without sensitivity to differences in magnitudes, a system
of weights in a decision procedure using two criteria does nothing more than choose
which criteria is the dictator. This would force political representatives to choose
to follow either their mandate or their independence but would never allow them
to balance those decision criteria. The measure of what is in the common good in
the model is almost certainly cardinal, given that most cost-benefit analyses (its
real-world corollary) provide such cardinal measures. However, public opinion mea-
sures are typically only ordinal. I show this by examining three methods by which
political representatives typically gain knowledge of public opinion: voting, direct
communication, and public opinion surveys. All of these yield ordinal measures of
public opinion, which are inadequate for inclusion in a balancing procedure.
In order to save the balancing conception of political representation, I must
show how public opinion might be conceptualized and measured using cardinal mea-
surement scales. This task is far from trivial, and because measurement scales are
just special types of utility scales it requires me to show how interpersonal com-
parisons of cardinal utility might be made significant, thus producing an aggregate
(or social) utility scale. This process would therefore produce a social utility scale
representing public opinion from individual utility scales representing individual
opinions. It is thought by many that the insignificance of such comparisons render
the measurement of cardinal social utility impossible.2 In chapter 4, I show how this
2This is the view of standard social choice theory after Arrow (1963).
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problem can be avoided by carefully defining the source of individual utility scales
as attitudes about public policies. I formulate an attitude model that explains the
source of individual utility differences, and then show how those differences can be
measured through series of pair-wise comparisons of alternatives. This serves as the
basis for comparisons between individual utility scales. Because all individual atti-
tude sets share similar underlying structures, there exist significant metrics (central
tendency and dispersion of utility values) that can be used to normalize all individ-
ual utility scales. Therefore, at least within the context of attitude measurement,
it is possible to make significant comparisons of cardinal utility. In chapter 5, I
show that once a number of normative assumptions are made about which features
of attitudes are normatively significant — and I argue that these assumptions are
plausible within the democratic context — a political representative can formulate
a cardinal utility scale representing public opinion. Such a scale could then be
balanced against some measure of expected welfare in a social decision process.
This dissertation has implications for a number of research areas. I address
these in chapter 6. The most direct implications are in democratic theory and public
opinion survey methodology. I argue that a necessary feature of democracies is that
some political officials involved in policy decisions respect public opinion. However,
a method that is capable of capturing the full information content of the public
opinion model that I present would likely require far more demanding measurement
methods than are currently employed by survey methodologists, and likely more
demanding than is feasible in real-life measurement settings. I present a number of
simplification methods that might track the measurement of public opinion that I
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present, though they may not completely capture the richness of the model.
I next address the implications of the model on deliberative democratic theory.
Some might worry that any introduction of public opinion into legislative settings,
in which deliberation about policy is central, will detract from the rationality of
the policy formation process. After all, if political representatives are to come to
a rational policy decision, one that is responsive to the best available arguments
and reasons, then public opinion that has been separated from the reasons behind
it may in fact make legislative decisions less rational. According to this view, there
seems to be no space for public opinion in a deliberative institution. I argue that
the use of public opinion can be integrated into decisions within deliberative insti-
tutions. I point out that within a society that features informal deliberative settings
throughout, public opinion can in fact be seen as the result of a deliberative process,
but one that has not been controlled to the degree as that found in a legislature;
this should give public opinion some status in the public decision once deliberation
has ended and a decision must be made. However, public opinion also gives repre-
sentatives information about their constituents that might aid them in determining
what arguments may ground public opinion. It will often be reasonable to include
such arguments within the legislative deliberation process. Finally, communication
between representatives and their constituents often resembles a deliberative set-
ting, with representatives both informing the public with their arguments and being
informed in return.
I then address an implication of the method of finding social utility on models
in social choice theory, where cardinal utility representations are typically avoided as
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measures of preference. It is generally thought that no significant way exists to make
interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility. I show that if more is known about
what the utility is used to represent then it becomes possible to make significant
interpersonal comparisons of utility. However, social choice theory is typically neu-
tral to what underlying phenomenon utility represents. I provide a case in which
abandonment of that neutrality may allow for a more powerful analysis of social
utility using social choice theoretic tools. A similar abandonment of neutrality in
social choice analysis has been suggested by Regenwetter et al. (2006), who argue
that actual voting patterns take certain stereotypical forms such that they are not
susceptible to several voting paradoxes. The method I use in this dissertation adds
credence to the view that social choice analyses may often benefit from making
certain assumptions about phenomenon being measured.
The central argument of this dissertation can be summarized as follows: Any
representative democracy requires that all citizens be represented by some politi-
cal official(s) who have a role in policy decisions. This fulfills the democratic re-
quirement of self-governance. Because political representatives are also tasked with
coming to decisions that are in the best interests of the public, and the public is
sometimes misinformed about what policies are in their best interests, the proper
representation of the people requires officials to balance what they believe is in the
best interests of their constituents with the wishes of those constituents. A failure to
adequately balance these constitutes a failure of political representation. However,
a number of problems with the basic structure of public opinion, revealed primarily
by work in social choice theory and survey methodology, makes such a balancing
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procedure seemingly impossible. I present a model of public opinion that eliminates
the possible problems with the balancing procedure. This includes a model of in-
dividual political attitudes, a model that represents individual attitudes in terms
of utility scales over policy alternatives, and a social utility model that allows for
the interpersonal comparison of those individual utility scales. I show that it is
possible for public opinion to have a coherent role in the decision making of political
representatives.
In the next chapter I will begin my argument by showing that respect for
public opinion is crucial for any democratic theory that purports to allow for self-
governance, something that I will argue is a crucial part of any adequate theory of
democratic legitimacy.
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Chapter 2: Democratic Governance in the Modern State
In this dissertation I will argue that political representatives within democ-
racies possess duties to respect public opinion. Furthermore, ‘respect’ should be
understood as a particular type of responsiveness to public opinion. In the next
chapter I will give a formal model of the way in which representatives should respect
public opinion. In this chapter I will argue that this particular way of respecting
public opinion is crucial for justifying the legitimate authority of democratic insti-
tutions. There exist alternative ways of understanding respect for public opinion,
but I will show that they do not provide this crucial role in explaining democratic
legitimacy. Only a form of respect for public opinion that permits a degree of
self-governance by the public could provide this crucial part of the justification for
why democratic governments possess the political authority that they are commonly
thought to possess.
There are many ways in which political authority might be legitimated. The
existence of such a legitimate authority gives reasons to those who are governed to
abide by (at least some of) the commands or laws given by that authority. In some
social contexts the authority of, for instance, a even well-functioning dictatorship
might be perfectly justified by its beneficial consequences to society. However, in
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otherwise well-functioning political societies a dictatorship will not possess legiti-
mate authority. In the social contexts in which most modern western states exist
mere beneficial consequences do not seem sufficient to justify the authority of a state.
Another species of justifications originates in the governing authority, or sovereignty,
of the public itself. For instance, a democratic government might be said to have
authority because it permits the people to govern themselves. The fact that one
has been involved in the creation of a law or issuance of a command through a
democratic process may give one reason to abide by those laws or commands. This
is democratic legitimacy. One question I will attempt to answer is just what sorts of
institutions are required in a government that is in part rendered legitimate by the
form of its democratic institutions. I will argue that, at least in a state with large a
population, such a government must have representative institutions in which public
opinion is respected during the formulation of laws and commands. Furthermore,
if this “respect” is to permit self-governance, it must include public opinion in the
policy decision procedure.
2.1 Political representation and respect for public opinion
It will follow from the requirement of self-governance and the role of politi-
cal representatives within representative democracies that any political official who
serves the role of a political representative has a duty to take the public opinion
of her constituents into account when making policy decisions. This duty is dis-
tinct from any duty she might have to do what (she thinks) is in the best interests
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of those constituents or in the common good. Additionally, it addresses individ-
ual rather than institutional prescriptions. I will assume that political officials are
working within a western democracy that is reasonably just and democratic (e.g.
Britain, The United States, Germany, France, Japan, etc.). However, I will work on
a more abstract level than concerns of how the opinion and interests of individual
constituencies might relate to the common good of all of society, or how the duties
of different types of political officials may vary within and between different political
institutions. The purest case of a representative political official I have in mind is an
elected “law-giver” who “answers to” all of society, though no such official exists in
any actual modern democratic system. A more concrete case may be an “At-large”
city council member or other member of a legislature who is elected by the entire
public. But I think my conclusions will be general enough such that they can apply
to more complex cases, such as members of a legislature who each represent different
constituencies. Though such examples bring in complications, such as how different
constituencies come to an agreement with one another, they will not substantially
detract from my central claims.
A system of government cannot merely operate with concern for the inter-
ests or common good of the public for it to satisfy the requirements of possessing
democratic legitimacy. Plenty of non-democratic regimes purport to, and some-
times actually do, aim at the common good. It is conceivable that in obviously
non-democratic regimes, in which the people have no say in who governs or what
policies are instituted, public opinion may actually play some role in public decisions
as a measure of the interests of the public. But this does not make such a regime
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democratic, because the use of public opinion in this way is simply incidental and
could be eliminated at any time if some other better measure of the public inter-
ests were discovered. Similarly, some regimes that feature elections of officials may
permit little role for public opinion in decisions.1 Regimes in which elected officials
make decisions with little concern about what the public actually thinks also seem
importantly undemocratic. It is this last case that will be of particular interest to
this project. I will have to give good reasons to think that free and fair elections do
not provide a sufficient basis for democratic legitimacy.
A representative system of government in which officials wield substantial
power to govern in accordance with the common good but also requires them to
consider public opinion in their decisions has been called “liberal” representation.2
My argument about the proper interpretation of self-governance in the legislative
context relies heavily upon this conception of political representation, which re-
quires that representatives balance the views of their constituents about what to do
against their own views about what is in their constituents’ best interests. I will
defend this view here but I must also show that a number of popular alternatives to
it are not adequate; there are many ways in which representatives can be thought
of as “respecting” public opinion, and many of them do not require the considera-
tion of public opinion that I will advocate here. As I will claim, they also do not
require that the people are able to govern themselves in order for their opinions to
1Note that my claims here are about conceptual issues and not about how elected officials
actually behave or what would maximize their prospects of reelection in the form of Mayhew’s
(1974) analysis of rational congressional behavior.
2This usage was made standard in modern political philosophy by Pitkin (1967), and is derived
from its origins in Madison’s writings – for instance in the Federalist Papers, especially #51- #58,
#62, and #63 .
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be “respected.”
“Respect” for opinions goes beyond respect for the constituents themselves
as persons or citizens. Even a dictatorship could show respect in this way. I will
argue that ‘respect’ must refer to respect for particular features of the constituents,
specifically their policy opinions. I think the following interpretations of giving
“respect” to the opinions of the people are the main competitors, with the first
being the interpretation that I will advocate:
Self-Governance The actual opinions of the public play a role in policy decisions.
Minimalist The government (and/or individual officials) voluntarily relinquishes
power upon losing a free and fair election.3
Deliberative The reasons and arguments the people have in favor of their opinions
are included in the deliberative procedure by political officials.
I will argue that the last two interpretations of ‘respect’ for the policy opinions
of constituents are less satisfactory than the first. However, I will also show how
any of these interpretations require the adequate measurement of public opinion in
order to be adequately democratic. Therefore, what I do in this dissertation will be
relevant to proponents of all three interpretations. As I proceed it is also impor-
tant to realize that I am not refuting the use of any conception of democracy as a
solution to various problems of institutional design, but only in so far as they are
3This general view is pervasive in political science and political theory. For instance, see Schum-
peter (1950); Riker (1982); Dahl (1991). Also see Przeworski (1999), who uses the term to describe
this type of democratic theory.
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used as a fully adequate source of democratic legitimacy. The Minimalist concep-
tion of democracy provides good reason for frequent elections and the Deliberative
framework provides reason to require that legislation be discussed in deliberative
bodies, but neither framework adequately explains how democratic institutions per-
mit the people to govern themselves. I will show that self-governance is central to
democratic legitimacy.
2.1.1 Self-governance
When a system of government does not allow the people being ruled by it to
govern themselves it detracts from the legitimacy of that government’s authority to
rule.4 This is a claim I find very plausible, but it requires some explication to know
just how the political authority of a government might arise from a representation
scheme that permits self-governance. The explanation I will give here gains inspira-
tion from Rousseau’s theory of popular sovereignty, though I will rely heavily upon
a particular contemporary interpretation of this well-known theory.
In On the Social Contract , Rousseau claims that a government derives legit-
imate powers to govern from the sovereignty of the individuals that compose the
4I do not take a stand here on whether any political theory can show democratic authority to
be legitimate in the strong sense that contract theorists have often conceived of it, or even whether
democratic states possess the sort of authority that they frequently claim to possess. According
to this strong sense of legitimacy, if a state is legitimate then those individuals subject to its laws
and commands have reasons to abide by them in every instance in which they apply. There is
some reason to doubt that these standard forms of legitimacy and authority are often possessed
by states, or even could possibly be possessed by any real world state. One major problem, for
instance, is that many forms of legitimacy seem to rely upon the express consent of the governed,
something most citizens of states rarely give, and theories that only rely upon tacit consent have
a difficulty showing how merely tacit consent is sufficient to produce political obligations in the
subjects. See Morris’ (2002) criticism of legitimacy’s status as the foundation of political authority
and Simmons’ (2001) criticism of the existence of political authority in most states.
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community over which it governs. Rousseau thinks that this has the consequence
of allowing individuals to be free even when they are bound to follow the laws and
directives of the government. The sovereignty and authority of the state are derived
from the collective sovereignty of the people and this is the way in which the people
are said to govern themselves. Rousseau might have interpreted self-governance as
lacking policy content (or direction), such that the people govern themselves insofar
as they consent to be governed. This then might be similar in structure, though
certainly not in detail, to other social contract views like that of Locke. However,
Rousseau — at least according to the interpretation that I will introduce shortly
— imagined that self-governance also provided content to governance in addition to
consent. He claims that the wills of the public themselves play a role in providing a
foundation for the political authority of the government. However, the connection
between the wills of the citizens and policy decisions by the government is far from
obvious. The primary guidance Rousseau provides in this regard is that legitimate
actions of a government follow the general will of the public. The precise interpre-
tation of the general will is an issue of great controversy for Rousseau scholars, and
although it is not my intent to wade too deeply into it, a reasonable interpretation
will be important for my use of the general will as a model of self-governance.
Gopal Sreenivasan (2000) provides a particularly insightful interpretation of
the general will that also gives a very clear picture of just how the general will
might be linked to public opinion. According to Sreenivasan, the general will is the
decision that would arise from the public involved in a structured deliberation. One
crucial passage for this interpretation comes from On the Social Contract, Book II,
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Chapter 3:
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the
general will. The latter considers only the general interest, while the
former considers the private interest and is merely the sum of private
wills. But remove from these same wills the pluses and minuses that
cancel each other out, and what remains as the sum of the differences is
the general will. If when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the
citizens were to have no communication among themselves, the general
will would always result from the large number of small differences, and
the deliberation would always be good.5
An important distinction here is between the will of all and the general will.
Each individual has a particular will, or set of wishes and preferences, for how the
government should act, many of which are self-interested. For instance, if a city
is deciding upon a location for a new landfill, those who live on the west side of
town will prefer that it be located on the east side, and those who live on the east
side will prefer that it be located on the west side. The aggregate of such indi-
vidual wills is the “will of all.” But this is not the “general will” that Rousseau
thinks is the expression of popular sovereignty. In the above passage there appears
to be two expressions of what the general will might be. The first, the “sum of
the differences” that remains when one takes away from the “same will the pluses
and minuses that cancel each other out”, is rather cryptic. And in any case it
5pp. 31-32. Emphasis is my own.
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will turn out to be less informative for determining what sort of institutions might
instantiate popular sovereignty and self-governance than the second formulation.
Sreenivasan concentrates on this second formulation of the general will, which de-
scribes the decision process that instantiates it. This is a deliberative process in
which individual opinions are arrived at independently (without any “communica-
tion among themselves”), and in which all individuals within the deliberation are
“sufficiently informed.” Sreenivasan provides a more complete list of features of a
deliberative setting that produces the general will from a wider reading of On the
Social Contract, but does not significantly modify the picture provided in the above
passage:6
1. The subject matter of the deliberation is perfectly general.
2. The conclusions of the deliberation apply to all the members of the community.
3. All the members of the community participate in the deliberation.
4. All parties to the deliberation think for themselves.
These constraints on the deliberative setting are not likely to shock anyone
familiar with the deliberative democratic literature, some of which I discuss in sec-
tion 2.1.3. Similar constraints characterize most good deliberative settings that are
meant to determine what policies are in the common good. Rousseau himself seems
to have thought that the general will would always track the common good, but this
brings about a well-known tension in his view. It is unclear how any deliberation by
6Sreenivasan (2000), pg. 574.
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actual citizens, even one that is extremely well structured to facilitate the influence
of the best arguments, could necessitate the adoption of the policy that matches the
common good of the public. People often have false beliefs about what is in their
own interests let alone the common good, even when they are perfectly warranted
to have their beliefs. The fact that the “common good” is often ill-defined and
nebulous makes it all the more difficult for a deliberation to be directed at the same
conception of it. It seems plausible that individuals taking part in the deliberation
could reasonably have different conceptions of the common good. Therefore, unless
one adopts a vacuous view of the common good, one that simply equates it to the
content of the general will, one is forced to think that Rousseau’s view faces a serious
problem. The content of the general will cannot both be determined by the result
of an actual deliberation and also always directed at the common good.
Although the tension between the general will and the common good is a
well known problem for Rousseau’s view, it is not a problem for my own use of
the general will. There are a number of reasons to think that the general will so
conceived will tend toward the common good of the public, and likely better than any
other decision process; this is enough for my purposes. The tension in Rousseau’s
view stems from his insistence on an identity relationship (or something similar)
between the content of the general will and the common good. But if this is relaxed
to a relationship of correlation, then the conceptual problem with the general will
disappears. What is left is an empirical concern about how strongly the general will
correlates with the common good, and how strong this relationship must be in order
to justify the reliance on the general will in public decision making. If this is only
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a weak correlation then there is a reason to avoid the use of the general will in the
formulation of public policy. But if it is well correlated with the common good then
the general will seems to both have the benefit of tracking the common good closely
in addition to permitting self-governance.
Up until this point I have not explained the concept of the “common good,” A
clearer conception of the common good will be important to determine whether the
general will as I have interpreted it here tends to track it. I have already said that
one important feature is that it is not simply an aggregate of individual wants or
preferences. Such an aggregation is the will of all, which Rousseau explicitly states
is distinct from the general will. Given that the will of all can reflect private rather
than public interests this would be a poor proxy for the “common good.” There are
many alternative versions of the common good, and I do not think success of this
project relies upon settling upon a single version, but the consideration of two main
conceptions will be helpful to determine whether the general will tends to track it.
The common good may be in those interests shared between individuals, and in this
way arise from the individual interests themselves. For instance, individuals in a
community may share an interest in a strong economy and clean air, though not
in the prosperity of a majority at the expense of the prosperity of the minority.7
This will be the way in which I will conceive of the common good. However, there
might also be goods for communities, that may not arise from the interests of any
individuals when they are not taken as members of that community.8 For instance,
7This I take to be the conception of the common good favored by political liberals in the pattern
of John Rawls.
8This is a concept of the common good which is similar to that advocated by communitarians.
Will Kymlicka has a concise presentation of this view in his Contemporary Political Philosophy,
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if the existence of a community or its way of life is threatened, obtaining what is in
the common good of that community may require that its members sacrifice some
of their interests to assure that the community survives. The first type of goods
can be reduced to some set of individual goods, whereas the second type has an
irreducible character.
There is reason to be optimistic that the general will is tightly related to the
common good of either general type that I describe above. This optimism is based
in two commonly held beliefs in political theory. Firstly, the policy preferences
of the public are often the best source of information about what is in the best
interests of the public. This is primarily relevant to the first reducible conception
of the common good. Secondly, deliberative decisions are often better able than
preference aggregation for arriving at decisions that are in the common rather than
individual interest. This is relevant to both conceptions of the common good.
Robert Dahl argues for the acceptance of a principle that is relevant for how
the general will might track the first type of common good; he calls this the “Pre-
sumption of Personal Autonomy.” This presumption states that “In the absence of
a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best
judge of his or her own good or interests” (Dahl, 1991, pg. 100). One might also
take a more Millian view, that personal autonomy is not just instrumental to de-
termining individual interests, but constitutive of an individual’s interests.9 Some
interpretation of this principle seems correct, and I doubt many democrats would
pg. 220.
9John Stuart Mill expresses this in On Liberty, chapter 3.
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doubt its truth, though some may claim that there are many cases in which there
exists a “compelling showing” indicating that the public is not the best judge of
their own interests, especially in, for instance, economic policy making.10 Examples
of where public opinion fails to track the common good often, it seems, amount to
claims that public opinion does not meet the standards of the general will. Drawing
from Rousseau, if the public fails to be “sufficiently informed” about some issue
then that public opinion does not meet the standards of the general will. A simi-
lar failure to meet the standards of the general will arises if significant factioning
develops such that individuals fail to make their judgments independently. In fact,
it is unlikely that public opinion of a large society will ever come close to meeting
these standards. As I will describe soon, it is not my intention to show that public
opinion itself is an instantiation of the general will, but rather that it plays a role
in forming it.
The second aspect of the general will that aids in its correlation to the common
good is its deliberative nature. This is relevant to both types of common good that
I mention above. According to Sreenivasan, Rousseau thinks that the purpose of
the deliberative procedure is to bring out the “true wants” of the people rather
than the wants that they may happen to espouse at any given time. More precisely,
these are “...wants that the person has ratified through his own reasoning and that
also correspond to his critical interests” (pg. 551). Given that I do not want to
delve too deeply into Rousseau’s particular conception of ‘interests,’ the concept
10For example, see Caplan (2008) for such an argument against the ability of the public to arrive
at decisions about economic policy in the common good.
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of “critical interests” might be interpreted as roughly equivalent to an individual’s
actual interests. It is, therefore, important to remember that individuals do not
express their sovereignty through any preference they have, no matter how poorly
informed it may be. A democratic theory based upon the general will is more
restrictive of the preferences used in political decisions than a more naive form of
populism that requires governments to act according to any crude wants of the
public. In particular, the arguments and reasons provided in deliberation will tend
to focus the deliberators to those issues and policies of shared interest, relevant to
the community taken as a whole. For arguments to be accepted within a deliberation
they must be acceptable to all who take part in the deliberation. With this in mind,
a deliberative procedure can be thought of as focusing the attention of the public
to that which is shared in common, and therefore the common good.
The explanation above only addresses how the tension between the common
good and the general will (as interpreted as a structured deliberation by all citizens)
might be resolved; one should be careful to see that this does not simply reduce the
general will to a tool that tracks the common good. There is reason to care about
the form of the general will apart from its ability to track the common good. One
might possibly interpret Rousseau as formulating, in the general will, the proper
goal for the government to pursue. Such a role for the general will need not be the
explanation for how democracies have the authority to govern. If the sole reason to
abide by the general will is the fact that it is well correlated with the common good,
then a dictator using some sophisticated decision procedure might do this just as
well as a popular deliberative body might. The general will, however, can only be
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instantiated by some particular democratic process, and this in itself differentiates
itself from the common good. The common good is a particular outcome rather
than the result of some procedure. What makes the general will an instantiation
of popular sovereignty is the fact that it permits the people to govern themselves:
it promotes self-governance while at the same time directing the public to govern
towards the common good.
I have not yet mentioned what is likely the most problematic aspect of Rousseau’s
formulation of the general will. If the general will is taken to depict a real (or even
model) decision process then it seems to require that an entire political community
deliberate on the issues in a single deliberative setting. This is one of the reasons
why Rousseau suggests that small societies are best. In fact, Rousseau seems to ex-
plicitly exclude the appointment of political representatives to permit a deliberative
setting of a reasonable size, stating that:
...since sovereignty is merely the exercise of the general will, it can never
be alienated, and that the sovereign, which is only a collective being,
cannot be represented by anything but itself. 11
He clearly views an elected body of representatives as inadequate for permit-
ting something like self-governance. Referring later in On the Social Contract to the
English parliamentary system of the time, Rousseau states that:
The English people believes itself to be free. It is greatly mistaken; it is
free only during the election of the members of Parliament. Once they
11Rousseau, On the Social Contract, pg. 29.
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are elected, the populace is enslaved; it is nothing.12
Rousseau, I think, is basically correct here. If the primary means by which
the people exert influence over policy decisions is through elections of representa-
tives then there is something seriously lacking in their ability to govern themselves.
One could take Rousseau’s criticism of representation to have striking negative con-
sequence for Rousseau’s view of representative democracies. If legitimate govern-
ments were required to govern over only small societies then few governments are
legitimate. Perhaps the small 18th century city-state of Geneva, which Rousseau
so admired, might qualify as legitimate but almost no modern states would. The
natural remedy for this problem is an adequate view of political representation that
shows how and to what extent the general will might be instantiated within a de-
cision procedure within a representative governing body. The hope is that such
a project can show how political officials and their deliberations might represent
something like the general will of the public within representative legislatures. If
the essential elements of Rousseau’s system of legitimization are preserved within
such a process, then it would seem that large representative democracies might also
be in part rendered legitimate by way of popular sovereignty. This is explicitly con-
trary to Rousseau’s view that wills cannot be represented.13 I have doubts about
many details of Rousseau’s view about sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy, but
12Ibid. pg. 74.
13In On the Social Contract, Rousseau does seem to allow for political representation to be
involved in the governance of the people. These representatives are then entrusted with acting in
accordance with the general will. Note however that this form of representation does not allow for
the will(s) of the represented to be present in the acts of the representative. Therefore, the general
will cannot be represented, though representatives can govern in accordance with it. Therefore,
the government may be composed to political representatives, though the sovereign cannot.
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these will not play a significant role in my discussion of self-governance and political
representation.
I will use the general will as a model for a democratic decision procedure
that permits self-governance and tends to track the common good. A representa-
tive democracy based upon the above interpretation of Rousseau’s general will is
similar in many ways to the deliberative democratic framework of political legit-
imization. I will argue that these are compatible but that Rousseau’s concept of
popular sovereignty overcomes some concerns that one might have about the po-
tential of deliberative democratic systems for being undemocratic. I will argue that
political representatives in democracies have duties to respect public opinion that
arises from the requirement that democracies permit the public to govern itself. I
will also argue that Representatives can only be thought to “respect” the opinions
of the public if they take public opinion into account when making decisions within
a deliberative setting. Although I do not think that Rousseau would consider this
use of public opinion a true instantiation of the general will, because it still does not
allow the people to be directly present in the decision process, I think that it tracks
the concept of the general will well enough to explain how it permits self-governance.
In the beginning of this section I stated that the concept of the general will
would aid in the understanding of what it must mean for political representatives
to respect public opinion by facilitating the self-governance of their constituents. I
think some features of that decision procedure can already be made clearer. Any
group of individuals can be thought of as having an aggregate will if individual wills
are conceptualized as utility functions over the set of possible group actions (or
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policies).14 However, individual wills often conflict. In every society some public
decisions will benefit some individuals more than they do others, or worse yet,
benefit some at the expensive of others. Returning to my example of choosing the
location for a landfill, someone who owns land on the east side of a city would rather
a landfill be placed on the west side, whereas someone who owns land on the west
side would rather it be placed on the east side. If the landfill is located on the
east side, those on the west side will certainly benefit, whereas those on the east
side may actually have been better off had no landfill been built at all. These two
individuals have different self-interested preferences for where the landfill is placed,
and the aggregation of all such preferences within a public can be thought of as the
will of all.
If the will of all were used for public decisions, then it would result in something
like a pure aggregation of votes; if those on the east side have one more vote than
those on the west side then the public decision must be to build the landfill on the
west side, even if there are good public reasons (perhaps the east-side location is
larger) to do differently. But this mode of thinking is not the sort that public decision
making should consist in; instead, individuals should restrict considerations used in
their policy decisions to those relevant to what is in the best interest or common
good of the community, people, or state as a whole. Accordingly, the general will
requires that there is deliberation about the policy such that the decision tracks
14A utility function is just a preference relation over some set of alternatives. It is a technical
concept, without any of the theoretical content that the term ‘utility’ often connotes in moral and
political philosophy. Assume, for the moment, that there are no social choice theoretic problems
with such an aggregate will. I deal with these issues directly in this dissertation, and will show
that they can be avoided if the aggregate will is conceptualized in the appropriate way.
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the common good rather than merely the private interests of the majority. When
this is successful then the public wishes that are included in deliberation are only
those that are relevant to public decisions that aim at the common good. However,
notice that these public wishes, even when they are directed at the common good,
will often fall short of the general will because they lack a substantive deliberative
component and may contain serious rational deficits. Even if all the members of
the public are only concerned with the common good, within large societies it is
impossible for all citizens to rationally deliberate with each other. Therefore, the
individuals who deliberate will not be coextensive with the public. This threatens
to make the concept of the general will irrelevant to large modern democracies.
In my view, political representatives who are responsive in the appropriate
ways to public opinion can instantiate something similar to the general will ; I will
argue that representative legislatures allow for a public to implement policies that
reflect the opinions and interests of the people in a way that tracks the common
good. This instantiates something like the general will and thus permits the public to
express its popular sovereignty even when most members have no direct involvement
in the deliberation (among representatives) that brings about public decisions. In
the next chapter, I will describe a model of political decision making that I take
to be an instantiation of the decision procedure Sreenivasan describes as bringing
about decisions consistent with the general will that track the common good. I
prefer this Rousseauian-inspired picture of political representation, but this is not
a work of Rousseau scholarship and therefore I take the view to be attractive on
its own regardless of whether it is an accurate interpretation of Rousseau’s view.
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Next I will argue that taking ‘respect’ for public opinion to require the facilitation
of self-governance should be preferred over some other likely contenders. I will show
that notions of respect from both Minimalist Democrats and Deliberative Democrats
are inadequate. However, even if one accepts one of these other notions of respect,
I think that the model of democratic decision making that I will present in this
dissertation is relevant to how political representatives should act.
2.1.2 Minimalist Democracy
According to what I will call “Minimalists Democrats,” democracies are better
than alternative methods of governance, because they typically lead to more bene-
ficial outcomes for the governed. Specifically, they are more likely to lead to stable
societies that tend to track the interests of most people in society. This view is espe-
cially popular among political scientists. “Democracy” in this context is generally
defined as the existence of regular competitive elections, nearly universal suffrage,
and the peaceful transition of power in accordance with the results of those elec-
tions. But this view requires no substantive connections between the policy opinions
of the public and the actions of the government. There is certainly a significant in-
sight into how societies function in this tradition, but I will show how this cannot
be an adequate explanation for why democracies might have legitimate authority
when other forms of government do not. Such Minimalist democratic theories often
assume, mistakenly as I will show, that more demanding forms of democracy are
impossible or incoherent. Showing that this is mistaken will be the purpose of much
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of this dissertation.
It should first be observed that Minimalist conceptions of democracy are typi-
cally based upon two theoretical foundations: a consequentialism about the purposes
of government and a skepticism about the existence of a popular will and/or the
ability of elections to convey it. The sorts of reasons minimalist democrats give
for why democracy is desirable typically rely upon its supposed good consequences
for the lives of the governed. For instance, Przeworski (1999) claims that generally
only democratic states are capable of providing peaceful exchanges of power, and
that such exchanges are highly beneficial to members of the state. Power exchanges
dictated by democratic processes avoid the violence and resultant disorder common
to non-democratic regimes changes. Because changes of power are inevitable within
any society, a system that can eliminate violence and subsequent social disorder
greatly improves the well-being of individuals living in the state. This notion of
well-being can be defined in many ways, based upon a measure similar to that of
utility in economics or a more complex notion of well-being. It can also be found
through an aggregation procedure or a function sensitive to the distribution of over-
all well-being. However, whatever the details the underlying normative justification
for democratic systems remain broadly consequentialist in character. Importantly,
it is also contingent upon the physical and social environment in which the state
exists. It is plausible that in some environments democracies would have few if any
redeeming qualities. There is nothing good in itself about the democratic form of
government.
A second central feature of minimalist conceptions of democracy is a skepticism
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toward the ability of voting behaviors to convey information about the policy views
and interests of the people. Schumpeter (1950) and Riker (1982) present two classic
arguments for this. Schumpeter claims that the public generally has incoherent and
uninformed views about most public policy issues and Riker argues that findings
from social choice theory demonstrate that ordinal voting theory could not possibly
convey coherent views from the public (even if those views existed) to political
officials. This skepticism is one important reason why one might turn to more
minimal justifications of democracy that do not rely upon the connection between
the opinions of the people and the actions of the government. As I will argue in
section 3.3.1, I share the skepticism with minimalist democratic theories that voting
behavior can adequately convey the policy views of the public to political officials.
However, I do not think that this limitation of voting should doom democratic
theories that rely upon some connection between the actions of the government
and the policy opinions of the public. I will claim that the problem with voting is
primarily its inability to properly measure the policy attitudes (the concept I will
give public “opinions”) of the people, but that this is not reason to think that those
attitudes do not exist in a form relevant to policy formation by political officials.
Additionally, I will show in chapters 4 and 5 that public policy attitudes can be
coherently conceptualized and measured.
If the skepticism about public opinion is dropped, then I think minimal democ-
racy is no longer as attractive. What remains, I think, is the appeal of its consequen-
tialist basis, at least for those inclined to such theories of political legitimacy. More
precisely, there is a tendency for Minimalist Democrats to focus exclusively upon
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consequentialist considerations when evaluating governmental forms. Although I
agree that the consequences of a form of government should figure into its evalua-
tion, I do not think that consequences exhaust the set of evaluative criteria. As I
have explained above, I also think that the opportunity democracy gives to individ-
uals to govern themselves is an important consideration in its favor. Furthermore,
purely consequentialist justifications seem to support political systems that give
very little control to most citizens. The psychological and social benefits of self-
governance might even be produced so long as the people are made to believe they
play a role in governing. A society might actually be ruled by a small group of
ultra-competent civically-minded aristocrats. This elitist political system is in prin-
ciple unacceptable in my view, but a minimal democrat would be forced to explain
its unacceptable nature in terms of certain contingent facts: that it is inherently
unstable or that a set of aristocrats will always (eventually) act in their own self-
interest. It seems possible that an institution might be suitably designed to promote
long-term stability and directedness toward the public good of such an aristocracy.
In any case, there is considerable controversy about the relative harm to social well-
being of elitist political systems.15 Therefore, it may be difficult for the minimal
democrat to condemn a political system exclusively for the system’s consequences
on the lives of those who are governed. Any adequate democratic theory should be
able to criticize, for instance, something like Plato’s vision of an ideal city-state (as
my example above resembles) even if Plato is correct about how well a society so
organized would thrive. I would say that such a system does not allow the people
15For a discussion of this see Peffley and Rohrschneider (2007).
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to suitably govern themselves, but it would seem that the Minimal Democrat would
have little to say against it.
Even if my criticisms of Minimalist Democracy are unsuccessful, if it can be
shown that some coherent public will or opinion does exist in a form that could
possibly guide policy decisions then political representatives should be responsive to
that will. Robert Dahl’s (1991) Presumption of Personal Autonomy is relevant here.
He claims that one core justification for democracy is the immediacy and veracity
with which every individual knows her own interests. Because each individual has
better access to knowledge of her own interests than any other individual, public
officials should generally accept each individual’s assessment of what is in that in-
dividual’s interests at face value.16 I think this has intuitive appeal, certainly if the
assumption simply amounts to the claim that individual assessments of interests
should be used by political officials, in conjunction with other information, to make
decisions. There are some contexts in which these assessments might simply be
ignored, for instance in very technical matters about which the public is generally
uninformed, but it calls for a presumption in favor of including this information.
This would seem to support the use of public opinion by political officials if it can
be shown that some coherent measure of public opinion exists in a form that can be
measured. In this dissertation I will show that this is the case.
I have shown in this section that there is reason to deny the Minimalist Demo-
crat’s view of “respecting” public opinion. Furthermore, even if one accepts the
16Note that it need not be assumed that individuals have special (in the sense discussed by
philosophers of mind) access to their own interests to accept this. It need only be assumed that
individuals generally have better access to this knowledge than any other individual.
34
Minimalist Democratic view of “respect” there are still consequentialist reasons for
the public opinion to be integrated into the decisions of some public officials.
2.1.3 Deliberative Democracy
The deliberative conception of democracy claims that the legitimacy of demo-
cratic decisions relies upon their origins in fair rational deliberative procedures, or
the similarity of those decisions to what would be arrived at by an ideal delibera-
tive procedure. This tradition is quite compelling, because it seems to show how a
democracy might be both inclusive and rational. By permitting individuals equal
access to the rational discussion that gives rise to public decisions, there is a sense in
which the opinions of all citizens might be respected by such a deliberative process.
This seems particularly true when all of the citizens of a social group are included
in the deliberation, and when certain deliberative norms facilitate free, equal, and
independent deliberation. Therefore, in its most idealized forms, deliberative demo-
cratic theory purports to show how the public can govern itself on a free and equal
basis through a deliberative process. This resembles in certain ways the method of
finding the general will that I have suggested above.
Deliberative democracy appears to match the sort of respect for public opin-
ion that I take to be central to self-governance, at least in so far as those opinions
are backed by reasons acceptable to all.17 However, large complex societies that
are organized into modern states do not permit the direct democratic deliberation
17Later I will show that my own conception of public opinion does not require that the reasons
behind it be apparent, though the entire decision process by political officials should be rational
in a way similar to what deliberative democrats suggest.
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on the order of what Rousseau discusses, even at the local level (at least upon a
superficial interpretation of his theory). Few public political organizations of any
type could realistically operate as direct deliberative democracies and even fewer
would satisfy the requirements of rough deliberative equality that the deliberative
democratic model requires. For instance, even deliberation among all the citizens
of a small town of 500 would be unlikely to satisfy the conditions required for that
deliberation to point to the general will. And even one of the best known proponents
of large-scale deliberations, James Fishkin, does not claim that public deliberations
could ever meet something close to Rousseau’s standards.18 For instance, a Fishkin-
style “deliberation day” only permits some representative sample of the population
to deliberate about a set of issues. And those Fishkin-style deliberations that have
been attempted do not typically meet the requirement that all individuals think
independently; factions and deference to designated “experts” are prevalent. Al-
though this sort of deliberation may be useful to the public as its members are
forming opinions about various issues, it seems implausible that it could serve the
role of a legitimate legislative body.
Even if direct democratic deliberation is impossible in most cases, it may be
possible that deliberation among political representatives might approximate the re-
quirements on deliberation. One way in which a deliberative process among political
representatives might respect public opinion is if it gives equal consideration to the
reasons and arguments for various policy positions held by the people. Additionally
18Fiskin has written much about his experiments with deliberation among actual citizens. For
an introduction to this project see his 2009 book When the People Speak.
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a rational deliberation process purports to give equal consideration to the interests
of members of the public by being concerned only with the common good or pub-
lic interest. I will consider several interpretations of deliberative democracy that
I think are natural readings of deliberative theory compatible with political repre-
sentation and I will examine how well they promote self-governance. Here I will
explicitly consider the work of Jurgen Habermas (1992), Joshua Cohen (1989), and
Philip Pettit (1997). Although these authors all have distinct views of deliberative
democracy, different interpretations of their views can cause them to either diverge
or converge. I think that these views, as well as most deliberative democratic views,
converge to one of two distinct interpretations of deliberative democracy depend-
ing upon how they are explicated. Therefore, I will attempt to formulate different
versions of deliberative democracy independently from the authors who purport to
support them, though I will mention their views when they are relevant. I think
that one interpretation is not adequately democratic and the other interpretation
requires that representatives make use of public opinion in a way similar to what I
will describe in this dissertation.
The first interpretation of deliberative democracy treats reasoned discourse as
the primary mode of legitimating social decisions, a process that can be adequately
carried out by political representatives. This interpretation arises most naturally
out of Pettit’s Republicanism, but I think it is also a natural consequence of Haber-
mas’ and Cohen’s views if an attempt is made to make their idealized theories more
concrete. Specifically, it arises from Cohen’s (with Sabel, 1997) notion of delibera-
tive “Polyarchy” and Habermas’ discursive democracy when the deliberative ideal
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is treated as a hypothetical condition that legislation must meet, rather than a de-
scription of the decision process. This interpretation of deliberative democracy is
not sufficiently democratic.
The second interpretation arises from a treatment of the idealized condition of
deliberative democratic theory treated as a model of the decision process; I specifi-
cally have in mind Habermas’ discursive democratic model and Cohen’s variant of
this. However, I think that Pettit’s Republicanism can also be interpreted in a sim-
ilar way. Discursive politics requires that deliberation happen at two primary levels
within society: in a formal setting among political officials and in an informal (and
unconstrained) setting among all members of the public.19 Although policy deci-
sions are made by the formal process within political institutions, in order for such
a system to be democratic there must be some means by which deliberation at the
informal level affects deliberation (and consequently decisions) at the formal level.
A reasonable explication of this process requires that public opinion be involved in
institutional (and especially legislative) deliberations and decisions. Although all
three authors mention that public opinion should play some role in legislative de-
liberation, they do not describe in significant detail how this actually should take
place. Therefore, the theory of political representation and the duties of those repre-
sentatives that I will provide in the next chapter might simply act as an explication
19Cohen and Fung (2004) place particular importance on deliberation among citizens rather than
within a formal legislature, and their “Radical” democratic system places some formal constraints
on the deliberation that takes place in the public. They imagine that deliberation among political
officials within a legislature only has the purpose of providing suggestions and direction about the
subject matter that should be discussed within the local deliberative forums open to all citizens. In
many ways this instantiates the general will, and therefore does seem to allow for self-governance.
However, I have doubts about how likely it is that such a system could adequately govern a large
modern state.
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of this view. In this way, I see the second interpretation as being closely related to
a political system that requires self-governance through the use of public opinion by
political officials.
The first interpretation of deliberative democracy places too much emphasis
on legislative deliberation about interests at the costs of the actual policy opinions
of the public. If committed to this interpretation, deliberative democrats would
advance a substantive view of political representation that is undemocratic. Delib-
erative democrats often describe democracy such that there is no requirement that
policy decisions are clearly linked to the wills, opinions, or attitudes of the people;
they typically only require that people have some rational recourse against policies
with which they disagree. However, without a link between the people and the
method of policy choice itself, a political system cannot properly be called demo-
cratic. Rather, what is left is a rational social decision procedure with a stated
end of advancing the common good or interest. But this ignores the value of self-
governance, because it withholds from the people the right to have their considered
policy opinions involved in the eventual decision.
Consider a political system in which the identities of those political repre-
sentatives who present arguments as well as how they eventually vote are kept a
secret from the public. There is some reason to think that such decisions would
tend to be more rational, and better point to the public good, than those that are
totally transparent to the public.20 Deliberative transparency may, for instance,
20See Stasavage (2004) for a discussion of the benefits and costs of transparency in policy for-
mation.
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force deliberators to argue for policy positions that they know to be inadvisable just
because some set of their constituents or political donors support those positions. It
is not necessary to imagine a hypothetical case in order to see this in action; many
bureaucratic bodies deliberate about which policies are in the common good, but
are largely opaque to the public. And legislative deals between political parties are
often struck in closed-door meetings. The deliberative democrat may claim that
all deliberation should be public, because the people should be made aware of the
reasons and arguments for the adoption of each policy. But this might be accommo-
dated by imagining that a transcript is produced at each deliberative meeting, one
which gives a complete account of the deliberation except with all names replaced
by random numerical labels. There is little room for inclusion of public opinion in
such deliberation, especially given that there is likely little public interest in some
of the more mundane decisions made by bureaucracies, but as long as the delibera-
tive process is guided by reasons and the public good this would seem to fulfill the
deliberative ideal. However, all links between the public and the government are
lost in this case, and members of the public are no longer able to effect change in
the adoption of policies through the expression of their opinions and their votes,
because they have no means of determining just how their representatives argue
and vote. This would not even satisfy the conditions for minimal democracy. Such
a system seems unsatisfactory from a democratic point of view. Of course, such
a process may be perfectly adequate for administrative and bureaucratic decision
making, but it is not adequate for a legislative process.
Pettit (1997) emphasizes an aspect of Republicanism that may be important
40
to the democratic credentials of deliberative democracy: individuals need to have
avenues to contest public decisions that run contrary to their opinions on the issue.21
Therefore, there should be some rational process in which public officials must defend
their decisions to the public, as well as give public hearing to policy opinions of the
public and the reasons that back them. In this way, members of the public might
influence public decision making if they are able to provide arguments that are
convincing to the legislative members. Although this opens the forum to the public,
it subordinates the rational decision making of the public to that of the legislature. I
think this is a crucial criticism of this type of deliberative democracy. The currency
of deliberation is argumentation, and all members of the public are free to give
arguments that will be treated equally. However, the value of arguments are judged
from the top-down. In a system that is strongly deliberative rather than populist,
decisions are made by legislators after they appraise the available arguments; when
public opinion is largely ignored, then the legislators are permitted to be at the
helm of an oligarchy with respect to the appraisal of arguments. I will argue that
in order to avoid such an oligarchy the opinions of the public must be included into
the deliberative process. When these opinions are the fair judgments of the public
about what is in the common good or interest, they should be given standing in
their own right.
The second (more populist) interpretation of deliberative democracy provides
an opportunity to include reasoned public opinion in the public decision process.
Habermas, for instance, discusses two “tracks” of deliberation within society: a for-
21Specifically, see pp. 183-200.
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mally constrained type that takes place within political institutions and the informal
type that takes place within the public. An important aspect of the theory is the
flow of opinion between areas of formal and informal deliberation. Cohen (1999)
has concerns about how effective such a flow might possibly be. Habermas himself
seems to concentrate on the flow from the informal to the formal deliberative sys-
tems, especially in the case of important social movements. But Cohen thinks that
this would limit, to an unreasonable extent, the degree to which the public could
affect legislative deliberations. Similar in many ways to Fiskin’s (2009) deliberative
procedure, Cohen imagines a deliberative system he calls a “directly-deliberative
polyarchy,” in which many public decisions are made by deliberative bodies com-
posed of members of the public, whereas general guidance and direction is given
by a legislature. As I described above, I am skeptical of the capability of public
deliberative bodies to make decisions in large societies, but I think that Cohen is
correct that there must be more attention given to just how the results of informal
deliberation in the public might flow up to formal deliberative bodies, and especially
legislative ones. In the next chapter, I will propose one such a method by which this
upward flow might occur. I think this is compatible with the second interpretation
of deliberative democracy that I have described here, but is more easily captured
by the view I described earlier in this chapter based upon the general will.
I will return to the role of deliberation in democracies in section 6.2.2, after I
have presented my models of political representation and public opinion.
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2.2 Respect for public opinion
What I have sought to do in this chapter is show that democratic political
institutions should foster respect for the opinions of the public. I have prepared
the way for my discussion, in the next chapter, of how exactly they should do this:
roughly stated, political representatives should integrate public opinion into their
deliberation and decision procedures. Although I think this is the case generally,
this is especially important for legislative institutions to properly be considered
democratic. Additionally, this respect should even extend to those opinions that are
rationally opaque from the representative’s perspective. Although most deliberative
democrats would accept that arguments provided by members of the public should
be respected, it is typically important that reasons and arguments are attached to
public opinion when it flows up to the legislative process. I will claim that the very
fact that the public comes to some opinion about some policies gives the legislative
body reason to respect that opinion; by doing so, the legislature respects the people
as sovereign in themselves and capable of coming to reasoned decisions without
further rational assessment by the legislature.
All that I will attempt to show is that there should be a presumption that
public opinion should be integrated into the decision process. Of course, there will
sometimes be overriding considerations against using public opinion; for instance,
if it advocates the violation of civil liberties or it is clear that the public is badly
misinformed about a matter of great importance. And I am not advocating for
a purely populist principle, whereby public opinion should be generally followed
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without modification. As I described earlier in this chapter, I think that public
officials play a vital role in using a deliberative process to decide upon policy that
accords with the general will, and consequently aims at the common good. This
will require a decision process that includes public opinion as an input, but is not
fully exhausted by it.
One core consideration in favor of the presumption is based upon the exis-
tence of rational peer disagreement. To begin with, it should not be assumed that
legislators are significantly more competent reasoners or have significantly better
access to true information relevant to policy decisions than the public, at least not
in the manner that adults are significantly better reasoners than children.22 Such
a large distinction in basic rational capabilities and access to relevant facts would
undermine the very basis of popular sovereignty; when some small subset of the pop-
ulation is truly superior in some major respect to others in society then the grounds
for equal rights to political participation become weaker. There have been some
doubts as to whether most members of the public possess the basic sophistication
required to make policy decisions.23 And some have worried that such a disparity
in competencies risks undermining the bases for the basic principle of popular gov-
ernance in democracy (Friedman, 2006). But research into the supposed “wisdom
of the crowd” should create skepticism about whether a single legislator could be a
better judge of whether a policy advances the common good than her constituents
22I take this assumption from Dahl (1991), though I take it to be widely held.
23This is the classic view of Lippmann (1922), that was revitalized by empirical work following
after Philip Converse’s (1964) classic studies. Also see Converse and Markus (1979). Notice how
this is distinct from Schumpeter’s (1950) criticisms of democracy that focus on the unwillingness
of the public to devote attention to questions of public policy.
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as a group. For instance, large diverse groups often collectively have access to in-
formation and expertise that is unlikely to be possessed by a single individual.24
Recent work in the study of public opinion surveys also provides some evidence for
the view that the public, again taken as a group, is relatively rational when choosing
between policies (Page and Shapiro, 1992). I have doubts about the general “wis-
dom” of groups when their judgments are unchecked by legislative deliberation, but
I think that this research should create skepticism about the general presumption
of an incompetent public.
If it is not clear that legislators are significantly more competent at making
policy decisions than the public, or even individual members of the public, dis-
agreements between legislators and the people should generally be taken as cases of
genuine peer disagreement. Such a view gains even more credibility after a lengthy
public deliberation about the policy issue has already taken place, and therefore it
does not seem that continued group reasoning could alter the opinion of the public.
Given that people bring different values and beliefs (as well as different priority
orderings over them) to the decision process, it is possible that different individuals
may arrive at different conclusions even if they all reason reasonably well. It is a
matter of controversy in social epistemology how exactly peer-disagreement should
be treated, but I think that it does give reason to back the presumption that officials
should respect public opinion.25
24This has been most popularized by Surowiecki (2005). Though the basic idea is similar to
Condorcet’s well known “Jury Theorem,” which proves that for a set of independent two-alternative
forced-choice judgments, the average of the that set approaches the correct response as the size of
the number of individuals making judgments (the size of the set) increases. See Lyon and Pacuit
(2013) for a useful introduction to the “wisdom of the crowd.”
25For instance, see Lackey (2008) for a discussion of this.
45
It is one matter whether institutions should be created that facilitate and
promote the respect for public opinion, but quite another whether individual play-
ers within those institutions have duties to act in accordance with purposes of the
institutions. Very few discussions substantively address the duties of individuals
within democratic institutions that otherwise meet the requirements of democratic
legitimacy (or are at least deemed democratically adequate). This is unfortunate,
because most questions of proper governance occur within existing political insti-
tutions that are at least partially democratic (and presumably at least partially
legitimate, justifiable, or adequate). Political officials must often decide how ex-
actly they should act within those democratic institutions. The guidance that does
exist is largely pragmatic in nature. For instance, the research in political science
that follows Mayhew’s (1974) classic analysis of rational political behavior of mem-
bers of Congress largely informs legislators how they can best stay in office. One
major purpose of this dissertation is to offer moral rather than practical guidance to
political representatives. It should also serve as guidance to members of the public
about what they should expect from their political representatives.
Like any other institutions, properly deliberative democratic institutions re-
quire the existence of officials who carry out the institutions purposes. In most
institutions, and certainly in most democracies, public officials take oaths that give
them a set of duties that they did not possess before taking office. It is uncon-
troversial that such explicitly acquired duties exist. However, the more interesting
duties, and the ones I am concerned with, are not explicitly stated within oaths
or contracts. They originate in the purposes of the officials’ positions. These pur-
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poses can be multifaceted, ill-defined, and often controversial; sometimes they may
actually be indeterminate or incoherent. I will have to argue that they are implicit
within the concept of an official’s role in the democratic institution, and thus ac-
quired upon taking office. This is decidedly harder than showing that duties listed
explicitly in oaths are acquired by officials taking those oaths, but I will attempt to
give a version of this duty that is weak enough to be necessitated by any adequate
democratic institution. In the next chapter, I will introduce the “Duty of Political
Responsiveness,” and will attempt to suitably describe what exactly it requires of
political officials, and especially political representatives within democracies. It will
turn out to require that those political officials subject to it respect public opinion in
some way appropriate to the position they possess and the institution in which they
serve. In representative institutions the notion of ‘respect’ I will support requires
political representatives to be “responsive” to public opinion. In the next chapter I
will further explicate just what this means.
47
Chapter 3: Political Responsiveness
In this chapter my primary goal will be to describe and explain the significance
of political responsiveness by political representatives. In the last chapter I argued
that representative democracies must feature political officials who respect public
opinion when making their policy decisions, and that this requirement is best based
in the principle of a self-governance. It also constrains what can be meant by
‘respect’: it requires that political officials integrate public opinion into the policy
decision process. This amounts to them being responsive to the public.
3.1 The duty of political responsiveness
At this point it will help to introduce a technical version of ‘respect’. Label
the specific notion of ‘respect’ that I will be concerned with as ‘respectO’. This form
of respect requires that public opinion be integrated into policy decisions. The rest
of this dissertation will show how this integration can be made coherent.
First I will specify an institutional requirement for a system of government to
be democratic: In order for representative democracies to instantiate the require-
ment of self-governance, and thus be appropriately democratic, the following duty
must exist for some set of officials within the government:
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Duty of Political Responsiveness Representative officials have a prima facie
duty to respectO public opinion when making policy decisions.
Within most political systems this will be a moral duty rather than a legal
one. There are many reasons why it is best that certain duties possessed by political
officials (as well as others) are not codified into the legal system; a moment’s thought
will reveal that the prospect of legal sanction for not being responsive to constituents
may cause representatives to always act directly according to public opinion rather
than just respecting it. Given what I have argued in the previous chapter, that
would be undesirable.
One may certainly deny that any officials have the above duty, but as I argued
in the previous chapter such a denial is not consistent with democratic decision
making. I think that in most cases those who would deny the existence of this
duty simply make a mistake about what it means. For instance, there are many
public officials within modern democracies, such as judges and generals, who have
traditionally made great effort to ignore public opinion. This is not a problem for
my view, as I claim that there is only a duty of responsiveness for some set of
officials; designate them “representative officials”.1 It is also consistent with this
duty that some overriding considerations may give representatives reason to totally
ignore public opinion; this could still constitute respectO for public opinion.
Given what I have argued in the first chapter, I take the following to be a
1This is a broader category than “political representatives.” That term likely only contains
members of legislatures, but I conceive of representative officials as possibly also containing officials
who are not explicitly granted representative and/or legislative authority, such as members of the
Bureaucracy.
49
necessary requirement of any political system to be democratic:
Minimal Populism A political system can be considered democratic only if there
is some class of public officials who have significant control over policy for-
mation and who are generally obligated to abide by the Duty of Political
Responsiveness.
This condition is distinct from a common definition of ‘populism’ as the ex-
pression of the popular will through voting behavior.2 As I will show in section 3.3.1,
I think that voting behaviors toward political candidates are poor measures of the
“popular will” about public policies, at least insofar as “popular will” is equivalent
to “public opinion”.3 I take “popular will” and “public opinion” to be collective
psychological phenomena, and not merely behavioral ones. Therefore, my concept
of minimal populism runs deeper than the standard view from voting. An early ob-
jection here may stem from this equivocation of ‘will’ and ‘opinion’. I will explain
why this is reasonable in the next chapter.
Given that Minimal Populism is only a necessary condition for a political
system to be democratic, there are a host of other requirements that might also
be necessary for any given political system to be considered democratic. Minimal
Democrats place requirements on elections, and Deliberative Democrats likewise
require that all policy be subject to deliberation and be contestable. Both of these
2I think this is typically how William Riker’s influential definition of populism expressed in
Liberalism against Populism, chap. 1 is interpreted, but it is more explicitly defined by Richardson
(2002), pg. 58.
3Note that “popular will” is distinct from the “general will” that I discussed in the last chap-
ter. “Popular will” is a more general term that is often used to express something like “policy
preferences” in modern political science and philosophy. I will not seek to regiment it here as I
have done with “general will.”
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constraints are consistent with Minimal Populism. If it is also assumed, as it often is,
that only democratic political systems can be legitimate then this is also a necessary
condition of a legitimate political system. I, however, will not defend that claim. In
this chapter I will concentrate on a defense of Minimal Populism against a number
of problems that arise when attempting to integrate public opinion into a decision
procedure that also includes measures of expected well-being or interests, or some
(other) measure of the common good. As I will show, the possibility and coherence of
such a decision procedure is doubted by many; overcoming these doubts will require
the development of a relatively sophisticated model of public opinion. Although
particular details of this model may be shown to be incorrect without threatening
my wider argument, the correctness of its basic features are vital for the plausibility
of Minimal Populism.
Abiding by a duty to be responsive does not itself require that an official utilize
some particular policy decision procedure. The duty as I have specified may admit
a large set of possible decision methods. I will argue that an attractive, and perhaps
best, model of this is a weighing procedure between public opinion and what the
official takes to be in the public’s best interest. However, this is not obvious on its
face. Perhaps public opinion should act as a veto, or an initial screening device of
policy alternatives. Additionally, deliberative democrats may argue for a role that is
less straight-forwardly decision theoretic; for instance, they may require that public
opinion sets the topics about which political officials deliberate. There is a further
complexity that most policies are decided by some group of officials who represent
different constituencies within society. Policy decisions have strategic elements as
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well; if an official wants the government to adopt a policy most aligned with the
opinion and interests of her constituents then it may sometimes be best for her to
vote for policies that are not most preferred by (or in the best interests of) her
constituents. Therefore, the decision procedure for a political representative may
require elements of game theory as well as standard decision theory. I will largely
avoid such issues, though will touch on them briefly in chapter 6.
The balancing procedure of policy decision is at least implicitly the ortho-
dox view of political representation for liberal democracies. The most systematic
description of this view comes from chapter 9 of Hannah Pitkin’s classic work on
political representation, The Concept of Representation. However, It must be em-
phasized that the balancing procedure is truly only implicit in Pitkin’s work. She
argues that most modern theories of political representation are faced with a conflict
between requiring political representatives to follow the mandate given to them by
their constituents and the independence those representatives have to do what they
think is in the best interests of their constituents.4 If representatives ignore their
mandates, which require them to act in accord with the wishes of their constituents,
then there is no real sense in which they are representing their constituents at all;
rather they are ruling them, and an election is simply a tool to decide who should
rule. On the other hand, if representatives ignore their independence and always
act according to the wishes of their constituents then there is a sense in which they
are not representatives at all, but simply are agents playing a similar representative
4There is slightly different language than that used in political science to describe the differ-
ent behavioral “styles” of political representation, though they are largely equivalent to Pitkins
distinctions. See Weßels (2007) for a discussion of how these different styles are categorized in
political science. Achen (1978) provides a more formal presentation of representation styles.
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role as a lawyer who files a lawsuit on behalf of someone or a police officer serving a
warrant on behalf of the state. Agents use their best judgment only in cases when
they are not explicitly instructed to do otherwise. However, their actions are always
subject to direct control or overriding by clients. Pitkin argues that as the concept
“political representative” is used it cannot be restricted to one or the other of these
extremes. Rather, a political representative must balance between these two, using
both the mandate given by her constituents as well as her own judgment about what
would be best for her constituents.
Pitkin calls the balancing view of political representation liberal representa-
tion. This view takes its name from the “liberal” views of thinkers such as James
Madison, especially in the Federalist Papers, rather than later “political liberals”
such as John Rawls.5 Madison described the two elements of political representation
as a key to the new American legislative system, with regular elections making a
mandate salient to representatives, while they retain broad legislative powers that
permit them independence. Additionally, the two parts of congress were designed
to operate at different points along the mandate-independence spectrum, with the
Senate’s indirect elections and longer terms permitting it more independence than
the House of Representatives. Madison’s primary concerns, however, were those of
institutional design; he sought to give representatives incentives to abide by certain
standards of political representation. My own concerns, and I think Pitkin’s as well,
are the proper actions of representatives independent of the incentives that may
5Of particular importance for this are Federalist Papers #51- #58, #62, and #63 .
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exist within an institution.6 For instance, someone who takes herself to be a rep-
resentative of her constituency must surely be doing something against the norms
of that office if she always acts in favor of those who can give her the larger cam-
paign contributions. This is the case even within an institution with few safeguards
against such actions. She is also likely acting wrongly. Of course, some legislative
institutions are structured such that “constituents” have no expectation that their
“representatives” will in fact be responsive to them. However, according to Minimal
Populism, when no such institution exists to serve the role of responsiveness then
that system of government should not properly be called a democracy.
An explanation of the mandate-independence spectrum does not make very
clear how exactly political representatives should “respect” public opinion. I will
argue that the balancing procedure should be modeled by a weighing (in a mathe-
matical sense) of a representative’s mandate against her independence.7 I think that
the other natural models of policy choice are unsatisfactory. Later in this chapter
I will give a formal analysis of the weighing procedure that must be used to bal-
ance a representative’s mandate against her independence. But it will be useful to
first consider the obvious alternatives to the weighing conception of this procedure
first; the reasons why such methods are not acceptable will shape how the weighing
procedure should be formulated. The general theme that will run throughout my
criticisms is that political decisions by political officials require relatively rich infor-
6Also see Brennan and Hamlin (2000) for an in-depth analysis of representation and institutional
structure.
7The weighing conception of decision is well-known in decision theory, though often vaguely
formulated. For a very recent discussion of the weighing conception, see John Broome’s recent
book, Rationality Through Reasons, pg. 52.
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mation sources, whereas many standard decision procedures are rather information
poor. The outputs of such information-poor procedures are therefore incapable of
distinguishing between choice situations that intuitively should produce very dif-
ferent decisions. As I will argue, I think that only a weighing procedure between
different cardinal measures of public opinion and common good is capable of ade-
quately representing the sorts of decisions political officials are often faced with.
3.1.1 Other policy decision models
I will consider two kinds of alternatives to the weighing conception of the
balancing procedure: “ordinal” aggregate models and deliberative models. First I
will consider what I will call ordinal decision models. Some decision theorists object
to the weighing (or balancing) of reasons in choice models.8 One alternative to a
weighing procedure is the use of only ordinal components in the decision procedure.9
For instance, a political representative might include the fact that her constituents
prefer some policy alternative x over another y and both of them over z in her
policy decision, but not any measure of the magnitude of these preferences or the
differences between those magnitudes. Such a limitation significantly constrains the
role that public opinion might play within a policy procedure, and results in public
opinion only modifying policy decisions in several rigid ways. Although there is
a large set of possible ordinal decision rules that differ in their exact application
and interpretation, for instance “preemption” and “override,” they all share some
8For instance, see Horty (2012), pp. 2-5.
9Many systems of legal reasoning are compatible with purely ordinal forms of reasoning; for
instance Joseph Raz’s (1999) system of legal reasoning. However, most legal theorists do not
consider in detail whether their system of reasoning is purely ordinal.
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general problems.
Public opinion might preempt policy decisions by excluding rankings that some
large proportion of individuals disagree with. For instance, if some large majority
ranks a single policy alternative last in a set of policies under consideration (so prefer
all alternatives to it), then that alternative may be excluded from consideration by
the representative. Alternatively, public opinion may override the decision of a
representative for similar reasons. Morality and law are rational systems that are
often represented in this fashion, and my claims do not necessarily extend to those
domains. But I do not think that the ordinal model is adequate for policy decisions.
The primary reason for this is the way in which fine-grain differences in polices seem
to matter quite a bit in policy decision.
Probably the most common examples of fine-grained policy choices come from
cost-benefit analysis. Costs and benefits typically have clear cardinal significance,
and the elimination of that significance seems to distort the overall analysis. Con-
sider the set of policies x, y, z, and associate each alternative with a cost in number
of lives lost over a year (or some other quantity) as a result of the policies: x:1000
lives lost, y:100 lives lost, z:10 lives lost. Preferences for these outcomes can be rep-
resented by the order z  y  x. But certainly the following statement about the
sizes of the differences in preferences are also significant, where u(ϕ) is the cardinal
(numerical) expression of the preference for ϕ:
[u(y)− u(x)] > [u(z)− u(y)]
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Note that if these numbers were simply subjective numerical expressions of
preference — perhaps numbers individuals selected themselves to represent their
cardinal preferences over the set of alternatives — then such a statement about
the differences would not likely be significant, at least not without good theoretical
reasons to think that they can be interpreted in this fashion. But lives lost have a
natural cardinal significance, and it is unreasonable to think that an ordinal model
of balancing could adequately represent an interaction between public opinion and
such a cost-benefit analysis.
Using the above example, it can easily be seen what makes an ordinal balancing
procedure problematic. Assume that the public preference over the policies can be
represented by the ranking x  y  z. Furthermore, to make matters simpler,
stipulate that this is a near unanimous ranking. How might representatives use
this information? As I already stated, they might exclude z from consideration,
because it is ranked lowest by the public. Or because there is near unanimous
agreement among the public that x is the best, they may simply choose x. I think
that such a decision is impossible or will implicitly involve cardinal information of
public opinion. The first question I think representatives would ask themselves is
about the strength of the public favoring x over y; if there are stirrings in the public
of a very strong preference of x over y (and I will address below how this might
actually be measured), then it might be reasonable to choose x at the cost of 900
lives. But this would seem to be a horribly misguided choice if x were barely (though
nearly unanimously) favored over y. I think a careful reflection on different domains
in which policies must be chosen will reveal a similar structure.
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The ordinal methods of balancing that I have described also implicitly intro-
duce cardinality in the conditions of the application of public opinion in the decision
(or the application of whatever criteria are balanced against public opinion). For
instance, public opinion about some alternative pair might only override the judg-
ments of officials when more than 70% of the public agrees on the ranking of those
alternatives. But this in itself constitutes an estimate of some sort of difference of
magnitudes of social preferences, albeit only two classes of differences (those that are
greater than or equal to the threshold and those that are lower). The advantage of
this level of cardinality is that it is clear where the magnitudes come from; they are
just the different numbers of people supporting various rankings of the alternatives.
But I think this returns to the first problem I suggested with the ordinal balancing
method; it does not provide the sort of information that seems necessary for policy
decisions. For the reasons I give above, just two classes of preference magnitude dif-
ferences are not enough to balance against the sort of cardinal information common
in cost-benefit analyses.
One might attempt to infer more classes of preference differences from informa-
tion about the number of people who support a given preference ranking. This just
requires the inference of social preference magnitude differences from the number of
individuals with various social orders, which is a different method for obtaining the
cardinal information about preferences than what I will present here, but nonethe-
less it abandons the ordinal framework. However, such a method has implications
for the practical implementation of the sort of public opinion measurement method
I suggest here, and so I address it in section 6.2.1.
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The second category of alternative decision procedures comes from delibera-
tive democratic theory, which I introduced in section 2.1.3. One interpretation of
Habermas’ discursive democratic theory, for instance, requires that informal delib-
eration in the public “flows” up to the formal deliberation process amongst political
representatives. I generally accept the basic structure of this view, but many delib-
erative democrats may be committed to thinking that this information flow can only
be in the form of deliberatively relevant information: primarily arguments, reasons,
and topics of importance. This is the aspect of the procedure that will be prob-
lematic if it is hoped to allow for self-governance, which I have argued is necessary
for democracy. A second related type of deliberative process comes from Cohen’s
concept of “radical democracy”, where general items of concern are decided on by
political representatives, but details are decided by deliberations amongst members
of the public.10 The “radical” feature of this view is the fact that most particular
decisions are made within deliberative sessions among the public. Political officials
are primarily tasked with a certain amount of direction of public deliberation, which
might also be construed as agenda setting (to use a term from social choice theory).11
This notion of deliberative democracy is clearly democratic. Additionally, it seems
to satisfy Minimal Populism as I defined it above, because people are in a sense
their own representatives. Therefore, it will be instructive to see how a system of
government that satisfies minimal populism might be undesirable for other reasons;
most importantly, for being too populist.
10See Cohen and Fung (2004).
11In social choice theory, agenda setting is typically taken to be a form of manipulation. However,
one might also think of it as important to any public deliberation so that the most important issues
are discussed. This is its use in “radical democracy.”
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Both of Habermas’ and Cohen’s decision procedures integrate public opinion
into the decision. Habermas’ procedure permits public opinion to form the backdrop
against which deliberation by political officials occurs, whereas Cohen’s view makes
deliberation by the public the primary source of eventual decisions. As I argued in
the last chapter, I think that Habermas’ view gives far too little respect to public
opinion as a source of considered policy judgments of the public, whereas Cohen’s
gives far too much respect to those judgments. Referencing the goal of the general
will that I introduced in the last chapter, Habermas’ procedure will fail to get at
the general will, because the procedure fails to find its source in the sovereign will
of the people. Habermas’ deliberative “flow” is only concerned with the arguments
and reasons given by the people and not with their considered judgments (their
opinions). Therefore, it fails to instantiate the general will.
Argument forms and reasons for accepting the truth of their premises need not
be attached to individuals, at least not when they are publicly acceptable (and thus
admissible within deliberation), and so wills of the people themselves never enter into
the deliberative procedure itself. This is much like Edmund Burke’s conception of
political representation, in which representatives are thought to present the interests
of their constituents as abstract and therefore fully detached from the individuals
who have them.12 But Burke’s view is most decidedly non-democratic, at least to
modern readers. I think Habermas’ view suffers from a similar problem, but perhaps
an even worse case of it than Burke’s view. In rational deliberation, arguments
12See Pitkin’s (1967) discussion of Burke’s views on representation in chapter 8 of Concept of
Representation. Burke does not present a single coherent picture of political representation in any
of his writings and therefore it is rather difficult to piece together without the help of secondary
sources.
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and reasons that originate from the public are not given any special status; all
rational considerations must be treated equally for the process to be considered
rational. When this is the case, and political officials rather than the people are
in the position to judge the relative merits of various arguments and reasons, then
small but articulate and intelligent private interest groups will often deserve more
support than much larger groups of citizens who possess lesser rational capabilities.
From a purely deliberative standpoint this is a desirable outcome, because the better
argument expressed by a tiny majority is able to win the day. However, when such
arguments are the only means by which the people are able to affect the decision
process, the system can rightly be called democratic no more than Burke’s view of
political representation.
Cohen’s view of radical democracy obviously meets the requirements of Min-
imal Populism, but is inadequate for another instructive reason. In the radical
democratic framework most important political decisions, especially those of local
importance, are made by deliberative groups of average citizens. Even assuming
that none of the standard practical problems with such massively deliberative sys-
tems arise in this case, Cohen’s democratic model fails to take into account the role
that political officials have in using their expertise and position within a profes-
sional deliberative body to point the direction of policy toward the public interest.
This directedness is important to avoid policy decisions that merely aim at some
aggregate of preferences of the members of society, something akin to the will of
all, rather than the general will. Additionally, local deliberation will never be able
to resolve issues of regional or national concern. This will, it seems, again require
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deliberation among political representatives, given that in modern societies large
national programs are particularly important for the lives of citizens.
I have considered both decision theoretic alternatives to the weighing proce-
dure (preemption and overrule) and deliberative alternatives. However, I have not
presented any details of what a weighing procedure involving public opinion might
look like. In fact, there are likely many ways by which a weighing procedure could
be modeled. In the next section, I will provide what I think is a reasonable for-
mal representation of the procedure by which political representatives might weigh
public opinion against their estimates of what is in their constituents’ best interests.
3.2 A model of policy choice
My purpose so far has been to show the necessity of a weighing conception
of policy decision by political representatives. For representatives to respectO pub-
lic opinion, they must use a weighing procedure that utilizes cardinal information
about both public opinion and their constituents’ well-being (as estimated by the
representatives). Next I will present a formal specification of such a weighing pro-
cedure consistent with the Duty of Political Responsiveness.13 Specifically this is a
model in which both public opinion (representing the mandate) and the expected
welfare produced by the policy (representing independence) are weighed against one
another. I will use expected welfare measures as a stand-in for a measurement of
13The duty is general enough such that there are many specific models likely comply with it.
Therefore, there may be better models than the one I provide here. However, I think the one I
present here is intuitive and provides a suitable test-case for the duty and exhibits a number of
important problems that I think will be common to most possible decision procedures.
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what is in the common good. I do this for convenience, and because welfare is a
concept that is (relatively) easily represented with expected utility measures. Note
that the model I present here only covers a subset (public opinion and expected wel-
fare) of the total set of possible decision criteria relevant to policy choice. Morality,
for instance, may provide either weight for some policies or act to override the result
of such a weighing procedure.14 Therefore, the model I present here should only be
thought of as one piece of a potentially much larger decision procedure.
The following are the basic elements of a procedure that weighs public opinion
against an official’s beliefs about what is in the interests of her constituency.15
I Constituency of the official, which contains a set of individuals I1, I2, I3... ∈ I.
Fi Set of policies available to the official’s choice, where alternatives x, y, z... ∈ Fi
Oi Set of outcomes that could result from the choice of a policy, o1, o2, o3... ∈ Oi
P(Fi) Set of subjective probability distributions of the official over the set Oi, for
each member of the set of policies Fi by the official. For example, Px(Oi) ∈ P(Fi)
is the probability distribution that results from the adoption of the policy x
over the set of outcomes Oi
IFi The collective preference function of individuals in I over the alternatives
within Fi.
16
14This is especially likely if one uses a non-utilitarian moral theory, because there will need to
be some way to account for the rights of individuals that are not themselves based upon utility or
preference. This is a sort of “laundering” of the outputs of the social decision (Goodin, 1995).
15One could represent this with any standard decision theoretic model, for instance that of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963), though that would require some work.
16Note that I will use ‘alternative’ as a general technical term that can be any item within a
preference function.
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IO The official’s estimate of the preference function for individuals in I over the
outcomes within Oi based upon well-being.
The set of alternatives that is immediately under consideration by an official
(Fi) is only a subset of all possible alternatives. This will be adequate for an expla-
nation of the basic model, but in chapter 5 it will be necessary to consider the entire
set of alternatives under consideration within the same choice context. I will explain
choice contexts in more detail later, but a choice context can be thought of as a
set of policies about a similar topic or attempting to solve a similar problem. For
instance, a set of possible alternative health care systems would likely be contained
in a single choice context, and a set of policies that advocated various foreign poli-
cies would likely be contained in another. Later, I will require that all alternatives
within a single context could theoretically be placed along a single cardinal utility
scale, something that may be impossible across choice contexts. Therefore, define
a set of terms that allows for representation of choice contexts:
F The set of all possible alternatives that could be under consideration (over all
possible choice contexts).
Di A choice context, such that there is some set Di ⊆ F
D Set of all choice contexts.
O Set of all possible outcome sets Oi.
In this model every official has some constituency (I) that serves as the in-
formation base for all questions of public opinion and interest. The identity of the
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constituency may depend both upon explicit norms within the political system as
well as a more comprehensive theory of political representation. Within most democ-
racies, explicit norms of constituent identity typically track the set of individuals
eligible to vote for the representative in elections; so for instance, a U.S. Senator has
an explicit constituency that contains all adult citizens of her U.S. state, whereas a
member of the House of Representatives only has an explicit constituency contain-
ing adult citizens in her house district.17 However, in the U.S. there seems to exist
a non-explicit norm that makes the public opinion and interests of all individuals
within a representative’s own state more relevant to her decisions than those outside
her state. Given that my model here is not restricted to political representatives
in legislatures, it may also include constituents of various government agencies and
officials within those agencies. Although it is true that most agencies in principle
serve all citizens or residents served by a particular government, it would be unlikely
that many agencies would make such broad inquiries into the opinions and interests
of all those individuals. Rather, agencies are typically called to pay special attention
to those individuals who have significant stake in the policy decisions the officials
make.
Other more foundational reasons might lead officials to take certain views
about contents of I. For instance, someone who holds the Burkian view of political
representation (which I mentioned earlier) would hold that political representatives
17Here I ignore the further complexity presented by children, incapacitated persons, or those
who are otherwise ineligible to vote. In the American context, the most interesting are the cases
of non-citizen residents and felons who have lost the right to vote. Even though such individuals
cannot vote, their interests and opinions seem to command some weight in the decisions of public
officials.
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should not privilege the interests of the members of their districts, but rather should
always consider the interests of all members of the state. Although Edmund Burke
thought that an important role of a representative was to represent the interests of
the members of her district within the legislature, this did not mean that the repre-
sentative should pursue those interests at the cost of the interests of those outside
her district.18 Therefore, a Burkian concept of constituency is far broader than the
concept typically employed in American politics. Phenomena such as those above
hint at a complex weighting procedure that officials should use when determining
the relative influence of different individuals on their decisions. However, such a pro-
cedure could be added to the model I provide here, and does not seriously hinder
the argument I will make.
Every constituency (I) is represented as having a social preference function
over various sets of alternatives. Any constituency has such functions over many
different sets of alternatives within different choice contexts in the set of all possible
alternatives D; therefore, it need not be assumed that all possible alternatives are
comparable. Outcomes (in O) can be defined in a multitude of ways, though it is
likely simplest to think of them as descriptions of possible worlds. And although
these outcomes must be described in a fashion detailed enough to adequately deter-
mine their effects on the constituency, and thus the resultant social welfare function
over outcomes, they need not be completely described possible worlds. Many differ-
ences in possible worlds simply make no difference to welfare. Additionally, actual
18It should be noted that Burke would have denied that public opinion should ever be considered
by political representatives in making decisions.
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utility estimates (such as those from cost-benefit analysis) are never capable of dif-
ferentiating meaningfully between the relative goodness of possible worlds that are
too similar, nor the relative probabilities of possible worlds given each policy alter-
native. Any actual analysis will be a crude estimation of the expected utility of
some policy.
According to the concept of representative independence, political officials are
in part tasked with determining the most likely set of probability distributions (P)
given the set policy alternatives under consideration (Fi). This aspect of the model
is not likely to be controversial, though what specific use officials should make of
such a set of probability distributions is certain to be. Figure 3.1 shows a standard
choice situation for some official. Each policy (x, y, z ∈ F1) is associated with some
set of outcomes (O1) and a probability distribution over that set (P(F1)) . In the
figure, this distribution has been reduced to probability values over the three possible
outcomes (o1, o2, o3 ∈ O1), but in any more realistic case the set of possible outcomes
will be far larger. This small set of possible outcomes means that (P(F1)) can be
described in terms of three probability values over the set of possible outcomes for
each policy alternative ({pi, qi, 1− (pi + qi)}).
Given what I have already assumed, officials have at their disposal preference
functions by the public for both policies themselves (public opinion) as well as the
outcomes of those policies (expected welfare).19 There are a number of ways in
19Harsanyi (1982) theorizes about a similar distinction between utility derived from “moral pref-
erences” and “personal preferences.” He suggests that an individual may have a “moral” preference
for some policy that will nonetheless produce worse outcomes for that particular individual (an
outcome ranked lower by that individual’s “personal” preferences). For instance, the wealthy
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Figure 3.1: Expected welfare
which officials could use this information. Consider the method that relies entirely
upon the direct preferences of the public for the policies, thus ignoring the contents
of IO and P entirely. This would be similar to Cohen’s “radical democratic” view
(Cohen and Fung, 2004), whereby officials make the components of their welfare
calculations known to the public during some public deliberation on the topic, but
policy decisions are based upon public preferences alone. In the way I have formal-
recognizes that her and her family (which she may care most about) will be worse off under such
a tax system, thus her personal preferences rank higher taxes lower than the status quo. Harsanyi
thinks that the moral preferences of individuals will tend to assign equal weights to the well-being
of all individuals within the society, and thus will also tend to be identical. Although this last claim
does not seem plausible, Harsanyi’s general point is useful. Individuals possess different criteria for
evaluating policies, which produce distinct preference sets. And individuals are capable of using
these different preference sets within different choice contexts.
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ized the decision process here, such deliberation would just affect the contents of
IFi and not the decision process itself. Using such a method, the social decision is
some social choice function over Fi, utilizing only the information contained within
IFi ; this only abides by the Mandate given to officials by their constituents.
Alternatively, officials could ignore IFi and instead only use 
I
O and P . This
would maximize the Independence of officials, if it is assumed that the sole end for
which they should use their independence is to further the collective welfare (or
common good). This could also be reduced to a Harsanyi- style utilitarianism if the
officials used some averaging (or summation) function to determine the best out-
come. However, officials could also use a more complex function, such as maximin.20
The essential feature of their independence is not a specific choice function used to
make the decision, but rather the use of the expected welfare measure rather than
policy preferences to make policy decisions. Also note that these outcome prefer-
ences could take many forms, including measures of objective well-being, preferences
over the outcomes, counts of Sen-style capabilities or Rawlsian primary goods, or
the satisfaction of idealized preferences.21
It is not my intention to provide a complete explanation of how the expected
welfare of the constituents should be measured. In fact, not much should even be
read into my choice of ‘welfare’ to designate the subject of officials’ Independence.
I will largely ignore a number of important issues that arise when welfare or a
similar concept is used as a criterion of choice, but I think these can largely be
20The maximin function maximizes the utility of the individual with the least utility.
21The “capabilities approach” and “primary goods” serve central parts of Amartya Sen’s and
John Rawls’ views (respectively) of how well-being can be represented and compared across indi-
viduals. See Sen (1992), chapter 3 and Rawls (1971) chapter 2, section 15.
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compartmentalized. For instance, it is likely that officials should include future
welfare of members of the society in their calculations of welfare, but the future
welfare should be discounted against current welfare. How the future should be
discounted is a troubling question that any consequentialist view of policy choice
will likely encounter, but I only require that the measurement of welfare take certain
structural properties that permit its balancing with the policy opinions. And such
structural properties will be present regardless of how different sources of welfare
information are integrated to form the measure of total (or all-things-considered)
welfare.
Complete Independence for the official would require the public decision to be
fully determined by what that official believes to be in the best interests of the con-
stituents, assuming that it was the prescribed method to determine the interests of
the constituents. This dissertation is primarily a study of the role of public opinion
in decision making of public officials, and so I treat IO primarily as a placeholder.
However, several of its features will be important for my analysis. It must first be
shown that some social preference function over Fi can be calculable from IO and P
in order for the expected welfare of the public to be weighed against public opinion.
This is possible so long as IO is a cardinal utility function. Every alternative in
Fi is associated with a position in IFi as well as a set of probability assignments
over the set O. These probability assignments and the preference function IO allow
for a set of utility assignments over Fi to be calculated that meets the conditions
of expected utility theory, as long as it is assumed that it is meaningful to use the
probabilities P in such calculations in the first place. Label this new function:
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IO×P . In other words, officials are able to find a cardinal -value utility function over
the set of policy alternatives under consideration (Fi) that represents the official’s
best estimates of the expected welfare that would result from the adoption of those
alternatives. Remember, however, that this need not be a simple expected utility
function; it could be something more complex. However, for any standard utility
function that utilizes the probabilities found in P , it must be assumed that the re-
sulting function meets the requirements of expected utility theory, giving it cardinal
measureability. Therefore, the weighing model can be described very simply. Where
there are two positive weights wFi and wO on IFi and 
I
O×P respectively, the social
decision function f(ϕ) that balances the mandate and independence of the political
representative to find the utility assignment on (the alternative) ϕ is found by:22
f(ϕ) = wFi ×IFi(ϕ) + wO ×
I
O×P(ϕ)
As a formal matter of calculation this weighing procedure does not necessarily
require that either public opinion or expected welfare are along cardinal scales.
Weighing could be allowed if one or both of the scales are along ordinal scales
through something like a majoritarian social choice procedure. Assume that both
functions have ordinal measureability and the weights are positive integers, weights
can then be given the role of the number of “voters” possessing the preference
functions. So if the interests of individuals are given double the weight as public
22IFi and
I
O×P must both be associated with utility functions. However, if either of these utility
functions only have ordinal measureability then the result of f(ϕ) will be arbitrarily determined by
the particular way in which utility assignments are made. This is a formal way to understand the
requirement of cardinal measureability on both measures of public opinion and expected welfare.
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opinion in the weighing procedure, and:
I{x,y,z} = x  y  z
IO×P = z  y  x
The resultant ordering must be z  y  x. In fact, the resultant order-
ing of the weighing procedure with this set of weights must always be equal to
the ordering of the constituents’ expected welfare. And this example isn’t unique;
when there are only two criteria, any weighing will result in the direct adoption
of whichever component has greater weight. This results in a dictatorship of the
greater weighted criterion. As I argued earlier in this section, the weighing pro-
cedure must be sensitive to magnitudes of utility differences if the procedure is to
allow for large differences in criterion to overcome smaller differences in the other
criterion, even when the criterion with the smaller differences is weighed more than
the one with large differences. One complication of the cardinal weighing procedure
is that it seems to require that the different cardinal scales (public opinion, welfare,
etc.) are comparable. I deal with this in detail in section 6.1 when I present the full
weighing procedure.
The demandingness of the weighing conception may be seen by some as a
very good reason to reject it. However, I think that such a conclusion should be
resisted. I showed in section 3.1.1 that both ordinal and deliberative uses of public
opinion are unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the weighing conception has a great deal
of intuitive appeal, and is very influential in our everyday notions of how political
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officials should make decisions. It is certainly easy to imagine political officials
weighing magnitudes of public opinion against what will produce the greatest welfare
of their constituents during their decision process. It would seem odd that this
reasoning process is illusory or otherwise incapable of being modeled. And, as I
have already claimed, the common measures of welfare are often cardinal. A cost
difference between two policies of $4,000 is clearly significantly larger than $100,
and a difference in the loss of lives of 400 people is significantly larger than a loss
of 10. Exactly how these differences should be factored into the composite welfare
or interests measure contained in IO is not obvious, but I see this as exactly the
problem that modern cost-benefit analysis takes itself to address. Therefore, there
is reason to pursue the possibility that public opinion can be represented by using
cardinal measures , and that it is capable of being modeled as such. However, any use
of public opinion faces a number of serious problems, both from empirical research
in political science and conceptual research in social choice theory. In the next
section, I will evaluate a number of ways in which public opinion is measured in large
representative democracies. I conclude that most current methods produce only
ordinal representations of public opinion, and are thus not adequate for the weighing
conception of policy choice. Furthermore, public opinion appears to suffer from
serious problems of preference instability. This has made many question whether it
can be modeled with standard preference and attitudes representations that assume
preference stability. In the next chapter, I will begin a presentation of a public
opinion model that does meet the requirements of the weighing conception.
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3.3 The problems with measuring public opinion
If the political Mandate is to be taken seriously, then there must be some way
that political representatives come to know the contents of that Mandate. In the
next sections I will discuss a number of methods commonly employed by political
representatives (and others) to learn about the public opinion. I will use social-choice
theoretic analyses to show that these methods cannot possibly provide political
representatives with the information necessary to include public opinion within a
weighing procedure. However, the potential problem with public opinion runs deeper
than the methods currently used to measure it. A number of findings in political
science indicate that many members of the public are relatively ignorant about
many facts relevant to public policy debates. Additionally (and perhaps because
of their ignorance), most members of the public seem to exhibit “unstable” policy
opinions, which seem to change randomly through time. Consequently, it is of
great controversy in political science just how well-formed and well-informed public
opinion is; I will discuss this debate in section 3.4.
3.3.1 Voting
The 2008 U.S. presidential election had the highest national voter turnout
rates of any national U.S. election since the 1960s. For democratic theorists who
take voting to be the best measure of national public opinion, this seems to have
been a high water mark of public opinion measurement. Nonetheless, in the general
presidential election of 2008 only about 62% of eligible voters cast a ballot for
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president.23 And even on that day, voter turnout in many states failed to surpass
half of eligible voters. If election results are taken to instantiate in some way the
opinions of the people — all of the people — then actual voting behaviors seem
to put into serious question the foundations of the voting–centered concept of the
political Mandate.24
The voting apologists may attempt to exclude the preferences of non-voters.
One classic interpretation of voting behavior represents a vote as an indication that
a threshold of utility that voter associates with a given election result has been
met.25 This overcomes worries that voting is never rational, given the small chance
that any given individual’s vote is decisive. When an individual votes, this counts as
a measurement of their positive utility achieved from their act of voting, based upon
the likelihood that their vote is decisive, minus the negative utility of the act of voting
itself. If the negative utility associated with voting is known for each individual,
then voting does have some potential to provide some genuine information about the
utility each individual attributes to the attainment of the public decision at stake.
There have been criticisms of this general economic analysis of voting behaviors,
23This data comes from the United States Election Project (2012).
24There is a very old idea in American political thought, expressed by Jefferson and others, that
there is no expressed right to have one’s policy opinion included in policy deliberations, but rather
only have a right to an opportunity for such inclusions. Such a view would permit the exclusion
of many individuals from the measure of public opinion if they have not actively taken part in
the political process. This in part stems from the more literal active interpretation of the public
“will,” according to which the will of the people is some collective action. This contrasts with
the psychological interpretation of the will that I have provided. A similar view, though one not
reliant upon a concept of the public will, is expressed by Pettit’s republicanism (1997), in which
members of the public need only be given opportunities to contest the actions of government in
order for it to be democratically legitimate. It was these views that I attempted to cast doubt on
in chapter 2.
25See Downs (1957) for a classic utility-based view of voting decisions.
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likely the most important coming from “expressive voting” theory.26 This view
takes voting behaviors as expressions of underlying individual policy preferences
and not underlying utility analysis by the individual. However, both the expected
utility and expressive voting views are susceptible to similar formal criticisms.
It can rather easily be seen that a large component of what determines voting
turnout behavior is not related to the utilities individuals assign to the various social
outcomes that would result from alternative candidates. For instance, in the U.S.
there is a very systematic oscillation in voting turnout in national elections, with
peaks occurring during years with a presidential election, and troughs occurring
during non-presidential years.27 One may interpret this oscillation as an indication
that people are generally more concerned with the outcome of presidential elections
than with non-presidential elections; this does have some intuitive appeal given the
importance people in the U.S. assign to the office of President. However, such an
explanation would present a number of additional problems for interpreting voting
behavior in congressional elections. Consider a member of the house of represen-
tatives attempting to interpret the Mandate produced by the most recent election.
Assume that there is a midterm election Em, with a given policy platform m that
ranks some set of policy alternatives F1. The election two years prior to this was
a presidential election year (Ep) and had a different platform of p over the same
set of alternatives F1. Of course, in the simplest case, m = p, but this need not
always be the case. It is unclear whether m can ever provide a mandate if it is
26See Brennan and Lomasky (1997).
27For instance, the non-presidential years of 2002 and 2006 had national turnouts of 29.5% and
48.9% respectively, whereas the presidential years 2000 and 2004 had turnouts of 54.2% and 60.1%
respectively.
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different from p. Therefore, assume that m and p significantly differ (however
that is to be measured), and that Em has half of the voter turnout of Ep, with the
representative winning easily in both cases. It becomes quite unclear at this point
what exactly is the representative’s Mandate. Perhaps the most reasonable thing to
say, and what is often said in politics, is that clear Mandates (those that should cer-
tainly be acted upon) only arise in elections in which a candidate wins a convincing
victory with high voter turnout. The election results of Em might simply signal a
great deal of indifference within the electorate, thus permitting the representative to
act according to her Independence. In this way, Em might have the effect of wiping
away the previous Mandate from Ep though not bringing with it a new Mandate of
significant strength. But this in fact just undermines the ability of an election to
measure the Mandate.
The waters get even muddier when considering the many reasons people vote
for various candidates. In the above analysis I assumed that people only vote for
candidates based upon policy platforms, but people may also vote for candidates
who they think will govern well. Given that people typically have better formed
opinions for political leaders than possible public policies (Converse and Markus,
1979), it may also be reasonable that they do this. And this is part of Schum-
peter’s famous criticisms of populism: given how unclear the connection is between
the election of candidates and the adoption of public policies, it seems reasonable
that the public vote for candidates they trust to govern well rather than just those
who have policy platforms of which they approve.28 Additionally, governance in
28See Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy , especially pp. 256-282.
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the American context is often thought to be a competitive exercise, in which players
(the political representatives) compete for influence within the government. For this
reason, self-interested voters — those who want their preferred policies instituted
— should not necessarily choose the candidate who matches her policy preferences
most closely. This is made obvious by a simple example. Consider a set of policy
alternatives {x, y, z, a, b} of a voter with a strict priority ordering of those alterna-
tives x  y  z  a  b. This means that she would prefer that x obtains more
than she would prefer that y obtains, and so on.29 Consider three candidates for
public office, each of which have an agenda and some probability of enacting that
agenda based upon the political skill of that candidate (where ¬x stands for “x not
obtaining”):30
C1 60% chance of enacting {x,¬y, z, a,¬b} if elected
C2 30% chance of enacting {x, y, z, a, b} if elected
C3 70% chance of enacting {¬x,¬y, z,¬a,¬b} if elected
If it is expected that a voter will choose a candidate that is most likely to enact
her policy preferences, C3 should be eliminated right away, because that candidate
has a high likelihood of enacting policies that the voter disprefers.31 It is unclear
what the voter would decide in the comparison between C1 and C2. It is true that
29We also assume that, for example, if x obtains then ¬x does not obtain.
30We might might also include the trustworthiness and other features of each candidate that
determine the likelihood of each enacting their stated platforms.
31Note that there too little information in this example to say what it is rational for the voter to
do this. That would require having the voter’s cardinal utility assignments over the alternatives.
However, my example here shows that there are factors that go into the voters decision other than
each candidate’s platform.
78
C2 will attempt to enact identical priorities to those of the voter, but C2 is less likely
to be able to enact the voter’s highest priority policy (x). In such a case, the voter
must decide whether she is willing to trade any possibility of enacting y or b for a
higher probability of enacting x, z, or w.
If a voter’s preferred platform is not the only consideration that voters should
take into account when choosing a candidate, then it must be assumed that members
of the public do not necessarily act rationally if they vote for candidates on the basis
of platform alone. It is likely that voters act irrationally about a great many matters,
but not likely that this irrationality makes them more likely to express their policy
preferences in terms of their voting behavior. Because candidates must be elected
in order to be involved in the enactment of any policies, voters might also only
vote for candidates whom they believe have a chance of winning, so that they are
not “throwing their votes away.”32 In any case, this need not be resolved here.
I have shown additional considerations voters may use to make a voting decision
besides a candidate’s platform, but this is only one among potentially many others.
Every additional consideration voters might use to make voting decisions beyond
the policy platform of the candidates further alienates the voting choice from the
policy preferences of voters. If the plausible assumption is made that these factors
have significant effects on the voting behaviors of a non-trivial percentage of voters,
then it would seem that elections are a poor source of information about public
opinion.
32In social choice theory this is called strategic voting, and there is no voting method that is not
susceptible to it (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
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3.3.2 Direct communication
Perhaps the most direct method by which constituents can express their policy
preferences and the reasons for those preferences is through direct communication
with their representatives. Consequently, the obligation of a representative to listen
and respond to her constituents in a variety of ways is ingrained into the practice
of American democracy, for both its function in making public opinion known to
representatives as well as aiding in public deliberation. And in fact, such direct
communication is one of the main activities taking place within American Congres-
sional offices.33 When a constituent communicates directly with a representative or
the representative’s staff — be it in person, over a telephone, writing, or through
protest activities — it is intuitive that some important feature of a constituent’s
attitudes are expressed to the representative. Unlike voting, direct communications
from constituents do seem to give some clear information about the policy opinions
of the constituents themselves; it is this capacity of communication upon which I will
concentrate. A deliberative democrat will be more concerned with the arguments
and reasons behind her constituents’ policy opinions, and these are frequently the
subject of direct communication. I don’t doubt the usefulness of such exchanges
for deliberative politics, but I will present some doubts about its usefulness for
understanding public opinion.
In order to investigate the ability of such direct communications to convey
preferences useful to a representative, I will attempt to model them in the social
33See Mayhew (1974) for a discussion of the major portion of congressional activities that involve
direct constituent communication and services.
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choice theoretic terms. Although such a framework is more natural in the case of
elections, I think that a similar analysis will provide clarity about the structure of
the information provided by direct communications. Consider a set of four commu-
nications from three members of a constituency, {I1, I2, I3} within a constituency of
50 total members:
1. I1 writes a letter stating that, “I wholeheartedly support the new plan to give
every American free health care, and think that a 1% increase in taxes is small
price to pay.”
2. I1 calls the office of her representative, reiterating her support for free health
care that she recently expressed in a letter.
3. I2 stands outside the office of the representative every day for a week, holding
up two signs, one saying, “Keep your hands off of my health care” and another
saying “Taxed to death.”
4. I3 signs a petition against any increases in taxes from new health care legisla-
tion.
A representative must first determine whether to treat communicating con-
stituents differently from non-communicating ones. Given that a very small portion
of constituents communicate with representatives, it is unlikely that a representa-
tive should use communication as the primary means of gaining information about
public opinion. However, one might argue that communication provides some useful
information, especially when a representative receives a great deal of communication
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about a particular topic. In such a case, communication might provide a sample
from the population of all constituents. Certainly this is not a random sample, but it
might be a sample selected based upon the strength of opinion. Under such a view,
an individual only communicates with a representative once the extremity of the
utility she assigns to the alternative under consideration reaches a certain thresh-
old. Therefore, the amount of communication that a representative receives might
provide information about the preferences of the entire population of constituents.
This is similar, then, to the threshold view of voting that I discussed above.
If the threshold view of political communication I describe above is assumed,
it may be possible to state something about the cardinal values of the utility each
individual assigns to the policy alternatives under consideration (Fi). For example,
define two policy alternatives: universal health care and higher taxes (h) and no
change in either healthcare or taxes (¬h). Then, for each individual Ii ∈ IC ⊂ I,
and each individual In in the set of non-communicating constituents IN ⊂ I (where
the union of IC and IN exhaust the space of individuals in I):
∀(i ∈ IC , n ∈ IN)(|ui(h)− ui(¬h)| ≥ |(un(h)− un(¬h)|)
This just says that the amount of utility difference each member of the com-
municating group assigns to two alternatives is at least as large as that assigned
by those members in the non-communicating group. This may even be a strict in-
equality, though that would be a stronger claim and wouldn’t change much about
my conclusion. Importantly, this statement does not specify how much greater the
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utility differences are for those who choose to communicate and those who do not.
It may be the case that those in IN are largely indifferent between the alterna-
tives, such that the utility differences from the three individuals within IC could
overwhelm the differences from the 47 within IN if a simple averaging procedure
were used to calculate the social utility of adopting h. However, these quantities are
unknown, and it seems likely that it would be impossible to obtain such information
by simply communicating with constituents; this is exactly the problem of subjec-
tivity in cardinal utility measures that concerned Arrow (1963) in his limitation of
standard social choice theory to ordinal measures. I will discuss that problem in
more depth in chapter 5.
A similar problem is faced when attempting to make quantitative distinctions
between the members of IC . One might, for instance, want to interpret different
communicative actions as being caused by different amounts of utility differences.
The fact that I2 is willing to take a good deal of time out of her day to actively
protest h might mean that she assigns a larger utility difference between h and
¬h than I3 does. Similarly, given that I1 is willing to write to as well as call her
representative she may also assign more utility difference between h and ¬h than
I3 does. Such comparisons are especially arbitrary between I1 and I2. But really,
all these conclusions about utility seem quite arbitrary. Again, the use of direct
communications to infer attitude strength comes up against Arrow’s worries about
the basic subjectivity of individual assessments of cardinal utility. The ways in
which individuals describe the degree to which they prefer some alternative over
another is importantly subjective, and so it seems impossible to make comparisons
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of cardinal utility from descriptions or actions that require complex background
knowledge about each person in order to interpret the significance of their actions.
For instance, I1 might spend most of her day writing letters to her representatives
on a wide array of issues about which she is only mildly interested, I2 might spend
all week protesting mostly for the thrill of it, and I3 might only sign petitions
when she is absolutely committed to a cause. In order to make sense of their
communication behaviors, it is necessary to relativize them to each individual’s
behavior and psychological tendencies. That would seem to be too complicated
a task for behaviors as complex as personal communications. I will discuss these
general problems in greater depth in chapter 5.
Personal communications seem too complicated to allow for a meaningful as-
sessment of public opinion from them. However, public opinion surveys are designed
to regiment the communication of opinion information in just the way that is im-
possible for normal political communication. This may decrease the complexity of
interpreting individual responses and allow for satisfactory representation of public
opinion. However, next I will show that most modern opinion surveys measure only
ordinal information about public opinion, and are therefore unsuitable for use with
the weighing procedure. This is a problem that I will attempt to remedy in the next
two chapters, providing a model of public opinion that is amenable to measurement
by public opinion surveys.
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3.3.3 Public opinion surveys
I will argue that public opinion surveys are natural methods of measuring
public opinion, given the limitations of other measurement methods. But most
current types of public opinion surveys only provide ordinal-level measurements,
and are therefore inadequate to allow political representatives to abide by the Duty
of Political Responsiveness. In the next two chapters I will lay the groundwork
for better measures of public opinion, but I must first show that standard opinion
surveys are indeed inadequate. Figure 3.2 is one example of a survey question asked
in 2008 to a sample of Americans.34 It uses relatively standard “Likert”-type survey
items to produce ordinal scales of policy alternatives.35 This type of scaling method
is very common, not only in public opinion surveys, but also in social science research
of many types.
The individual then assigns the subject of each question a position along the
Likert scale. The ordinal interpretation of these responses is straightforward, except
for the “Not Sure” item. There are two natural interpretations of “Not Sure”: a
position between Somewhat Favor and Somewhat Oppose and an expression of in-
difference (or lack of judgment). The first interpretation would call for a placement
of the alternative in a middle position along the scale, whereas the second interpre-
tation would require that the alternative not be placed along the scale at all. This
is a scaling decision that relies upon there being an interpretation of “Not Sure”
34From the Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg News Poll # 2008-564: National Politics and the
Economy, question #30
35I discuss the Likert scale in more detail in section 6.2.1.
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. . . Barack Obama is considering an economic stimulus package that
would include tax cuts, an extension of unemployment benefits, and
job creation through government spending on such things as rebuilding
roads, bridges and schools. Such a plan would cost up to half a trillion
dollars, and would increase the already record U.S. budget deficit to
even higher levels. Generally speaking, do you favor or oppose a package
like this that would stimulate the economy but cause the budget deficit
to increase? (If Favor/Oppose) Are you strongly (in favor/opposed to)






Figure 3.2: Likert-scale opinion question
that is shared by the respondents. For the purposes of demonstration, I will assume
that no individuals selects “Not Sure” for any policy alternative.
It is important to notice that such scales must be ordinal, because no part
of the questioning process establishes the distance between the various possible re-
sponses.36 Nor does it provide any more information that allows for the meaningful
comparison of utilities between individuals. In order to see this, consider another
question that could have appeared on the same survey (though which I have in-
vented), making use of the same response scale:
Congressional Republicans have offered a stimulus plan that would
only feature tax cuts. This plan would cost up to one quarter trillion
dollars and increase the debt by that amount. Generally speaking, do you
favor or oppose a package like this? (If Favor/Oppose) Are you strongly
36See Jamieson (2004) for a discussion of the ordinal nature of standard Likert scaling procedures.
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(in favor/opposed to) such a stimulus package, or only somewhat?
... a third question:
Some Congressional Republicans have opposed any stimulus plan,
opting not to increase the debt at all from increased spending.
... and a fourth question:
Some Congressional Democrats want to implement a larger stimulus
package than what Barack Obama has offered. This would feature the
same balance of stimulus measures, but would cost 1 trillion dollars
(instead of 1/2 trillion). This would increase the national debt by that
amount.
Each proposed policy can be thought of as an alternative under consideration. Apply
the following labels to those policies:
x $1/2 trillion comprehensive stimulus
y $1/4 trillion in tax cuts
z No stimulus
a $ 1 trillion comprehensive stimulus
This allows for an assignment of ordinal utility values to each policy alterna-
tive. Consider some group of individuals I, all of whom have rated every policy.37
37This means that none of them have responded with “NOT SURE.”
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Make numerical assignments to each type of response along an ordinal utility scale,
with “Strongly Favor” being assigned ‘4’, “Strongly Oppose” a 1, and so on. For
instance, some individual I1 may make the following responses for each question: (x,
Strongly Favor) (y, Somewhat Favor) (z, Strongly Oppose) (a, Strongly Oppose),
thus producing the set of assignments {(x, 4)(y, 3)(z, 1)(a, 1)}.
Assume the following assignments for the entire group:
I1 {(x, 4)(y, 3)(z, 1)(a, 1)}
I2 {(x, 2)(y, 1)(z, 1)(a, 4)}
I3 {(x, 2)(y, 3)(z, 4)(a, 1)}
On the face of it, these measurements may actually give more information than
simply individual ordinal scales; specifically, it seems to provide the same ordinal
scale across all individuals. This is the extra information that is provided by the
labels of the scale items. Given the coarseness of these labels (there are only four
of them) they seem to provide a degree of ordinal interpersonal comparability. This
makes it possible to say that someone who “Strongly Favors” some alternative favors
it more than someone else who “Somewhat Favors” it. And even if this is denied,
there seems to be no doubt that the difference between “Favor” and “Oppose” is
interpersonally significant in this context. Someone who “Favors” an alternative
certainly prefers it more than someone who claims to “Oppose” it. Whereas ordinal
measures without interpersonal comparisons only permit statements of preference
within individuals, ordinal measures with interpersonal comparisons permit com-
parisons between them. For instance, it can be said that I1 rates y higher than I2
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rates x, even though both individuals rank those alternatives in their second-best
ordinal positions. The labels used to make ordinal assignments are meaningful in
this case, so it might be possible to use this information in a social choice function.
However, it is not likely that all terms have the same meaning across individuals;
this is likely only true for “Oppose” and “Support.” Therefore, for the purposes of
interpersonal comparability, it is possible to partition assignments into four classes,
obtaining the following intrapersonal orders:
I1 x  y  z ∼ a
I2 a  x ∼ y ∼ z
I3 y ∼ z  x ∼ a
And the following interpersonal order, where In(Fi) is an individual (n) pref-
erence function and [I1(x), I2(a), I3(z)] means I1(x) ∼ I2(a) ∼ I3(z), when it is
assumed (I think implausibly) that all scale positions are interpersonally compara-
ble (and not just “Favor” and “Oppose”):
[I1(x), I2(a), I3(z)]  [I1(y), I3(y)]  [I2(x), I3(x)]  [I1(z), I1(a), I2(y), I2(z), I3(a)]
This is the most information that could possibly be gotten from an opinion
survey of that structure, and because it does not just restrict significance to the
“Favor” and “Oppose” groups of labels it actually makes more interpersonal com-
parisons of preference than are likely significant.
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The interpretation of the scale that provides ordinal interpersonal comparisons
is not actually more useful in forming a social preference function than the first set
of individual scales. This is because no measure exists to provide the differences
between utility assignments; the numerical utility assignments are only significant
up to their ordinal information, and so any set of assignments that maintain this
order is just as good as any other. The best social choice function available for
ordinal scales is based upon the majoritarian voting method, which makes no use
of the additional information provided by interpersonal comparisons of preferences.
It should be stressed again that the above ordering is the best case scenario for
interpreting these survey scales; I find it far more likely that only the difference
between “Favor” and “Oppose” can be guaranteed to be equally significant between
individuals. Similar considerations also doom any attempt to use scales with more
positions, which is common for many Likert-type scales.38 As the number of po-
sitions increases, it becomes less plausible that the significance of those steps can
be compared between individuals. Therefore, Likert-type scales offer little more
than ordinal-scale measureability and only rough ordinal interpersonal comparabil-
ity. For now I think this is a satisfactory examination of the information derivable
from Likert-type scales. I will return to this topic in section 6.2.1 when I consider
whether there are any plausible assumptions that would permit aggregates of Likert
scales to estimate cardinal measures of public opinion, even though individual scales
are not cardinal. I will show that there is not much hope for this either.
38For instance, some Likert-scale items ask the respondent to select a response from a 5 or 10
point scale.
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Public opinion surveys, and for that matter all standard methods of measuring
public opinion for use by political officials, do not capture the amount of informa-
tion necessary for officials to balance public opinion against what they believe is
in the interests of the people. This problem with how public opinion is typically
measured has received relatively little attention within political science.39 However,
the problem I will consider next has received a great deal of attention. Since the
early years of public opinion measurement, there has been a concern that the public
is too ignorant and uninterested in public policy for it to offer adequate opinions on
many topics. Even before the widespread use of scientific methods to study pub-
lic opinion, Lippmann (1922) and then Schumpeter (1950) rather famously argued
against the populist view of democracy, stating that public opinion couldn’t possi-
bly serve as a coherent and intelligent basis for policy decisions. This old concern
became a problem for survey methodology when Philip Converse’s (1964) studies of
early public opinion surveys showed that most people exhibited what appeared to
be random opinions about most political issues. His findings began one of the most
important debates in public opinion survey methodology, and it will be the other
major problem (besides the need for cardinal measures) that any model of public
opinion must overcome to be useful to political representatives.




Beginning with Philip Converse’s (1964) study of early American opinion sur-
veys, there has been rather damning evidence that what is taken to be “public
opinion” originates primarily from random thoughts of the respondents attenuated
by features of the questioning context. Converse found that individuals’ espoused
opinions about various public policies fluctuated randomly over several years. Nearly
the only thing that remained stable was the political party with which respondents
identified. He concluded that most individuals simply do not have coherent attitudes
(they have “non-attitudes”) in most public policy domains.
The debate that followed Converse’s findings indicated that although some of
his results were due to measurement error, he was correct that most public attitudes
are subject to widespread instability.40 This finding greatly affected subsequent
models of public opinion, including John Zaller’s (1992) influential “Top-of-the-
head” attitude model, which will serve as the basis for my treatment of policy
attitudes. This model represents attitudes as sets of considerations that is open
to each individual to use in deciding between the available alternatives. Although
the total set of considerations available to make an opinion judgment is stable,
the precise set of considerations used by the individual will vary between survey
instances. Therefore, the opinion exhibited by an individual about an alternative
may change between survey instances even though the attitude underlying those
40See Achen’s (1975) famous response to Converse, arguing that Converse’s “non-attitudes” were
primarily the result of measurement error. Also see Converse and Markus’ (1979) contemporaneous
reply to Achen, arguing that response instability could not entirely be produced by measurement
error.
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expressed opinions remain the same. In the next chapter, I will develop such a
stochastic model of attitudes that is compatible with expected utility theory, thus
allowing the standard models of public opinion to interface with social choice theory.
I will first develop Converse’s original problem in terms of a violation of the
standard ordinal preference theory. Such a presentation of the problem is rarely
used in political science, in favor of statistical formulations, but this is a rather
natural representation of the problem that will lend itself to a social choice theoretic
analysis. The preference model I will develop in the next chapter relies upon a notion
of preference instability that is similar to the problem Converse originally found in
responses to public policy questions.
One way in which preferences can fail to satisfy standard ordinal preference
theory is by violating the condition of transitivity. Consider a set of alternatives F1,
such that the triple x, y, z ∈ F1. To say that this triple is weakly transitive is to say
that:
Weak Transitivity x  y ∧ y  z → x  z
Because (weak) transitivity is basic to most forms of rationality, it is quite
difficult in normal situations to think of intransitive preference sets that are still
intelligible. However, it becomes easier if it is imagined that an individual is asked
to report her pair-wise preferences over some large set of alternatives. In that case,
the fact that the pair is involved in a transitive triple may be hidden from the
individual by the large number of pair-wise comparisons that she needs to make.
Therefore, she can only rely upon whatever preferences she actually has (or at least
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can access) that are relevant to each pair-wise comparison, and if her preferences over
the alternatives within this triple are not especially well-formed then intransitive
results seem plausible.
Consider an individual’s preferences over the following alternatives, where all
descriptions are changes to the status quo:
x Lowering taxes and increasing defense spending
y Lowering taxes and decreasing education spending
z Increasing taxes and increasing defense spending
Assume that she prefers x to y because she thinks that defense spending is,
on the whole, one of the most important government functions. Later she claims to
prefer y to z because she thinks that lower taxes are generally better than higher
taxes. However, even later on she is presented with a pair-wise comparison between
x and z. At this point she recognizes that given the importance of a strong de-
fense increased defense funding may even warrant increasing taxes in order to avoid
deficits. Therefore, she prefers z to x. Each pair-wise choice is made independent
of the others, meaning that the resultant responses depend only upon the attitudes
of the individual toward each of the alternatives, and not upon any constraints of
rationality. If the individual is required to make these comparisons within a short
period of time, then the logical relationships between the various preferences would
likely be salient to her; therefore, it is likely that her choice between z and x would
not be independent from the others. Rather, she is more likely to choose x over z
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in order to conform to the requirements of transitivity. When transitivity does not
provide a salient constraint on choice, individuals may make sets of pair-wise choices
that when taken together do not conform to transitivity requirements. The case of
intransitivity in the above example involves multidimensional choice, which is an
obvious possible cause of such intransitivity. Many choices between public policy
opinions involve a large number of considerations relevant to the choice. Therefore,
any attitude theory that is thought to underlie public policy attitudes should treat
this as the normal (and not a special) case. The attitude theory I present in the
next chapter does this.
When the set of pair-wise comparisons is large enough, and therefore the in-
dividual is unaware of her previous expressed preferences, she may also exhibit
preference reversals. Consider a variant of the example I give above. The individual
could choose y over x if questioned again about her preference (she initially chose
x over y). However, this means that that the following two preference assignments
can be given to the same individual.
1. x  y
2. y  x.
This violates any standard preference model, all of which require the following
condition to hold:
Antisymmetry x  y → ¬(y  x)
I will call violations of this requirement preference instability.
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As I described earlier, there is some indication that both unstable and intransi-
tive preference expressions are common, and this has been perhaps best documented
in the case of public policy preferences(Converse, 1964; Fishburn, 1991; Zaller and
Feldman, 1992). Some have taken this to be an indication that populist views of
democratic governance are doomed, because their core guide to action — the public
“will” — simply does not exist.41 Most arguments against this skepticism of public
preferences have attempted to deny that instability or intransitivity exists on a wide
scale.42 However, I think that there is good reason to think that the preferences of
the public are lacking in the ways that have been described.
Observations like those I give above have caused many to give up on the
prospect of constructing anything resembling a social choice function out of the
attitudes of the public. However, in the next chapter I will describe a theory of
preferences that easily handles both intransitivity and instability. It will also show
why the assumptions of the standard preference models are violated by many public
policy preferences. This stochastic preference model accomplishes this by treating
any given choice instance as merely a noisy measurement of a preference, and not a
totally transparent display of it. This model also allows for the use of information
that only exists for entire sets of choices, and not for individual choices. This will
permit a description of a stochastic attitude theory in choice theoretic terms.
The purpose of this chapter has been to advance the following argument: Po-
litical representatives in democracies have duties to respect public opinion, and the
41In addition to Converse’s writings, see DeCanio (2006).
42For instance, see the research spawned by Achen’s (1975) findings that suggested that most
preference instability is due to measurement error, and not unstable public policy preferences.
Page and Shapiro (1992) provide perhaps the most important recent contribution to this view.
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weighing conception of the balancing procedure is the best explication of this “re-
spect.” However, public opinion as it is standardly measured has two important
problems. First, the ordinal opinion information typically produced by public opin-
ion measures is not suitable for the cardinal information required for a weighing
of public opinion against expected well-being. Secondly, widespread public policy
preference instability makes standard preference models inadequate for represent-
ing it; my model of the weighing conception relies upon another sort of preference
model. The model I present in chapters 4, 5, and 6 is meant to solve these problems
and consequently show how political representatives can balance public opinion with
their estimates of welfare.
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Chapter 4: A Model of Individual Opinion
I will argue here that what is typically referred to as “public opinion” can
be measured. However, a prerequisite for measurement of some phenomenon is its
existence. Therefore, I must show that something matching the concept of “pub-
lic opinion” that I introduced in the previous two chapters is likely instantiated in
modern democracies. Additionally, it must exist in a form that lends itself to mea-
surement. As I have already motioned and will explain further in this chapter, both
of these have been disputed. One possible worry is that although public opinion
exists, it may fail certain basic rationality requirements or be based upon incoher-
ent or fallacious reasoning. These may render it unsuitable for inclusion within any
public decision process. Consequently, its inclusion in the decision processes of po-
litical representatives would not fulfill The Duty of Political Responsiveness that I
introduced in the last chapter.
Most modern models of public opinion follow in the tradition of L. L. Thur-
stone’s psychological models of political attitudes.1 However, there is wide disagree-
1Some may question whether the terms “opinion” and “attitude” should be treated interchange-
ably, as I will largely do from now on. ‘Opinion’ and ‘attitude’ certainly have different connotations
in standard English as well as philosophy, but among those who systematically study public opinion,
“public opinion” is largely thought to be the the collective attitudes of the public (or some aggre-
gation of individual attitudes). Therefore, because I will not introduce a separate (non-attitude
based) conception of public opinion, I will treat them largely equivalently.
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ment about the relative contributions of the model’s different components of public
opinion. This is especially the case for the explanation of instability in individual
political opinions, a phenomenon that I introduced in section 3.4. Respondents to
public opinion polls often report different policy preferences when asked to make
identical comparisons in different questioning instances. Some have argued that
most of this preference instability is the result of genuine instability of attitudes
themselves (Zaller, 1992; Converse, 2006), whereas others have argued that this in-
stability is predominately the result of measurement error (Achen, 1975; Page and
Shapiro, 1992). I will present a model consistent with either view.2 Additionally, I
introduce a formalization of the model that is also directly compatible with social
choice theory, which is not the case for most models of public opinion. The first step
in the presentation of this model will be to provide a method for the representation
of unstable preferences. This will be required for my presentation of a public policy
attitude model, and will also provide a clearer conception of preference instability.
4.1 Stochastic preferences
Preferences in social choice theory are typically represented by what are called
algebraic preference models. However, there are alternative preference models that
have received far less attention in the literature. One family of models, called
stochastic preferences, represent preferences as stochastic relations.3 These mod-
2My view does depend upon there being some underlying stable attitude. This might preclude
Converse’s (1964) most radical “non-attitude” conclusions about public opinion.
3Martin Peterson (2008), in chapter 4, gives a useful recent discussion of this family of preference
models.
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els have a number of advantages over algebraic ones, and are especially useful in
the case of public opinion. Firstly, stochastic preferences can accommodate viola-
tions of transitivity and antisymmetry, both of which are prevalent in a number of
theoretical contexts including public opinion about public policies (Converse, 1964;
Fishburn, 1991; Zaller, 1992; Sen, 1995). I will pay particular attention to violations
of antisymmetry, which can lead to violations of algebraic transitivity.4
A stochastic preference relation over alternatives x and y is defined as a pair-
wise relation x  y with a certain probability P (I will call these values ‘P -values’)
of that strict preference being exhibited in any given choice instance. This can be
written as: p(x  y) = P . A stochastic preference with a P -value of 1/2 represents
indifference, whereas values away from 1/2 represent increases in stability, with values
of 0 and 1 representing perfect stability.5 It follows that p(x  y) = 1 is a gener-
alization of the algebraic strict preference relation x  y, because that algebraic
relation is satisfied in every instance of choice. Similarly, y  x can be generalized
as p(x  y) = 0. Depending upon one’s interpretation of P -values, they describe
either the probability that the individual will make some choice in any given in-
stance, the relative frequency of some choice over a set of choice instances, or a
fact about some mental structure of the individual. And this, of course, is not an
exhaustive list of possible interpretations. However, under all such interpretations,
the individual is assumed to make a determinant choice in every choice instance.
Additionally, although choices under stochastic preference models are not generally
4In section 3.4, I introduce “weak transitivity,” which is an algebraic transitivity condition.
5Values away from 0 and 1 toward 1/2 naturally represent increases of instability.
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constrained to pair-wise comparisons between alternatives, the specific model that
I will utilize is restricted to such binary choices.
Here I intend to find cardinal utility values using individual judgments, and
so I will interpret P -values as the frequencies of judgments (or choices). Therefore,
define a P -value for some relation x  y as the frequency with which x is chosen over
y (n(x, y)) divided by the number of instances of choice or, to use the language of
scientific measurement, the number of trials (t). Thus the P -value can be interpreted




I will argue that choice behaviors in the context of public policy questions
arise from underlying attitudes that individuals have about the alternatives, but P -
values themselves cannot represent those attitudes. Rather, the utility values derived
from P -values will represent (in some important sense) the attitudes individuals
have toward the alternatives. I will argue that utility can represent the features of
attitudes pertinent to the measurement of aggregate attitudes of a society. However,
this will not become suitably clear until I have presented the entire model.
It can be rather easily seen that stochastic preferences will not satisfy some
standard conditions of algebraic utility models. For instance, a common axiomati-
zation of algebraic (strict) preference requires that the conditions of anti-symmetry
and transitivity are satisfied (where x, y, z are alternatives):
Anti-symmetry: x  y =⇒ ¬(y  x)
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Algebraic Transitivity: x  y ∧ y  z =⇒ x  z6
Choice behaviors of any individual with stochastic preferences with P -values
other than 0 or 1 will obviously violate Anti-symmetry. This will also lead to viola-
tions of algebraic transitivity, even in cases where the stochastic preference has not
violated a version of transitivity that applies to patterns of P -values. The satisfac-
tion of the following condition called strong stochastic transitivity seems adequate,
even though it allows for violations of algebraic transitivity:
Strong Stochastic Transitivity p(x  z) ≥ max[p(x  y), p(y  z)]7
This is only one of several possible versions of stochastic transitivity, though
this “strong” version is implied by the utility model I will present in this chapter.
In contrast to algebraic transitivity, this is a condition on the set of all comparison
instances of a triple of alternatives, and it therefore can withstand the violations of
anti-symmetry that I have called preference “instability”. Strong stochastic transi-
tivity is a far more difficult condition to violate than algebraic transitivity, which
can be violated by intransitivity in any single set of three choice instances involving
the triple. The ability of stochastic preferences to withstand and, more importantly,
measure preference instability makes them particularly useful in domains where pref-
erence instability is common and linked to utility differences between alternatives.
This is the use I wish to make of such stochastic preference relations. In section
6Note that this condition is stronger than weak transitivity, which I introduced in section 3.4.
This condition is required for strict rather than weak preference relations. I restrict my model to
strict preferences, because the specific model I use is based upon binary choices, which are naturally
represented by strict preference relations. However, not much of deep conceptual significance hangs
on this modeling choice.
7This means that p(x  z) must be greater than the larger of p(x  y) and p(y  z).
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4.4.2 I will provide a means to find individual utility scales that can represent at-
titudes from a set of individual stochastic preferences.8 However, first I must give
an attitude theory that will serve as the basis of both individual utility scaling and
interpersonal comparisons of utility.
4.2 Public policy attitudes
In this section, I will give a formal analysis of those public policy attitudes
that are relevant to The Duty of Political Responsiveness. However, it must first
be made conceptually clearer what those attitudes are like. From now on, I will
denote all such attitudes as “policy attitudes.” I will be concerned with two primary
elements of policy attitudes through two distinct (though related) attitude models:
their possible rational basis (shown in figure 4.2) and the way in which they can be
modeled using cardinal utility representations (figure 4.4). These models describe
policy attitudes in different ways, thus making them capable of answering different
questions. A utility scale only represents the relationship between policy alterna-
tives in terms of the degree to which individuals affirm each alternative, and so
does not necessarily resemble the cognitive structure of that attitude. Similarly, the
other model will demonstrate how stochastic preferences might be based in a ratio-
nal process, though I leave open the possibility that some public policy attitudes
sometimes arise from non-rational processes. And again, this rational process need
not match all (or even most) features of the cognitive process that instantiates the
8I mean ‘utility’ in its purely formal sense, as a numerical representation of preference. Although
I will make this clear later, the reader should not import any other non-formal conception of ‘utility’
at this early stage of the presentation of my model.
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rational attitude structure. Therefore, the purpose of the rational model is not nec-
essarily descriptive, though it does provide some descriptive constraints on the type
of psychological structure that might be counted as a policy attitude. Whereas the
purpose of the utility model is to represent a very restricted element of the attitude,
the rational attitude model is primarily justificatory in nature; it demonstrates how
policy responses might be unstable while the attitudes that underlie those responses
are nonetheless stable and rationally formed.
Given the background theory of popular sovereignty that I have advocated,
some of the features of policy attitudes are likely already clear. But at this point
I must make explicit the necessary properties of those attitudes. Firstly, a policy
attitude should be framed from the perspective of a neutral social planner, who
makes a policy choice based upon what is in the common good rather than what
is in the self-directed interests of the individual who has the attitude. Therefore,
a policy attitude is not simply an expression of self-interest or desire, but is an
expression of the judgment of the individual about which policy should be selected.9
Public policy attitudes are modeled after the general will that I discussed in chapter
2, which I claimed underpinned the Duty of Political Responsiveness. As a model,
the general will also serves as a normative ideal for individual political attitudes that
direct governance toward the common good. Additionally, the general will provides
an ideal to political representatives about how they might aid their constituents in
making decisions that are aimed at the common good. But although the existence of
9I am leaving strategic considerations aside; what a constituent thinks her representative should
do from a strategic standpoint is different from her policy attitudes, although policy attitudes will
often dictate the strategy that should be used to achieve them.
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the ideal of common-good directedness is a necessary condition of policy attitudes,
it is not a necessary condition that all policy attitudes live up to this ideal. Popular
sovereignty, which is at the basis of the general will, requires that the judgments
of individuals be respected by representatives regardless of the manner in which
individuals arrived at those judgments. Political representatives do not generally
have a right to ignore policy attitudes just because they judge that those attitudes
were arrived at illegitimately. This is one feature that distinguishes the view of
popular sovereignty that I have defended from the deliberative democratic views
that I have rejected. I discuss ways in which representatives might weigh opinion
differently based upon the reasonableness of the opinion formation process, while
still abiding by the Duty of Political Responsiveness, in section 6.1.
The second necessary condition on policy attitudes is that they must be derived
from judgments about political policies, and these judgments must be explicitly
endorsed by the individual. This excludes so called “implicit attitude” measures
that have recently shown promise in predicting behavior by deriving attitudes from
behaviors and physiological reactions seemingly unrelated to those attitudes.10 Such
implicit attitudes are clearly not endorsed by the individual in the way that I require.
One of the best examples of implicit attitudes are those about race. One rather
robust finding shows that Americans are more likely to associate Caucasian faces
with positive words and images, and faces of African Americans with negative words
and images. This is the case even when individuals do not themselves report feeling
biased against African Americans, and occurs across racial groups (Nosek et al.,
10See Petty et al. (2012).
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2002).
One may think that if representatives should be in the business of understand-
ing the public policy attitudes of their constituents then they should also seek to
understand implicit attitudes of their constituents as well. For example, it might be
possible to give individuals implicit attitude tests to determine whether they have
more negative associations with “higher unemployment” or with “higher prices.” If
an individual has more negative associations with “higher prices” then it may be
reasonable to say that the following preference relation should be ascribed to that
individual’s attitude set:
(Higher unemployment)  (Higher prices)
But given the unconscious character of implicit attitudes, that individual may
consistently claim to prefer higher unemployment to higher prices, thus endorsing
the preference of:
(Higher prices)  (Higher unemployment)
In this way, implicit attitudes are contrary to the purpose of public opinion
in democratic governance; if public judgments (instantiated in public opinion) are
to play any role in self-governance, then the explicit judgments of the people must
actually be measured and respected by political representatives.
The sorts of attitudes I am concerned with must also be distinguished from
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emotional responses to policies, which are often thought of as attitudes. People
who have policy attitudes that support tax decreases will also tend to experience
negative emotional affect when told about likely tax increases, and will tend to vote
for political candidates who support tax decreases. However, such “attitudes” will
often come apart conceptually. Even socialists, who support high taxes, will often
experience negative affect when told that they must pay higher taxes, and may even
tend to vote against candidates who admit that they intend to raise taxes. Much
of the work by psychologists studying attitudes has been devoted to finding the
interconnections between attitudes, emotion, and behavior, but that is not what I
will be concerned with here.11 Rather, I will present a model that is limited to the
link between the structure of attitudes within an individual’s attitude set and the
choices by that individual over a set of possible policy alternatives.
The complete structure of policy attitudes must be inferred from direct, ex-
plicitly endorsed choices among a feasible set of policy alternatives. I will find the
relative strength of a political attitude toward an alternative by way of the relative
frequency with which that alternative is chosen over other alternatives within the
set of relevant policy alternatives. Therefore, attitude strength is inferred exper-
imentally from the set of choices by an individual. Although these attitudes are
the result of directly endorsed choices by the individual, the relative strengths of
attitudes are not endorsed. In this way, the structure of public policy attitudes can
only be found through a measurement process that is similar to the measurement
of other psychological phenomena. This requires some explanation, because it may
11See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.
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seem that this suffers from the same problems of the implicit attitudes I mentioned
earlier. And this may be the main problem with any measurement-based process
for understanding the “will” of the people; whereas with direct communication and
voting people are fully responsible for the opinion-relevant actions they take, in the
case of public opinion surveys the public opinion must be interpreted by way of
some sort of scientific measurement process. Furthermore, when only a sample of
the people are included in the survey, the opinion of the entire population must be
inferred from the opinion of that sample. For now, set aside the issues relating to
sampling methods, as I will address these in section 6.2.1.
It may be that individual expressions of opinion should only be taken at face
value, and that to infer anything from them is to not fully respect them. What
should be made of such a claim? I think that the core of this objection is as fol-
lows: to infer some underlying attitude through attitude measurement, when some
features of the measured attitude are not explicitly endorsed by the individual, sub-
ordinates the judgment of the measured individual to that of the person doing the
measurement. There is some plausibility to this. For instance, when a scientist or a
doctor takes measurements, the subject and the patient (respectively) are indeed in
a subordinated position. However, this measurement paradigm needn’t have such
a subordinating effect. There are non-subordinating situations that can also be
described as a form of measurement. For instance, the interpretation of communi-
cations might be thought of as a form of measurement. When I walk down the street
and someone gives me a look of annoyance, this is certainly an expression, but it has
little value unless I take it to be signaling (or at least linked to) some attitude(s).
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Specifically, I assume that there exists some attitude (not a very nice one) that has
me as its object. Likewise, many linguistic expressions are notably expressions of
some attitude(s), and often require some inference to determine which attitudes they
express. Although the statistical inferences that are used in standard public opinion
measures are more systematic than the sort of measurement and inferences required
for the understanding of direct communication, I do not think that it is different
in kind from other forms of communication. As I hinted at in section 3.3, common
methods of political communication are often difficult to systematically interpret in
ways that are necessary for their use in political decisions. I take the main purpose
of public opinion surveys not to be the treatment of individuals as experimental
subjects, but rather to aid in political communication. Opinion surveys allow con-
stituents to communicate their attitudes to their political representatives in ways
that facilitate the use of those communications in political decisions.
The requirement of communicative regimentation is one of the most substan-
tial ways in which the public opinion measurement that I will present differs from
direct political communication. I require that the full structure of an attitude set,
as represented by a utility scale, is derived from behavioral data about pair-wise
choices between policy alternatives. Therefore, the pair-wise choices between policy
alternatives is directly communicated by each individual, but a further set of infor-
mation is inferred from the patterns of identical pair-wise choices within different
choice situations. This process will require a great deal of explication, but the gen-
eral idea is this: the features of the choice situations in which some individual makes
choices between identical alternatives can differ substantially. For instance, varied
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question wordings may lead an individual to think about a choice between two al-
ternatives in slightly different ways. However, these differences are not relevant to
political decisions; only the attitudes between the alternatives themselves are. I will
introduce a method to derive information about the attitudes from choices.
Individuals are not capable of accurately communicating the cardinal struc-
ture of their attitudes; this is a major reason why the indirect method I present is
necessary. There are two major considerations that support such a claim. They are
related in important ways. The first arises from the economics and social choice lit-
erature, which shows the insignificance of cardinality in individual reports of utility.
In fact, Arrow famously claims in Social Choice and Individual Values that such
measurements have no place in social choice theory at all.12 This is because such
reports are wholly subjective, and there exists no straightforward way (if any way
at all) to make comparisons of subjective cardinal utility reports between different
individuals. The second set of considerations against the direct measurement of
cardinal utility can be found primarily in the psychological literature, and is related
to the problem of self-knowledge. Individuals seem particularly bad at reporting
their attitudes toward various objects, be they public policies or not.13 The choices
people make are often greatly affected by features of the choice situation that are en-
tirely unrelated to the actual choice at hand. This is bad enough for direct choices
or rankings of alternatives, but matters become even worse when individuals are
12In fact, in the first sentence of chapter 2, Arrow states “The viewpoint will be taken here that
interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact, that there is no meaning relevant
to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility” (pg. 9).
13See Carruthers (2011) for a broader discussion of the problem of self-knowledge in psychology
that extends to a large class of propositional attitudes, from beliefs to emotions.
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asked to report the cardinal structure of such rankings. It is unreasonable to expect
reported cardinal attitudes to be significant except in a very crude way.
A simple example will show how the problems of interpersonal comparability
of cardinal utility and self-knowledge are related. Consider a process by which
individuals report an entire set of attitudes toward a set of alternatives Fi. The
simplest method, and one that does not impose an outside interpretive structure on
responses, is a free assignment of real numbers to each alternative. However, it is
quite obvious that such a method would make interpersonal comparisons of cardinal
responses difficult. For instance, it is unclear what significance to place on the fact
that one individual’s smallest utility difference is 1 whereas another individual’s
smallest utility difference is 100. Therefore, I will consider a slightly more complex
method in which the basic limits of utility assignments are constrained though utility
differences within those limits are free to vary. Individuals may be told that they
can assign alternatives any numerical value within the interval [−10, 10], and that
this is to stand for the relative strength of their preference for those alternatives.
Instructions might also require that positive values only be assigned to alternatives
with “positive” valence, and negative values for those with “negative” valence, but
initially I will assume that this use of the scale is left to vary between individuals.
Figure 4.1 shows an example set of assignments by all three individuals in I over
alternatives x, y, z ∈ Fi.
There may be little difficulty in forming orders from these responses, and in





ϕ1 x y z
I1 -8 7 10
I2 2 4 0
I3 -5 0 -2
Figure 4.1: Utility Assignments by I over Fi, constrained to the interval [−10, 10]
using the Condorcet majoritarian method (y  z  x). But given the lack of details
about the ways in which individuals made utility assignments, it is impossible to
know the relative significance of utility assignments between individuals. Individuals
may use negative and positive numbers in different ways, and nothing about this
method allows for a common interpretation of all individual responses, even though
the numerical representations of these attitudes imply that such an interpretation
can be made. In fact, not even the significance of utility differences can be inferred
from such austere data. Compare the utility differences for I1 and I2. Do the greater
differences in assignments by individual I1 signify greater strengths of attitudes than
I2? Or are these individuals’ response styles merely different? It is not clear without
further information about the source of those utility assignments; a definitive answer
to the question of significance requires some knowledge about whether the source
of these differences is located in the attitudes themselves or in some other aspect
of the individuals’ psychologies. What is required is some basis for the comparison
of these responses, such that the underlying cardinal structure of attitudes can be
isolated from other phenomena that affect the numerical assignments.
From the above discussion, one might think that the cardinal structure of
individual attitudes might be directly elicited if only some further method is found
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to calibrate individual responses with each other, or if the elicitation is structured so
as to force individuals to use utility differences in similar ways. However, individuals
also seem to lack direct access to the cardinal structure of their stable attitudes,
even for emotional attitudes, which seem to have clear cardinal structure.14 I think
matters are even worse for public policy attitudes. In order to report cardinal
information about one’s attitudes, it is necessary to have abstract knowledge of how
one’s preferences for various alternatives are related to one another. It is unclear
how one could even determine such a structure except by considering individual
comparisons of utility differences. For instance, an individual might be able to
determine that some policy x being adopted instead of another policy y is more
important for her than a third policy z being adopted over some fourth policy a.
Thus, the following statement would be true of her attitudes:
u(x)− u(y) > u(z)− u(a)
If this individual could develop an order for all utility differences in her at-
titude set, this would enable her to claim self-knowledge of the cardinality of her
attitudes. In fact, this is the most limited amount of information about an attitude
that could still be counted as cardinal information. But it is highly unlikely that
any individual could report such a structure without exhibiting either instability or
non-transitivity in those differences. The most plausible method by which that in-
formation might be constructed is through a measurement method similar to what
14See Carruthers (2011), chapter 5.
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I will propose, one that constructs information about attitudes through a series
of identical comparisons. These comparisons permit instability information to be
utilized in the construction of the utility scale. This method requires that certain
assumptions be made about the basic structure of public policy attitudes.
I will present a schematic version of a very general type of stochastic attitude
model that relies upon only very general features common to several competing
attitude theories.15 However, there is wide disagreement about the relative contri-
butions to public opinion of the model’s various components, especially about the
relative contributions of error and stable policy attitudes. These models all follow
in the tradition of Thurstone’s (1959) “Law of Comparative Judgment.” My model
will be based upon Thurstone’s basic attitude model. Additionally, I present the
model in a form that is directly compatible with social choice theory, which is not
the case for standard public opinion models.
First, I will present an attitude model that shows the possible rational basis of
policy opinions. This attitude theory explains how unstable expressed preferences
might arise from a reasoned attitude formation process, but this need not require
that all individuals form policy attitudes in this way for those attitudes to demand
the responsiveness of political representatives. As I claimed in chapters 2 and 3, in-
dividuals who are citizens of a democracy have the right to have their policy opinions
respected by their political representatives, although this does not extend to having
the reasons they used to formulate their attitudes respected if those reasons are
15For instance, see Achen (1975); Zaller and Feldman (1992); van der Veld and Saris (2004);
Converse (2006).
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not publicly acceptable. Consequently, the requirement of respect for opinion does
not permit political representatives to “launder” the policy attitudes of individuals,
eliminating those attitudes that are not based upon publicly acceptable reasons,
beyond possibly excluding unjust policy alternatives.16 However, this does not pre-
clude the “laundering” of the reasons behind those preferences when representatives
consider what reasons should be included in political deliberation.
Assume that any individual preference (from now on I mean stochastic prefer-
ence) between two alternatives is determined by some weighing of considerations for
and against each alternative. This, of course, presents a series of problems related
to how considerations can be individuated and how the weighing procedure should
be thought of (or whether this should be thought of as a weighing procedure at all).
I will put these problems to the side, because any theory of reasoning will face them,
not just the attitude model I present here. However, if it can be assumed that dif-
ferent considerations can be categorized based upon the types of effects they have on
the resultant attitudes, then only the effects a given set of considerations has on the
attitude will be necessary to determine the resultant choices. Therefore, one might
also dispense entirely with the use of considerations in a model of attitudes without
any serious harm to how the theory predicts choice. Such a simplification strategy
will become useful later when I discuss the representation of attitudes using utility
theory, but such a simpler model does not explain as well the possible rational basis
of policy opinions.
16See Goodin (1995) on the various ways that individual preferences might be restricted or ad-








































































Figure 4.2: Attitude model
The full attitude model is shown in figure 4.2. This represents the attitude of
an individual toward a pair of alternatives x, y ∈ Fi. The resultant pair-wise atti-
tude, Ax,y (top-middle of the figure), is the psychological structure that determines
choice patterns between those two alternatives. This pair-wise method of analyzing
attitudes will likely seem unnatural to some who think of an attitude as being about
some particular (single) alternative. I will give such an analysis of attitudes, but
it will require the development of a utility theory first; the attitude an individual
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has towards an alternative will be represented by the utility value she assigns to
that alternative, relative to some set of alternatives under consideration Fi.
17 But
at that point I will eliminate all reference to considerations from the model, in favor
of a simpler analysis. However, so long as considerations remain in the model —
and they will be necessary to justify the simpler version of the model — a pair-wise
definition of attitudes is required. Why this is will become clear shortly.
First consider the case of a static attitude that is not susceptible to any at-
titude change. The static attitude Ax,y has two contents: a set of relevant con-
siderations Cx,y = {x2, x3, x4, y1, y2, y3, y4}, and a probability distribution P(Cx,y)
over the combinations of considerations in Cx,y that are used in any instance of
choice.18 The total set of considerations in Cx,y is shown in the box below the label
‘Ax,y’. The probability distribution (P(Cx,y)) represents the salience or importance
of each combination of considerations to the person’s deliberations over the pair of
alternatives.19 Finally, assume that every alternative favors one or the other alter-
native and that each consideration is equally favorable to that alternative as any
other. In other words, no consideration has more “force” than any other. Therefore,
the differential weight given to different considerations must be represented either
17As I will show in section 5.1, this will eventually need to be broadened to all alternatives in
the choice context (Di), which will allow for interpersonal comparisons of utility values.
18Given that the number of combinations increases exponentially with the number of consider-
ations, this distribution will be rather complex and difficult to calculate in sets much larger than
a few considerations. Therefore, it may be more intuitive to replace this element of the model
with a probability function over individual considerations, though that function would not fully
determine the resultant choice pattern (P − value) of the individuals for that alternative pair.
19This model is similar in certain respects to a recent reason-based preference model presented
by Dietrich and List (2013). Their model features “reasons” that modify the resultant individual
preference based upon which of those reasons are salient in any given choice context. However,
their model lacks an endogenous explanation of how certain reasons might be more often salient
than others. Because this is an important aspect of public policy attitudes, I include this in my
own model.
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in the probability distribution or in the number of considerations favoring a given
alternative. The basis of salience in the basic structure of the attitude is impor-
tant, because it is this structure that I will attempt to measure through a utility
theory. Salience, therefore, is a normatively significant feature of the attitude, and
not merely the result of aspects of human psychology unrelated to the individual’s
will. This attitude theory posits that there is an important stochastic nature to
attitudes; the same attitude is not always expressed in identical ways, even though
it may have a stable structure. And it is that entire structure that is relevant to
public opinion and the sovereign will of the people.
The choice an individual makes between two alternatives x and y in some
particular instance of choice is determined by two steps. The first is the set of
salient considerations, given particular features of the questioning environment, how
the comparison is made, the individual’s state of mind, and so on. The second step
is the random measurement error that affects the choice without affecting how the
individual thinks about the question. Some features of the measurement instrument
(if, for instance, it uses a Likert-type scale that has options from 0-10 or -5 to 5)
may affect the sorts of responses an individual gives, even though it does not change
the sort of considerations the individual uses. This does not affect the attitude
itself and thus is not an important feature of the attitude model. Measurement
error is a problem for any type of measurement, and because it is not a result
of features of the stable attitude its features are not relevant for policy decisions.
Therefore, as a conceptual matter, I will largely ignore it. I will primarily use
it as a random factor that decides the choice when there are an equal number of
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considerations favoring each alternative, but this is just for convenience, and could
be easily changed without harm to my view of policy attitudes. In fact, I recognize
that this use of measurement error is a bit misleading. Ideally I would use it as a
factor that randomly alters the policy choice from any set of considerations, with
the probability of that occurring as a function of the number of considerations that
would need to be changed in order to alter the choice. However, this would yield an
unwieldy model. In part this is an artifact of the particular way I am structuring
the full version of the attitude model, and there will be a much more natural way
to model measurement error once I give the simplified attitude model.
The full attitude model allows for attitude change through the addition and
subtraction of considerations, though I only show the possible results of such attitude
change. A−1x,y is an initial set of considerations with C
−1
x,y = {x1, x2, x4, y1, y2, y3, y4}.
This set is subject to change through whatever orderly process exists to make such
change. So, for instance, such a process allows for x1 to be dropped from C
−1
x,y and
x3 added to Cx,y. I will not discuss how attitude change might function, but the key
for my purposes is that it can produce stable attitudes. Even though such a stable
attitude may change over time, at any given time there is some set of considerations
that constitutes that attitude.
The stochastic element of the model is represented by a probability distribution
over the set of considerations, which determines the probability that any ratio of
considerations in favor of x or y is selected in some given instance of choice. For
each trial (ti) a set of considerations is chosen from the set of all considerations in
Ax,y in accordance with the probability distribution P(Cx,y) over Cx,y. The choice
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of alternatives in that instance is determined by the set of considerations contained
within that selection of alternatives. In figure 4.2, the squares labeled ‘t1 – t5 show
consideration selections from Cx,y for each trial in bold font. But in this depiction
of the model, the probability distribution P(Cx,y) is not detailed, mostly because
it would be very complex for a set of seven considerations if all combinations of
considerations are included in the distribution. However, a simpler example can
illustrate how such a probability distribution can lead to policy responses. Consider
a very restricted C ′x,y = {x1, y1}, contained in A′x,y. In this case, P(Cx,y) can be given
with only three probability values. An example of such a probability distribution is
shown in figure 4.3.
Salient Considerations x1 x1, y1 y1
Probability .4 .4 .2
Figure 4.3: Probability distribution
Assume that error related to measurement only affects individual choice in the
case of balanced considerations (x1, y1), and that it results in the selection of x or y at
chance level. P(C ′x,y) would result in a selection of x over y with a probability of 0.6
(and y over x with a probability of 0.4).20 Using the P−value notation of stochastic
preferences: p(x  y) = 0.6. The rational attitude model, with its reliance upon
the salience of various considerations, offers a number of possible interpretations
for any given probability distribution over considerations. For instance, the relative
20x is chosen over y with p = 0.6, because x1 has a probability of 0.4 of being the only consider-
ation used to make the choice, and the probability that both x1 and y1 are used has a probability
of 0.4. If x1 is the only consideration, then x is chosen straight-away. If x1y1 is used then x is
chosen with a probability of 1/2. .4/2 = 0.2 and 0.4 + 0.2 = 0.6.
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salience of a consideration P(C ′x,y) might be thought of as the relative importance the
individual places on the consideration. This permits an easy way to understand what
aspect of an attitude can be stable, even when different expressions of that same
attitude might bring about different results. The considerations involved in choice
and the relative salience of those considerations are the stable aspect of an attitude.
Of course, the term ‘salience’ carries a descriptive connotation in psychology. Some
considerations might simply be more likely to be thought of, perhaps because they
are consistent with some sort of cognitive heuristic or more easily understood and
remembered.21 This is a problem for any theory of rational choice, and so I do not
think I need to take it on specifically. It is not my purpose here to show that people
are exceptionally rational in all of their policy attitudes; I have simply intended to
show that individuals could have stable, rationally-based policy attitudes that are
nonetheless susceptible to unstable expressions in policy opinion measurements.
Next, I will show how sets of attitudes might be represented along a cardinal
utility scale. Not all of the details of the model I provide in figure 4.2 are important
for the utility analysis, and so I will drop much of this detail at this point. I will also
present a simplified attitude model (in figure 4.4) that will make clearer how the
cardinal properties of policy attitudes are formed. It must be remembered that all
uses here of ‘utility’ are purely formal, such that utility values are simply numerical
representations of attitudes; the subject of analysis (policy attitudes) does not differ
in the simpler model.
First, assume that there exists a set of static attitudes about some alterna-
21For an introduction to such cognitive phenomena see Kahneman (2011).
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tive ϕ1, and all other alternatives in Fi, where ϕ1 ∈ Fi. ϕ∗ can be any other
alternative in Fi. As before, each alternative pair in Fi is the subject of a distinct
attitude. Therefore, if Fi = {x, y, z, a, b, c}, then there are five attitudes associated
with alternative x (Ax,y, Ax,z, Ax,a, Ax,b, Ax,c). The utility analysis will permit the
representation of the entire set of attitudes by a single utility assignment, which
has cardinal significance along a utility scale containing the other alternatives in Fi.
This simpler representation will allow for a deeper analysis of individual attitudes
and how such a model may permit interpersonal comparisons of attitudes.
A few key assumptions will allow for a straightforward method by which
P − values can be said to originate from the utility assignments to alternatives.
First, any effects due to transient features of the choice situation (framing effects,
contextual variability, etc.) and measurement error can be captured by a single
element of the model T , because I will assume that the probability distributions of
their effects are all normally distributed and independent; such assumptions permit
the conclusion that the combination of those effects are also normally distributed.22
Note that both the stochastic effects from the probability distribution over the set
of considerations (P(C)) as well as measurement error in a specific choice context
are modeled by this single element of error T . The stable element of an individual’s
attitude toward ϕ1 can then be represented as a utility value, u(ϕ1). This “true”
attitude toward ϕ1 is the utility scale value derived from a comparison of ϕ1 with
all other alternatives within the set Fi. Given the three elements (u(ϕ1), u(ϕ
∗),
22Thurstone makes this assumption in the simplest formulation of his attitude model (“Case
5 ”), though it is not a necessary assumption. More complex formulations allow this assumption
to be dropped.
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and T ), the probability p(ϕ1  ϕ∗) that an alternative ϕ1 will be chosen over some
other alternative ϕ∗ ∈ Fi in any given choice instance is determined by the attitude
model in figure 4.4.




Figure 4.4: The attitude toward alternative ϕ1
This simplified attitude model assumes that the individual is forced to make
a set of choices between two alternatives in pair-wise comparisons, which will of-
ten result in preference instability. When the contribution of u(ϕ1) − u(ϕ∗) on
p(ϕ1  ϕ∗) is small, or that of T is large, then p(ϕ1  ϕ∗) will be close to 1⁄2. T
can be thought of as acting in two steps of the model. It first acts on both u(ϕ1)
and u(ϕ∗) in the determination of d(ϕ1,ϕ
∗), which is the measured utility differ-
ence between those alternatives. This accounts for transient effects that arise from
some particular comparison context of any two alternatives and the effect of that
comparison context on the probability distribution over considerations (P(C)) from
figure 4.2. This transient aspect of the attitude model arises for all instances in
which those alternatives are compared, but it is distinct from the difference between
the utility assignments to those alternatives when those utility assignments are cal-
culated through comparisons with all alternatives. Next, T acts on the expression of
d(ϕ1,ϕ
∗) in p(ϕ1  ϕ∗). This represents both response error and transient effects
from factors within the particular choice instance. The model allows for the isola-
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tion of T from the stable component of the individual’s attitude u(ϕ1), such that
u(ϕ1) can also be isolated as the portion of the attitude that is relevant to social
decisions.
In order for this model to be relevant to public opinion measurement, it must
be plausible that a numerical representation of an attitude — a utility value — is
able to characterize the features of attitudes that are relevant to social decisions
of public policy. It is possible that the stable portion of the attitude represented
by u(ϕ1) is relevant to the social decision, even though the numerical form of that
attitude is not. In order for this representation to be relevant it must be meaningful
to place the strengths of an individual’s preferences, at least within each particular
policy domain (or choice context), on a single cardinal scale. However, such a
representation is a significant departure from the attitude theory typically given
by the attitudes literature in psychology. I must be more explicit then about the
way in which some utility scale can be said to represent a set of attitudes. In
my view, the utility scale represents the degree to which an attitude supports the
choice of the target alternative of that attitude relative to the degree to which the
attitudes of other alternatives support their target alternatives. Given that there
is no objective standard with which to compare attitudes, this model must rely
upon relative judgments. In section 5.2, I will present a means of interpreting each
individual set of responses by making use of certain descriptive statistics of each
individual scale, based upon psychological characteristics of the individual. This
strategy is intended to allow for a proper interpretation of each individual attitude
by making use of certain facts about each individual’s attitude structure.
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Before I move on to a consideration of how individual utility scales might be
constructed, I will consider a problem that arises for most attitude theories. It
may be the case that the precise identity of attitudes measured in any given choice
instance cannot be assured, because it can never be guaranteed that two different
choice instances actually involve identical attitudes. This is similar to the problem
of identifying the (proper) referent of an attitude. Differences in question wording
is one of the simplest examples of how different choice instances are thought to
nonetheless be instances of the same attitude. For instance, if one wants to deter-
mine whether an individual prefers more money spent on the arts (keeping all other
funding stable) or more money spent on space exploration (again keeping all other
funding stable), it is likely that the exact question wording could have an effect on
the set of considerations an individual uses in her response (tns from figure 4.2).
Therefore, when measuring an attitude itself and attempting to avoid systematic
biases due to particulars of question contexts, one may use several different word-
ings and question frames. However, it is not clear that asking an individual whether
she would rather support ”the arts” than ”space exploration,” is similar enough
to ”public funding of visual art, music, and other media” and ”the public develop-
ment of space travel technology” to trigger identical underlying attitudes. These two
comparisons may produce fundamentally different stable considerations, and there-
fore might best be modeled with two different pairs of attitudes. This produces
a significant worry that the theory of attitude measurement I have provided also
requires a substantive theory of attitude identification. Although I recognize that
this is an interesting problem, it is not a problem unique to my theory of attitudes,
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but rather is something at the center of many contemporary debates among survey
methodology theorists.23. Therefore, I will set this problem aside for the purposes
of this dissertation. I will assume that differences in semantic interpretation of a
question can be properly contained within the probability distribution over possible
consideration sets.
In this section, I presented a model of attitudes (in figure 4.2) that I think
shows how reason-based policy attitudes might produce unstable (stochastic) policy
preferences. Additionally, I have shown how these attitudes can be represented
in terms of differences of utility (in figure 4.4). In the next section, using this
utility attitude representation, I will show how individual utility assignments can
be derived from sets of stochastic preferences. This will then allow for a deeper
analysis of individual attitude sets, and eventually the significant comparison of
those attitude sets across individuals, resulting in an aggregate cardinal measure of
individual attitudes (i.e. a cardinal measure of public opinion).
4.3 Individual utility
There are a number of stochastic utility models that allow for the derivation of
a cardinal utility function over some set of alternatives Fi after having obtained the
stochastic preference relations between its members.24 I use a model that imposes
23See Schuman and Presser (1996) for an introduction to these problems.
24One important model that I will not utilize is from Luce (1959). This model is more demanding
than what I will use, but produces ratio-scale utility values instead of interval scale values. I
think that the conditions it places on the structure of individual preferences is unrealistically
demanding. Therefore, I will obtain ratio-scale significance by making assumptions about how
measured preferences relate to general patterns in individuals’ total set of preferences within some
choice context. I will describe this in section 5.2.
126
relatively weak requirements on the structure of stochastic preferences between al-
ternatives and yet still allows for the production of a cardinal utility function over
them. Specifically, this need only produce an interval -scale utility function; in the
literature these have been called strong utility models. Suppes et. al. (1989) present
an axiomatization of such a model that derives differences in utility assignments
from P -values. However, such a method only allows for meaningful distinctions in
utility differences between non-perfectly stable alternative pairs. Therefore, Suppes
et. al. also prove that local sets of non-perfectly stable alternatives can be strung
together to obtain an interval-scale utility function over an entire set of alternatives
(Fi), even when there are some perfectly stable preference-relations between some
of those alternatives.
A scale is formed by defining a difference structure for Fi. This structure
includes both an order of alternatives as well as an ordering of utility differences
between those alternatives. In such a difference structure, some real valued utility
function u over the set of alternatives under consideration {x, y, z, a, b, c} ∈ Fi can
be defined, and claims such as the following are possible:
u(x)− u(y) ≥ u(y)− u(z)
Furthermore, these differences are determined by P -values, such that the fol-
lowing is true:
u(x)− u(y) ≥ u(z)− u(a) ⇐⇒ p(x  y) ≥ p(z  a)
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With all alternatives ϕ ∈ Fi and x  y iff xRy ∧ p(x  y) ≥ 12 (where ‘R’ is
some binary relation), a unique strong utility model over some set of alternatives F
can be obtained iff the following conditions are satisfied:25
Comparability If x  y and x  z then yRz and if y  x and z  x then yRz.
Monotonicity Suppose xRy, yRz, xRz, aRb, bRc. If p(x  y) ≥ p(a  b) and
p(y  z) ≥ p(b  c), then aRc and p(x  z) ≥ p(a  c). Furthermore, if
either antecedent is a strict preference relation, then so is the conclusion.
Solvability If xRy, xRa, and p(x  y) ≥ t ≥ p(x  a) for some t ∈ (0, 1), then
there exists z ∈ Fi such that xRz and p(x  z) = t.
Connectedness For any x, y ∈ Fi that do not satisfy p(x  y) = 12 , there exists a
sequence x = x1, x2, x3 . . . xn = y ∈ Fi such that exactly one of the following
conditions holds with i = 0, . . . , n− 1: (i) xi  xi+1 or (ii) xi+i  xi.
The Monotonicity and Solvability conditions produce local interval scales be-
tween those alternatives that do not form perfectly stable P -values. The Com-
parability condition ensures that middle alternatives (in the above case, y, z) are
comparable with one another. The Connectedness condition ensures that all local
interval scales can be extended and joined throughout the entire set of measured
alternatives. This condition forces unique uni-dimensionality through the entire set
Fi rather than just within each internally comparable subset of Fi.
Assume that the stochastic preferences are consistent with the strong utility
25This axiomatization comes from Suppes et. al. (1989), pg. 392.
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model. According to this model it is possible to find an individual interval util-
ity scale over all measured alternatives in Fi from the set of individual stochastic
preferences over that set. This demonstrates that it is possible to obtain individ-
ual cardinal utility scales utilizing only sets of individual pair-wise judgments. As
I argued above, such judgments are less problematic than estimates of individual
interests or welfare, and so their use in the measurement of attitudes helps dimin-
ish worries about the subjectivity of individual utility measures. The strong utility
model provides a set of conditions that must be satisfied by the method for finding
individual utility scales, but it does not specify how exactly scale values should be
calculated. Therefore, I will have to provide a scaling method that is compatible
with the model. I will present one such method based on Thurstone’s “Law of Com-
parative Judgment” (Thurstone, 1959, chapter 3). Although this is certainly not
the only scaling method adequate to the task at hand, its mathematical details are
relatively conceptually clear.
Thurstone’s scaling method can be broken down into two main steps. First,
response proportions (P -values) are transformed into standardized scale differences
between all alternatives. Then all comparisons of alternatives are weighted based
upon the expected level of instability from transient features (T ) of each comparison.
These weighted comparisons are finally averaged for each alternative to obtain utility
scale values. In section 4.4.2, I present an example of such a scaling procedure, and
therefore it may help to read that section concurrently with this one.
Referring back to figure 4.4 (pg. 123), in the mathematically simplest case,
one can assume that the amount of instability created by different alternatives’ T s
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are identical. This assumption eliminates the need for unique weights on each pair-
wise comparison, which is required in the more general case. I am making this
assumption mostly for reasons of conceptual clarity, not because it is necessary to
produce a scale.26 I also assume that the effects of T s are normally distributed,
such the P -values produced by any utility difference can be found via the standard
cumulative normal distribution function (Φ) as shown in equation 4.1.27 This is
Thurstone’s Law of Comparative Judgment in its simplest form (“Case 5 ”), which
determines measured P -values based upon underlying scale value differences between
alternative pairs (ϕ1,ϕ2).
28 The normal form of the function Φ is determined by
the normality of the term T .
p(ϕ1  ϕ2) = Φ[u(ϕ1)− u(ϕ2)] (4.1)
However, in order to determine scale differences between two alternatives
(d(ϕ1,ϕ2)) from some P -values, the inverse cumulative normal distribution (Φ
−1)
must be used; this is also called a probit function in statistics.29 The method for
finding utility differences from P -values is shown in equation 4.2.
d(ϕ1,ϕ2) = u(ϕ1)− u(ϕ2) = Φ−1[p(ϕ1  ϕ2)] (4.2)
26Thurstone’s “Case 4,” for instance, offers a reasonably simple mathematical structure while
allowing for differences in the T s of each comparison.
27Just as with the standard normal distribution, this assumes a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1.
28For various relaxations of the assumptions required for the scaling method I use here see
Falmagne (1985), chapter 5.
29The probit function (like all quantile functions of which it is a type) is difficult to use, and re-
quires rather advanced mathematical methods to make calculations. Luckily, any standard spread-
sheet or statistical package provides a function for carrying out such calculations, because they are
quite common in statistics.
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Equation 4.2 only finds utility differences between all alternatives, and does
not directly produce a utility scale. Such a scale can be formed by calculating the
average difference between each alternative and all other alternatives; if equality
of all T s is not assumed then this must be a weighted average. If the conditions
of the strong utility model are satisfied, along with the additional assumptions I
have just made, then this scaling procedure will produce interval-scale individual
utility scales over all alternatives within the choice domain (Fi). This does not
yield a zero point that is meaningful across individual utility scales or allow for
immediate interpersonal comparisons of utility. However, it is not an arbitrary
assignment of cardinal utility differences. The assumptions I have made about the
normal distribution of dispersion effects of T s in the above attitude model and the
basic similarity of those effects across attitudes provide the non-arbitrary bases for
making these individual utility assignments.
Importantly, the above method is able to produce cardinal utility scales making
use of only patterns of pair-wise judgments (or choices) between alternatives. Thus,
this does not require individuals to provide utility values themselves, but rather de-
rives utility values from the choices of individuals. There is no entry for individual
subjective impressions of individuals’ own utilities, which are major sources of the
difficulty in interpreting individual cardinal utility measures. The task of the next
chapter will be to describe a non-arbitrary basis for making meaningful interper-
sonal comparisons of utility. Psychological characteristics shared by all individuals
that allow for assumptions about the patterns of individual utility assignments will
serve as this basis. However, in the next section, I will provide an example of how
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individual cardinal utility scales can be used to represent individual attitudes over
some set of policies.
4.4 An example from health care reform
4.4.1 Policy alternatives and attitudes
In this section, I will introduce an example that reveals how a cardinal utility
model can be used to represent public opinion. I will continue this example in
the next chapter (section 5.3). In this first part of the example, I will show how
individual utility functions over some set of policy alternatives can be found from
sets of stochastic preferences. Assume that there is some constituency (or society)
I composed of a set of individuals {I1, I2, I3} who are attempting to decide between
alternative public health care policies. Define a set of alternatives {x, y, z, a, b, c} ∈
Fi, where the alternatives have the following identities:
x Nationalized health care system
y Free health clinics for the poor
z Subsidies for full private health insurance for the poor
a Subsidies for catastrophic health insurance for the poor
b More tax deductions for health care costs
c Status quo30
30Assume that the society in question has a health care system similar to that in the United
States prior to the 2009 reforms.
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These identities will play no important role in the formal analysis of the indi-
vidual and social preferences, but they should give the reader an understanding of
the sorts of policy alternatives that might be modeled using the method I present
here.
In the ideal case, each individual is asked a series of questions that measure
the respondent’s preference for every alternative relative to every other alternative.
As I explain in section 4.1, the frequencies of responses are derived from a series
of comparisons of each alternative pair. To prevent the tendency of individuals to
respond consistently to identical question wordings, preferences about a single pair
of alternatives might be measured through a series of differently worded questions
comparing those alternatives. For instance, the pair x and z might be compared in
two separate trials (t1 and t2), using the following questions:
t1(x, z) In order to improve health care access for the poor, would you rather the
federal government completely nationalize the health care system or would
you rather it give poor individuals subsidies to buy private insurance on the
current market?
t2(x, z) In order to improve health care access for the poor, would you rather that
the federal government give individuals who cannot afford private health in-
surance subsidies, so that they can purchase insurance plans on the current
private market, or rather the federal government eliminate the entire current
private health care system, giving all individuals equal access to all health care
facilities regardless of their ability to pay?
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In a complete measurement of attitudes, each individual would answer ques-
tions in many such trials for each alternative pair, with each trial differing in the
precise manner in which individuals are asked about the pairs of alternatives. Each
trial would introduce different transient considerations into the individual’s response
(elements of T ), as I described in section 4.2.
Next I will show how a utility scale, satisfying the strong utility model, can be
derived from some set of P -values.
4.4.2 Utility scaling
Using the standard cumulative normal distribution function from equation 4.2
(section 4.3), one can find utility differences between all policy alternatives from a set
of P -values. I give a set of P -values for one individual in figure 4.5. Each cell of this
table contains the P -values for p(ϕ1  ϕ2), where ϕ1 is listed in the top row and ϕ2
is listed on the leftmost column. Therefore, P -values for alternatives should be read
down columns and not across rows. For purposes of demonstration, assume that this
individual would rank the policy alternatives as follows: x  y  z  a  b  c.
Throughout this example, I will name the individuals based upon their response
patterns. I intend this to help the readers conceptualize the individual and social
utility scales that will result from the scaling process. Given the definitions I have
provided the alternatives, this individual might best be called “The Socialist.”
Utility differences are then calculated from P -values. For instance, consider
the proportions obtained for z in figure 4.5. Substituting z for ϕ1 and y for ϕ2 in
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equation 4.2, yields Φ−1[p(z  y)] = Φ−1[0.4] = [u(z) − u(y)] = d(z, y) = −0.25.
Similarly, d(z, x) = −0.84 and d(z, a) = 0.52. These values, along with all other
utility differences, are shown in figure 4.6.
HHH
HHHϕ2
ϕ1 x y z a b c
x — 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.001 0.001
y 0.75 — 0.4 0.25 0.05 0.001
z 0.8 0.6 — 0.3 0.1 0.05
a 0.9 0.75 0.7 — 0.25 0.2
b 0.999 0.95 0.9 0.75 — 0.3
c 0.999 0.999 0.95 0.8 0.7 —




ϕ1 x y z a b c
x — -0.68 -0.84 -1.28 -3.09 -3.09
y 0.68 — -0.25 -0.67 -1.64 -3.09
z 0.84 0.25 — -0.52 -1.28 -1.64
a 1.28 0.67 0.52 — -0.67 -0.84
b 3.09 1.64 1.28 0.67 — -0.52
c 3.09 3.09 1.64 0.84 0.52 —
u1(ϕ1) 1.80 1.00 0.47 -0.19 -1.23 -1.84
Figure 4.6: Scale difference values (ϕ1 −ϕ2) for The Socialist (I1)
For simplicity, I assume that no comparisons yield P -values of 0 or 1, and
that the number of comparisons is very large. This allows me, in section 5.3, to
present a case in which some individual exhibits very stable preferences for some
alternatives as well as very unstable preferences for other alternatives. In actual
measurement situations it will be nearly impossible to obtain so many comparisons
of the alternatives from all individuals, and so it is likely that some individuals will
135
exhibit P -values of either 0 or 1. There are a number of ways to interpret such data
consistent with the procedure I have given for obtaining scale values, but I will not
deal with this in depth here.31
An averaging procedure over each column of utility difference values for each
alternative in figure 4.6 produces the scale values (found in row u1(ϕ1)) for each
alternative. This process produces interval -scale utility values, but utility levels
and zero-points are arbitrary, and so individual utility values cannot be directly
aggregated in a meaningful way to produce social utility values. In order to make the
meaningful comparisons of utility necessary to aggregate individual utility values,
some method must be used to transform the scaled values of all individuals to new
scales that are interpersonally comparable. I will do this in the next chapter, and
then continue this example in section 5.3.
31One obvious solution is to exclude all P -values of 0 or 1. This is Thurstone’s (1959) own method
in his classic studies of attitudes, in which he employs a scaling method similar to the one I use
here. However, excluding these extreme values will compress the resultant utility scale. In light of
this, it may be better to specify upper-bound P -values, with all P -values above that bound being
assigned the upper-bound value. This makes it safe to claim that the utility difference observed
for each alternative is at least as large as that which would obtain through some arbitrarily large
number of observations. This is a significant choice that must be made by any empirical researcher,
but luckily it will not change any conclusions of conceptual significance.
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Chapter 5: Cardinal Public Opinion and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility
In this chapter I will show how the individual utility model that I developed in
the last chapter faces the well-known problem of making interpersonal comparisons
of cardinal utility when those scales are aggregated. Such a social utility function is
identified with public opinion, which I have argued should be thought of as having
cardinal-scale measurability. The problem of how to find the opinion of a public
that is relevant to the decisions of representatives then turns out to be a special
case of the problem of making interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility. The
problem of how to make non-arbitrary (or “meaningful”) interpersonal comparisons
of utility strikes many people as being intractable, at least within many contexts.
Therefore, many readers may at this point have skepticism of this entire project, at
least insofar as it seems to rely upon the possibility of interpersonal comparisons
of utility. However, as I will argue in this chapter, the direct consideration of that
problem is necessary for an adequate explanation of how public opinion can be used
by political representatives. The solution I will present is also instructive for other
measurement domains in which interpersonal comparisons are necessary. I address
this in section 6.2.3.
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5.1 Interpersonal comparisons of utility
The most basic type of interpersonal comparisons of utility determines whether
some individual is made better-off (or worse-off) to a greater degree by a social
decision than another person. This can be determined using purely ordinal measures
of utility, and in fact it is possible to obtain full comparability using a purely ordinal
utility theory. However, such full comparability of ordinal scales requires that it
be possible to produce a single ranking of all utility assignments for all individual
utility scales such that for any two scales (u1 and u2) and any two alternatives (x
and y), something like the following statement is meaningful:
u1(x) > u2(y) > u1(y) > u2(x)
It is unclear, however, how one might go about justifying such an ordering;
it certainly could not be accomplished without substantive (and perhaps dubious)
assumptions about the meaning of individual measurements. The use of empathy in
order to infer such orders has received widespread attention among philosophers and
economists.1 This strategy largely relies upon the ability of individuals to infer the
welfare of other individuals when they are in various states, typically by utilizing
their own experiences of such states. It is plausible that a systematic empathetic
process might yield very accurate predictions of the welfare produced by various
social states, especially when the empathizer has a great deal of knowledge about
1This solution to interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility has been given a large amount
of attention in the literature. See Harsanyi (1955); Arrow (1977); Sen (1979); Goldman (1995).
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the target of that empathy. As Amartya Sen (1970) argues, such judgments are
commonplace. When I contemplate giving $100 to UNICEF it does not take great
effort for me to estimate that the money will do a starving African child more good
than it will do me. Such judgments become more difficult, but not different in kind,
when welfare differences are not as great. Therefore, there is no great conceptual
problem with interpersonal comparisons of utility. The problems that arise from
such comparisons arise from problems in measurement, and there do not seem to be
the same bases for cardinal interpersonal comparisons of utility that exist for ordinal
ones. Finding such a justification will be the primary objective of this chapter.
My presentation of cardinal interpersonal comparisons of utility will require an
understanding of various types of utility scales. I will primarily rely upon the clas-
sification system introduced by S.S. Stevens (1946), which has become the standard
way of classifying measurement scales in the physical and social sciences. Scale types
are typically defined by the types of transformations under which the scale remains
invariant. For instance, ordinal scales remain invariant under all positive transfor-
mations, because no such transformations affect the order of utilities. However, for
all cardinal utility functions the differences between utilities are significant metrics,
and therefore only positive linear functions maintain invariance. For instance, the
order of the utilities along a scale are unaffected by a positive exponential function,
though that function changes the differences along that scale. A subset of cardinal
scales, called ratio scales, are not invariant even under those linear scales that alter
the zero-point. Cardinal scales that fail to be ratio scales are called interval scales.
Although the invararience conditions define scale types, those types also have
139
various significant metrics. Obviously, for ordinal scales only the orders of alterna-
tives are of significance. For interval scales (and ratio scales), the ratios of utility
differences are significant. To see this, consider two utility differences between x
and y (d(x, y)) and y and z (d(y, z)). A meaningful metric for the interval scale
containing all three alternatives is:
d(x, y)
d(y, z)
Any function that alters this value will also alter the utility scale; according
to the definition of the interval scale, this value will not change as long as the
transformation function is a positive linear one. It is typically said that such scales
have significant utility differences, and while this is technically not true, because the
values of differences are not significant but only the ratios of them are, I will use
this language when discussing interval scales. Finally, notice that the significance of
utility differences permits the establishment of a significant unit for that scale. Any
utility difference between any two alternatives can be assigned the unit value ‘1’,
and the rest of the utility differences can be adjusted to maintain identical ratios of
differences.
The ratios of utility values themselves are also significant for ratio scales.
Consider the values of x, y, z; if these alternatives are along the same ratio scale,










In fact, if these alternatives complete the scale, the above ratios totally char-
acterize the utility structure of the scale. This requires that a zero-point has signif-
icance, something that is not true of interval scales.
The types of scales are related to the types of interpersonal comparability,
though the type of scales do not determine the types of comparability between
them. So, for instance, two different scales may both meet the requirements to be
interval scales internally, but utility differences may not be significant between scales.
For most purposes, it is enough that the units of cardinal scales be comparable.
This allows for meaningful comparisons between utility differences, which makes
the following sorts of statements possible:
Differences u1(x)− u1(y) > u2(y)− u2(x)
However, because these scales do not share meaningful zero-points, it is not
meaningful to make the following sorts of statements:
Order u1(x) > u2(y) > u1(y) > u2(x)
Product u1(x) > u2(y) ∗ 2
Two interval scales, therefore, may share units but yet it may be impossible to
order utility values of those scales along a single scale, even though such an ordering
is trivial to form within each scale.
A stronger form of comparability, called the comparability of utility levels, al-
lows for meaningful statements about utility values in addition to differences. This
makes significant all three types of statements from above (Difference, Order, and
141
Product). Comparability of utility levels allows for the placement of the utility val-
ues of individuals along a single linear scale, because there is some meaningful point
along which all scales can be aligned. Comparability of units does not allow this,
because it only gives information about the utility values relative to other utility val-
ues within each individual scale. Unit comparability allows one to make judgments
of overall utility differences between two alternatives across some set of comparable
individual scales, but it does not allow for any operations beyond addition (and sub-
traction). For instance, it is not possible to say that the utility some individual I1
assigns to x is twice as great as what some other individual I2 assigns to y, because
there is no meaningful zero point shared by their two utility scales. This precludes
the use of an averaging procedure to aggregate utility values. Some reflection will
reveal that it is actually quite difficult to obtain unit comparability without sub-
stantial knowledge, or at least assumptions that presuppose some knowledge, about
the systems being measured. In fact, this sort of comparability does not exist in
some rather mundane examples from the natural sciences.
The problem of how one makes meaningful comparisons between various mea-
sured scales arises in nearly every domain of science. Typically, scientists overcome
this problem by making basic assumptions about all individual data sources ; such
assumptions allow for the statistical inferences that characterize most scientific find-
ings. In the case of psychology, certain assumptions are usually made about the
cognitive structures of all individuals. These are assumptions specific to particular
theoretical contexts, and possibly not applicable in others. A simple case will illus-
trate this. Consider two thermometers that both measure temperature in Celsius,
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but neither of which are perfectly calibrated. In other words, the output of the
thermometers are simple translations of one another, so that the output of one is
equal to the output of the other plus some constant value. Given these assumptions,
it can be assured that comparisons of the magnitudes of differences on these scales
are meaningful; the units of the thermometers are the same. However, compar-
isons of scale levels are not meaningful, because the thermometers have different
zero-points.2 In other words, the zero-points of the two thermometers refer to dif-
ferent levels of kinetic energy when used to measure the same system. However,
comparisons of scale differences between either of these thermometers and a third
thermometer that measures temperature in Fahrenheit, or some other unit, is not
meaningful without the use of a function that transforms either the Fahrenheit or
Celsius scales. Such a function applies both a constant translation to the scale as
well as some multiplier to account for differences in the units.
The proper transformation required to compare two thermometers is easy to
apply, as long as it is assumed that they are indeed working thermometers. Given
two properly working thermometers (u1 and u2) then, the measurement of any two
states (x and y) by those thermometers can form the basis of a unit transformation
between those scales. However, this only arises because the physical theory about
temperature and working thermometers allows for a simple transformation function
between scales, when some unit multiplier m is known, such that:






Additionally, m can be found from the measurement of any two states x
and y through simple algebra, because it can be stipulated that for any state y,
u1(y) = u2(y) = 0 (where 0 can also be any other value). Of course, nothing like
this simple function exists in the case of any standard utility theory. There is no
expectation that some individual’s valuation of an alternative must be related to
another individual’s valuation of that same alternative in the same way that it is
expected that two working thermometers agree on the measurement of some sin-
gle energy state. Therefore, it is unlikely that comparisons of utility scales will be
so straightforward. However, less straightforward scale transformations common in
other domains offer a clue as to how meaningful comparisons of individual utility
scales might be made.
Another example will show how context-specific assumptions are used within
the social sciences to accommodate the often large differences in baseline individual
response tendencies in psychological experiments. Consider a case in which an ex-
perimenter wants to determine whether some training technique improves reading
speed. The simplest method for measuring this is to randomly divide a sample of
subjects into two groups, those who receive the extra reading training (the “Manip-
ulation” condition) and those who only receive an unrelated sort of training (the
“Control” condition). All subjects can then be asked to read some passage with
the expectation that they will later be tested for reading comprehension, and the
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number of words that they read in some interval of time can be measured. Assume
that the experimenter obtains data from 12 subjects (one for each cell), which is
shown in figure 5.1.
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean
Control 72 62 53 100 91 46 70.7
Manipulation 82 65 60 105 92 50 75.5
Figure 5.1: Number of words read
One standard method to determine whether some manipulation has an effect
on performance is to use a statistical hypothesis test called the “t-test.” If the
sample means of two conditions are different enough (and/or error small enough),
then the t-test rejects the statistical hypothesis that the means of their populations
are identical. Though, given that this is a statistical test, there is still some small
probability (often .05 or .01) that the test rejects the hypothesis when in fact the
population means are identical. In the example from figure 5.1, even though the
mean value for the Manipulation is greater than that of the Control, a t-test finds
there to be no statistically significant difference between the two conditions; the vari-
ability between individual reading speeds, regardless of the condition, overwhelms
any systematic difference between the conditions.3
The problem of large variability between individuals, unrelated to differences
in the two conditions, can be avoided by testing each individual in both conditions.
Sometimes this is not appropriate, but by repeating the two conditions for all sub-
jects the systematic variability between subjects is eliminated from the analysis of
3The probability that the Manipulation condition does not produce higher scores than the
Control condition is 0.69 with a two-tailed t-test, assuming equal variance in the two conditions.
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systematic differences between the conditions. In the above case, treating each col-
umn in figure 5.1 as a subject will represent such a repeated analysis for six (instead
of twelve) subjects. A t-test of that experiment shows that subjects read signifi-
cantly more words in the Manipulation condition than in the Control condition.4
The key for my purposes is that a repeated experimental structure allows for the
interpretation of the experimental results (the Manipulation condition) within the
context of each subject’s responses from the Control condition. This is a very sim-
ple example of using individual response tendencies to interpret other responses by
that individual, and even with only two data points such a procedure permits a
much more powerful analysis of the experimental results. However, the results of
these statistical methods are only meaningful once some basic assumptions about
the source of the data are made; without such assumptions it is largely impossible
to make inferences in most scientific contexts. For instance, the t-test requires that
random error be distributed normally and for measurements to be independent.
This general theme, that assumptions plausible within a specific theoretical context
allow for a better interpretation of data, will guide the construction of the public
opinion model I provide here.
A related type of data interpretation is the normalization procedure. One
simple form of normalization that many are familiar with is the “curving” of exam
scores. Consider a case in which one wants to know whether a student did “better”
(represented with ‘’) on the midterm than on the final exam. Assume that both
4The probability that the Manipulation condition does not produce higher average scores than
the Control condition is 0.01 with a two-tailed t-test, assuming that the two conditions are repeated.
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exam scores are out of 100 possible points: the score of the midterm (m) = 70 and
the score for the final (f) = 55. The simplest method for interpreting “better” in
this context is to use the “raw” score, so that in this case m  f . However, as
anyone who has ever given or written an exam can attest, this is also probably the
wrong interpretation. Rather, knowledge about the relative difficulties of the exams
should be used in interpreting the scores, and usually the best method of obtaining
this information is by inferring it from the test scores of all tested students. One
common method of interpreting exam scores is to assign them grades based upon
score percentile; although a normalization procedure could also assign normalized
scores to raw scores, it will be simpler to examine how normalized grades can be
assigned to raw scores. For instance, if the midterm has a mean score of 71 and
the final has a mean score of 40, then under most standard methods for assigning
grades, it is likely right to say that f  m. In the standard case of grade “curving,”
the letter grade assigned to an exam score is determined by the percentile of the
population of scores that the exam score lies above. For instance, an ‘A’ may be
assigned to scores in the top 13% of the population of exam scores, a ‘B’ to the top
40% of scores that are below the top 13%, and so on. Importantly, the statistical
features of the population of test scores is not directly accessible, but can only be
inferred from the sample of scores, where the sample is the set of students who
wrote the exam in any given case. More precisely, it must be assumed that the
students who take some exam after attending some class are a random sample from
the population of possible students. There should be nothing unique about the set
of students who actually attended the class and wrote the exam; they are no better
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or worse students than some other possible set of students. If this condition is not
satisfied, if say there is reason to think that the set of students who wrote the exam
in this case is worse than the population of students, then there would seem to be no
reason to normalize scores using the “curving” procedure such that scores improve;
it would be correct to interpret those students’ scores as worse than average, and
so it would be correct to assign them lower than average test scores. The structure
of this example is important, and I will use a related method to make comparisons
between utility scales of public policy attitudes. However, one should also draw
a more general conclusion from this example: normalization techniques are widely
used to allow for meaningful comparisons between measurement scales, even though
such processes (such as exam score “curving”) are rarely thought of as methods of
making inter-scale (or interpersonal) comparisons.
My examples up until this point have dealt with scales that are typically not
measured using “utility,” but some may argue that utility theory presents a special
problem for the comparison of scales. Interpersonal comparisons of utility in wel-
fare economics and social choice theory have typically been treated interchangeably.
There is some good reason for this, because the purely formal findings relevant to in-
terpersonal comparisons are applicable to both fields. However, the theoretical basis
for utility in welfare economics and social choice theory are importantly different,
such that it may be possible to make sense of interpersonal comparisons of utility
in the context of social choices even when it may not be possible in the context of
welfare economics. In the case of individual welfare, the sort of assumptions that
would be required for interpersonal comparisons of utility are certainly complex. As
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has often been argued, there seems to be little grounding for measurements that
would yield comparable scales, because personal welfare is too complicated and in-
herently subjective.5 In contrast to welfare economics, in social choice theory the
term ‘utility’ need only be considered a term of art; it refers to any cardinalization
of individual preference sets, but generally does not bring with it any specific inter-
pretation.6 In this social choice context, claims about utility differences represent
differences in the magnitude of preferences. They need not imply that some choice
would actually improve the welfare (or any other notion of utility) of the individual,
and it is likely implausible to say that welfare is fully determined by preference
satisfaction.
‘Preference’ itself is a technical term in social choice theory, and normally its
precise interpretation can be left out of any social choice analysis. However, a rela-
tively specific interpretation of this concept is necessary for one to make substantive
assumptions about the source of utility values, and the method I present here will
depend upon certain assumptions about this source. As should be obvious from the
previous chapters, I will interpret preferences as representations of individual atti-
tudes about alternatives. Individual attitudes, when characterized in a particular
way, are simple enough entities that they allow for straightforward interpretation
and eventual comparability. This distinguishes them from individual welfare or in-
terests, which are typically characterized as having complex structures, the specifics
of which are of great controversy. There is comparatively a great deal of agreement
5Such a view has been frequently expressed, but see Robbins’ (1952) famous presentation of it.
6For an overview of the use of ‘utility’ in social choice theory and economics see Broome (1999).
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about the basic form of attitudes, and especially the attitudes about public policies
(see my discussion in 4.2).
As in the case of temperature scales and exam grades, meaningful compar-
isons between different utility scales require some understanding of the underlying
phenomenon that produces those scales, or at least the determination of some rela-
tionship between them. Arrovian social choice theory, which excludes interpersonal
comparisons of utility, is premised on there being no necessary relationship between
individual utility scales, but this is only one possible relationship. I will argue that
the public policy attitudes of most individuals are related to each other in some
describable way.
5.2 Interpersonal comparisons and social utility
In this section, I will impose a number of assumptions on the source of indi-
vidual utility assignments to permit similar interpretations of all individual utility
values within a choice context (Dj).
7 In terms of attitude strength, I impose as-
sumptions about the underlying sources of individual attitudes in order to provide
similar interpretations for measurements of individual attitude strengths. When
this interpretive framework is applied across individuals, this allows for ratio-scale
measureability of individual utility assignments and full ratio-scale interpersonal
comparisons of utility between individuals.8 Although these assumptions are given
7This is identical to Di, but in this chapter I will use the index ‘i’ for ui
8Note that this ratio-scale measurability arises from individual utility data that only has
interval-scale measurability. The underlying assumptions then will provide both additional struc-
ture to individual scales as well as provide a means to compare them.
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in terms of utilities themselves, they will be justified by making reference to psy-
chological processes, and specifically the structure of attitudes. I will begin with a
number of simplifying assumptions about the basic structure of the space of util-
ity assignments. Assume that each individual’s set of utility assignments over all
possible alternatives (Dj) within some context of choice can be described by some
frequency distribution of alternatives in Dj over possible utility assignments.
9 Fig-
ure 5.2 shows two such distributions, with the x-axis equal to possible utility as-
signments and the y-axis equal to the frequency of alternatives being assigned each
utility value. These distributions can be thought of as dispositions to assign various
utilities. Next, assume that the set of alternatives under consideration (Fj) is a
Random Sample from Dj, such that the probability of a randomly selected alterna-
tive having any given utility can be given by some probability distribution over the
set of utility assignments. This is a standard set of assumptions needed for some
descriptive statistics of a sample to approximate those of a population. I take the
Random Sample condition to be uncontroversial. It does not mean that the alter-
natives must be chosen in some random fashion, but just that the utility values an
individual assigns to them are not used in any non-random selection process of the
alternatives under consideration.
My goal will be to show how full ratio-scale interpersonal comparisons might
be made meaningful. Up until this point, I have argued that individual utility dif-
ferences are meaningful, because they are derived from a behavioral method. I have
9A choice context contains a set of alternatives that are comparable. These contexts will likely
be rather large, containing perhaps all public health care policies or tax policies, but will exclude
many alternatives. For instance, it may not make sense to compare health care policies to foreign
policies, and so they may be in different choice contexts.
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also claimed that the attitudes of all individuals are structured in roughly similar
ways, consistent with figure 4.4 (pg. 123). This assumption might be tightened by a
claim that individuals have identical attitude structures, though this is something I
will eventually reject. According to the tightened assumption about the structure of
individual attitudes, all that differs between individuals are the actual utilities they
assign the alternatives; their T s (from figure 4.4) and their general utility assign-
ment dispositions are identical. Nonetheless, zero-points of individual utility scales
would still be arbitrary, because these are the result of arbitrary scaling decisions
and did not arise from individual behaviors. By assuming that the population of
alternatives Dj forms a uniform distribution over utility assignments, and the set of
alternatives under consideration Fj is sampled randomly from Dj, then the mean of
ui(Fj) approximates the mean utility value of the population ui(Dj). All individual
utility scales can then be translated such that the mean utility value for each indi-
vidual scale is aligned. After such a translation, a simple averaging procedure will
be fully sensitive to the utility information available within the individual utility
functions. Call this the translate and average procedure.
The use of translate and average is based upon indefensible structural assump-
tions, because there are likely to be individual differences in the ability of individuals
to express their underlying utility differences in pair-wise choices. In terms of the
attitude model shown in figure 4.4, it is likely that T s will differ between individuals,
or at least there seems to be little reason to think that they will not vary. But it
turns out that an equally difficult problem exists with the sort of normative assump-
tion that must be made for translate and average to be appropriately involved in the
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social decision process. Call this assumption Expert Preference: ”experts” (those
with smaller T s, and thus less error per choice situation) and those with overall
stronger attitudes should both have more overall say in the social decision. The case
in which all T s are identical across individuals allows for a special case of Expert
Preference, in which there are no “experts” and only those with stronger attitudes,
but the core problem remains. Both versions of Expert Preference violate norms
of basic fairness that are central to democratic theory. More precisely, translate
and average seems to violate a principle that all individuals must have equal overall
influence on social decisions.10 Later in this section, I will show that this principle
can be captured by a normative assumption called Overall Fairness.
Consider a new method called normalize and average. It retains Random
Sample from the translate and average model, but it assumes that each individual
population of utility values is distributed normally (instead of uniformly) and that
both the mean and variance of those normal distributions must be used to properly
interpret individual utility assignments. According to translate and average only
the mean of ui(Dj) is a significant statistic, but under normalize and average the
variance is also significant. Additionally, the utility assignments over Fj (the sample)
can be used to determine both the mean and variance of the distribution. This
has the result of significantly constraining the meaningfulness of individual utility
differences from the scaling method alone; in order to determine the interpersonally
meaningful differences, one must make a further assumption about the variance of
10A similar principle also holds for Range Voting, which allows individuals to give candidates
cardinal scores that are then aggregated to determine a social decision function. See Pivato (2013).
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the population of all utility assignments by that individual.
The normality of individual populations of utility assignments is justified by
assuming that each individual is disposed to make certain types of utility assign-
ments. This psychological fact about each individual permits a proper interpreta-
tion of individual utility assignments. In the psychological literature about attitudes
these are called “dispositional attitudes” (Hepler and Albarracin, 2013). Research
involving these dispositional attitudes typically classifies individuals into categories
based upon their dispositions to form certain types of attitudes. For instance, the
tendencies of individuals to form negatively valenced or positively valenced attitudes
might differ between individuals. This can be easily represented in terms that I have
already introduced. Assume that the dispositions of individuals can be characterized
by normal probability distributions, with specific means and standard deviations.
Distributions may also differ in their skewness, such that a normal distribution with
a positive skew, like that shown in figure 5.3, represents an individual disposed to
having more negatively valenced attitudes; it might be best to call this individual
a “pessimist.” In terms of utility, the individual is disposed to assign “below av-
erage” utilities. The inclusion of skewed-normal distributions in the set of possible
attitude representations increases the generality of the attitude model. However,
for simplicity, I will assume that all individuals are neutrally disposed, such that
their dispositions can be represented by non-skewed normal distributions, which can
differ in their means and variances. In other words, individuals differ in the size of















Figure 5.3: A “pessimist”
Given the fact that Fj (the alternatives under consideration) is a random
sample from Dj, the mean and standard deviation of the utility assignments over Fj
can be used to estimate those of the normal distribution of a individual’s disposition.
For instance, consider two individual dispositions for utility assignments (u1 and u2)
over Dj shown in figure 5.2. Four utility values (2, 3, 4, 5) are plotted on the x-axis.
11
The differing dispositions against which u1 and u2 are interpreted means that utility
differences in u1 are less significant than those same utility differences in u2. This
is because the individual who exhibits u1 tends to produce larger utility differences
than the individual who exhibits u2. Therefore, the difference between say 4 and 5 is
more significant for u2 than it is for u1. This degree of significance can be represented
as normalization transformations of u1 and u2; each utility function is replaced by
a normalized function ti(Fj) for each individual i. These new transformed utility
scales have meaningful zero points, which are the estimated means of the frequency
distributions over ui(Dj). They also permit comparability of units, which turn out
to be the number of standard deviations from the mean. Taken together, these
11Note that each value might be assigned to different alternatives for each individual, such that
for example u1(y) = 3 and u2(x) = 3.
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also bring about interpersonal comparability of utility values themselves, or full
ratio-scale comparability. This renders meaningful the following sorts of statements
about the utility values in figure 5.2 where, for example, the transformed value of
assignment 2 by u1 is represented as t1(2):
1. t1(3) = t2(4) = 0
2. 2 ∗ (t1(5)− t1(4)) = t2(5)− t2(4)
3. t1(5) = t2(5)
4. −(t2(5)) = t2(3)
The above mathematical statements are instructive about the level of com-
parison permitted by normalize and average. Zero points are placed at the inferred
means of the populations of utilities (item 1), and then units can be compared based
upon the standard deviation of each distribution. Item 2 shows that each difference
in utility of 1 for u2 is equivalent to 2 units of utility for u1. With the comparison
of zero points and units, this allows for comparisons of utility values (item 3). Ad-
ditionally, meaningful zero points provide a meaningfulness to positive and negative
values (item 4). This is full ratio-scale comparability. Notice that the structure of
the transformed utility function (ti(Fj)) is a result of the form of the distribution
representing the dispositional attitude. For instance, a positively skewed distribu-
tion of an individual with a negatively valenced dispositional attitude (a “pessimist”
from figure 5.3), would result in a transformation function that produces larger dif-
ferences for equal changes to the right of the median than to the left.12 Because the
12Skewed distributions introduce additional complexities in identifying the point of central ten-
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individual is already more disposed to assign “worse than average” utilities to alter-
natives, utility differences between alternatives that are rated “better than average”
are more significant than those that are rated “worse than average.”
If the normalization method provides the basis for meaningful full ratio-scale
interpersonal comparisons of utility, then an average of the normalized utilities could
plausibly provide a significant measurement of the aggregate attitudes (the public
opinion). This then provides a basis for the use of attitude strengths in the mea-
surement of public opinion. In section 5.3, I provide an example of a normalization
function that is able to represent the relative significance of utility differences and
values in this way. It may help the reader to go through that example in order to
understand what the normalization function might look like.
The structural assumptions on utility that I have just given are largely em-
pirical, and so no wholly conceptual argument could make them any more than
plausible; I certainly cannot prove that they hold in normal cases of public policy
attitudes. Although there is support for the existence of certain dispositional atti-
tude types in the empirical literature (Hepler and Albarracin, 2013), the existence
of dispositional attitudes characterized by normally distributed utility assignments
can also be supported by the following specific intuition: in most choice contexts
people assess a few alternatives as being excellent, a few as terrible, with most al-
ternatives falling somewhere in between. Such generalizations about restaurants,
books, and wines (just to name a few) seem reasonable, but I think that this intu-
dency, because the mean and median (two standard measurements of central tendency) are not
identical, unlike in the case with the non-skewed normal distribution. For a number of reasons,
the median is likely a more appropriate measure of central tendency than the mean for such
distributions, but I will not discuss this here.
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ition extends to public policy alternatives as well. And note that in a more general
theory it need only be possible to describe each individual as having some disposi-
tional attitude, rather than just the neutral disposition that is represented by the
normal distribution. In principle, any individuals with dispositions capable of being
represented by some variant of the normal distribution (including skewed-normal)
can be meaningfully compared to one another, with each individual’s distribution
serving as the basis for interpersonal comparisons. This consideration is in need of
further elaboration, but I have only meant to show its general plausibility here.
The argument for the use of information about dispositional attitudes in the
interpretation of utility scales can then be characterized as follows: in order for
the significance of an individual’s responses to be understood, something about
her general tendencies (or dispositions) must first be known. For example, when
someone who generally responds negatively toward alternatives — meaning that
she has a negatively valenced dispositional attitude — reacts positively toward an
alternative under consideration, this should be interpreted as being more significant
than when someone who has a positively valenced dispositional attitude reacts in the
same way. Similarly, when someone who usually does not exhibit strong attitudes
does so, this is more significant than when someone who normally exhibits strong
attitudes exhibits those same attitudes. There is a final point that gets to the core
of the strategy I suggest here. The individual utility scales I produced in section
4.4 were interval scales, meaning that only the utility differences were meaningful;
this is what is implied by the strong utility model, which serves as the basis of the
scaling method. However, this means that the zero point is not given any special
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significance, and so the scale does not permit meaningful multiplication or division,
nor does it permit meaningful full interpersonal comparisons of ratio-scale utilities.
One intention of the structural assumptions I have just given is to make the zero
point of each utility function significant. In other words, these assumptions make
significant the fact that some utilities are above and others below the mean utility
value. This role for the utility assumptions is important, because it allows for a
meaningful normalization procedure for the individual utility scales, even though
such a procedure would not produce meaningful results if the utility values were
only interpreted by way of the strong utility model. This is necessary because the
specific normalization procedure I present in section 5.3 requires that individual
utility values be divided by a measure of variance in order to obtain the normalized
utility value, and the result of such division is not directly meaningful for interval-
scale values.
The fact that something is interpreted as significant does not necessarily make
it proper or just to use it in making a social decision. Such decisions must be guided
by some normative (or moral) principles. And just as there is a normative assump-
tion that coincides with the structural assumptions of translate and average, there
are normative assumptions that coincide with normalize and average. Again these
normative assumptions play two possible purposes. First, they show how struc-
turally significant utility values are appropriate for use in social decisions. Secondly,
they show how ambiguities in structural significance might sometimes be ignored on
normative grounds.
The use of normalize and average can be supported by two normative assump-
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tions about democratic social decision rules: Special Interests and Overall Fairness.
Special Interests states that any individual who has a stronger attitude for some al-
ternative x over some other alternative y should have more influence on the resultant
social utility difference between those two alternatives than some other individual
who has a weaker attitude toward those two alternatives. Overall Fairness requires
that all individuals must have equal influence on the resultant social utility scale.
The desirability of Special Interests requires the understanding of the source of utility
differences within individual utility functions. The strong utility model that served
as the basis for the utility scaling procedure I presented in section 4.3 derives utility
differences from differences in measured preference stabilities (P -values). However,
this in itself does not provide an interpretation of preference stability necessary to
determine the relevance of such differences to public policy decisions. Luckily, the
attitude theory presented in section 4.2 offers just such an explanation for this. If it
is assumed that individuals are generally able to exhibit their underlying attitudes
in similar ways between different pairs of alternatives (i.e. that T s are similar for all
comparisons by each individual), then stability differences represent significant dif-
ferences in utility within each individual’s utility function. But this may not permit
the use of measures of overall differences in preference stability between individuals,
unless it is assumed that T s are the same for all individuals. I have already argued
that it is implausible that the T s of all individuals are identical, because this would
deny the existence of individual differences in response tendencies. Because Special
Interests does not rely upon this assumption, it does not fail in the same way as
Expert Preference does.
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The dynamics of the normalize and average method illuminates certain fea-
tures of Overall Fairness that are important to its suitability in democratic decision
making. According to normalize and average, as the utility an individual assigns
to any alternative moves further from the mean of the set of the individual’s utility
assignments, its influence on the social choice function approaches a limit and the
influence of the individual’s other attitudes approaches zero. Although some individ-
ual or group may have more influence over the social utilities of some subset of the
alternatives, this will always decrease influence of that individual or group over the
social utilities of the other alternatives.13 Additionally, for social decisions within
large groups, the effect of Special Interests will be small when the sub-group pos-
sessing the strong attitude is small. Even when some large minority group exhibits
very strong attitudes in favor of (or against) some alternative, the normalization
procedure only gives that preference more weight as weight is taken away from the
group’s other preferences. It may be best then to think of a group or individual
with strong attitudes as having weight redistributed from weaker attitudes to those
stronger ones, rather than more weight being given to the stronger attitudes.14
In this section, I have not attempted to come to any firm conclusions about
which principles should be chosen, but rather have intended to show how deliberation
on that issue might go. In the next section, I will continue the example I began in
13The measurement of “influence” is complex and I will not deal with it in detail here. This can
perhaps, crudely, be measured by the total absolute values of the differences contained within an
individual utility function.
14This is similar in certain respects to the Adjusted Winner fair-division procedure (Brams and
Taylor, 1996). However, whereas the Adjusted Winner procedure makes use of individual (sub-
jective) reports of the relative importance of the various goods to determine the best distribution
of goods, my model measures and infers the relative significance of individual preferences from
choice behaviors (or judgments).
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section 4.4, demonstrating how translate and average and normalize and average can
be used to make cardinal measurements of public opinion. More importantly, I will
show how they differ. Then, in section 5.4 I will give an argument for why normalize
and average might be thought to instantiate the general will I introduced in chapter
2, thus making it an appropriate model for the Duty of Political Responsiveness I
introduced in chapter 3.
5.3 An example of social utility from health care reform
A continuation of the example from the previous chapter will reveal how a
normalization technique can produce interpersonally comparable utility functions
that suitably represent public opinion, even when those individual utility scales
arise from stochastic preferences of differing stabilities. Consider a utility function
ui(F1) for each individual Ii ∈ I, from which a set of individual transformation
functions (ti ◦ ui)(F1) can be found. For simplicity, assume that all members of
I are Moderates.15 These transformation functions transform utility values for all
individuals into normalized versions that take into account the mean and variance
of each individual’s utility values. After such transformations are complete for all
individual utility functions, a social choice function can find meaningful cardinal
social utility for all alternatives. For clarity of presentation, I will use an averaging
procedure to find these social utilities, though any number of functions may be used.
An averaging procedure has been preferred by many theorists, especially utilitarians,
15I described this condition and the more general conditions it depends upon in section 5.2.
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for a number of reasons 16 Perhaps the most obvious is the equal consideration it
seems to give all individuals, at least in its unweighted form. It seems to be a
natural and simple starting point for any cardinal social choice function, and so I
use it exclusively in my example here. However, my conceptual conclusions do not
depend upon its use.
Figure 5.9 shows the set of utility functions for the individuals in I, U =
{u1, u2, u3} and the normalized versions of those functions Ut = {t1, t2, t3}, all over
the set of alternatives F1 = {x, y, z, a, b, c}. Note that the individual utility scale
u1 is for the “The Socialist” that I introduced in section 4.4.2, figures 4.5 and 4.6,
and I repeat the utility values for “The Socialist” in figure 5.4. The P -values and
utility values for the individuals I2 and I3 are given in figures 5.5 to 5.8. Given their
utility scales, it might be useful to call I2 “The Risk-averse Centrist” and I3 “The
Apathetic Libertarian,” in a similar sense as I have called I1 “The Socialist.”
HH
HHHHϕ2
ϕ1 x y z a b c
x — -0.68 -0.84 -1.28 -3.09 -3.09
y 0.68 — -0.25 -0.67 -1.64 -3.09
z 0.84 0.25 — -0.52 -1.28 -1.64
a 1.28 0.67 0.52 — -0.67 -0.84
b 3.09 1.64 1.28 0.67 — -0.52
c 3.09 3.09 1.64 0.84 0.52 —
u1(ϕ1) 1.80 1.00 0.47 -0.19 -1.23 -1.84
Figure 5.4: Scale difference values (ϕ1 −ϕ2) for The Socialist (I1)
“The Risk-averse Centrist” (I2) is so named because she generally has “cen-





ϕ1 x y z a b c
x — 0.9999999 0.999999999 0.99999 0.999 0.99999999
y 0.0000001 — 0.6 0.25 0.2 0.55
z 0.000000001 0.4 — 0.3 0.1 0.45
a 0.00001 0.75 0.7 — 0.25 0.75
b 0.001 0.8 0.9 0.75 — 0.85
c 0.00000001 0.45 0.55 0.25 0.15 —
Figure 5.5: P -values (p(ϕ1  ϕ2)) for The Risk-averse Centrist (I2)
HHH
HHHϕ2
ϕ1 x y z a b c
x — 5.20 6.00 4.26 3.09 5.61
y -5.20 — 0.25 -0.67 -0.84 0.13
z -6.00 -0.25 — -0.52 -1.28 -0.13
a -4.26 0.67 0.52 — -0.67 0.67
b -3.09 0.84 1.28 0.67 — 1.04
c -5.61 -0.13 0.13 -0.67 -1.04 —
u2(ϕ1) -4.83 1.27 1.64 0.61 -0.15 1.46
Figure 5.6: Scale difference values (ϕ1 −ϕ2) for The Risk-averse Centrist (I2)
trist” policy attitudes, but is especially averse to radical changes like x (a nation-
alized health care system). Likewise, I3 is named “The Apathetic Libertarian,” be-
cause although she slightly favors libertarian-friendly policies (tax deductions and
subsidies rather than nationalization and free services) she only prefers those alter-
natives a small degree more than other alternatives. Her stochastic preferences and
utility values are shown in figure 5.7 and 5.8.
The utility scales can be transformed into normalized versions through a rel-
ativization of each utility scale to its mean and standard deviation. Assuming that





ϕ1 x y z a b c
x — 0.4 0.45 0.6 0.65 0.55
y 0.6 — 0.55 0.7 0.75 0.65
z 0.55 0.45 — 0.65 0.7 0.6
a 0.4 0.3 0.35 — 0.55 0.45
b 0.35 0.25 0.3 0.45 — 0.4
c 0.45 0.35 0.4 0.55 0.6 —
Figure 5.7: P -values (p(ϕ1  ϕ2)) for The Apathetic Libertarian (I3)
HHH
HHHϕ2
ϕ1 x y z a b c
x — -0.25 -0.13 0.25 0.39 0.13
y 0.25 — 0.13 0.52 0.67 0.39
z 0.13 -0.13 — 0.39 0.52 0.25
a -0.25 -0.52 -0.39 — 0.13 -0.13
b -0.39 -0.67 -0.52 -0.13 — -0.25
c -0.13 -0.39 -0.25 0.13 0.25 —
u3(ϕ1) -0.08 -0.39 -0.23 0.23 0.39 0.08
Figure 5.8: Scale difference values (ϕ1 −ϕ2) for The Apathetic Libertarian (I3)
point and one unit of normalized utility is equal to one of its standard deviations.
Or formally, where Fi is the set of utility assignments over F by Ii, ti(ϕ) is the





Equation 5.1 calculates what is called a t-statistic. Consider the normalized
utility assignment by individual I1 to alternative x (t1(x)). The calculation of the
normalized value for this alternative requires that the standard deviation (SD(F1))
and mean (F̄1) are calculated for that individual’s set of utility values. This yields
the following values:
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SD(F1) = SD{1.80, 1.00, 0.47,−0.19,−1.23,−1.84} = 1.37
F̄1 =
1.80 + 1.00 + 0.47 +−0.19 +−1.23 +−1.84
6
= 0.01
These values, along with the original utility assignment u1(x) are included in





This process is repeated for all utility values of all individuals, which are
shown in figure 5.9. I give the results of an averaging social choice function over
the normalized individual utility functions in figure 5.10, column avg(Ut). When
using this normalization procedure, no individual is able to have greater overall
influence on the resultant social choice function than any other. However, this social
choice function is sensitive to larger differences in individual utility scale differences,
which are the result of more stable stochastic preferences.17 Therefore, although an
individual can have more influence on the social utility assignment of any specific
alternative(s), this will in turn increase the variance of her utility assignment set
and decrease the utility differences between other alternatives within her normalized
utility function. This is the normalize and average procedure.
Some normative assumptions, which I will discuss in detail in section 5.4, may
make it desirable that individuals with greater overall preference stability have more
17Remember that more stable stochastic preferences have P -values that are further away from
1⁄2 than less stable stochastic preferences.
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ϕ u1 t1 u2 t2 u3 t3
x 1.80 1.31 −4.83 −1.97 −0.08 −0.26
y 1.00 0.73 1.27 0.52 −0.39 −1.34
z 0.47 0.34 1.64 0.67 −0.23 −0.79
a −0.19 −0.14 0.61 0.25 0.23 0.79
b −1.23 −0.90 −0.15 −0.06 0.39 1.34
c −1.84 −1.34 1.46 0.59 0.08 0.26








Figure 5.10: Social utility
overall influence on the social choice function. To accommodate such a condition, the
transformation function could be altered such that it only aligns individual utility
functions to some common zero-point but does not normalize them. Specifically, set
the zero-point of each individual utility function to the mean of that individual’s set
of utility assignments and translate all other utility assignments accordingly. Then
the translated utility value for u1(x) is found through the following function:
u∗1(x) = u1(x)− F̄1 = 1.80− .01 = 1.79
I do not show the complete translated values for all individuals and alterna-
tives, because the translation is much simpler than the normalization function and
so the reader may easily calculate them. By using such translated utility functions,
preferences of individuals are weighed differently on a whole based upon their overall
preference stabilities. This is the translate and average procedure. The social utility
function using this sort of transformation is listed in figure 5.10, column avg(U∗).
These two transformation methods produce different strict social orderings of
the alternatives in F , as shown below:
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avg(U∗): z  y  a  c  b  x avg(Ut): a  b  z  y  c  x
Translate and average (avg(U∗)) allows some small group of individuals — or
in this case, a single individual — to dominate (in the non-technical sense) the social
ordering. In the above example, the strict order of avg(U∗) is largely determined by
u2. Normalize and average (avg(Ut)) is more democratic in this respect, but it still
allows individuals with very stable preferences over some alternatives to have more
influence on the social utility values of those alternatives. For instance, the very low
utility value of x and high value of c assigned by I2 significantly decrease the social
utility assignments over those alternatives by avg(Ut). I will discuss the implications
of different normative assumptions on the types of allowable utility transformations
next.
5.4 Normative assumptions
In the last section, I calculated cardinal social utilities using two different
transformation methods and showed that the transformation one uses can signif-
icantly alter the resultant social utilities. Although the structural assumptions I
provided in section 5.2 form the basis of certain interpretations of utility values, and
subsequent comparisons between individuals, they do not themselves explain why
certain differences in utility values might be relevant to social decisions. Such an
explanation requires the acceptance of a set of normative assumptions about the
significance of utility differences to the social decisions. This is necessary to legit-
168
imize the selection of a transformation method. The precise normative assumptions
that should be made will be a matter of some controversy, similar to problems in
political philosophy dealing with issues of fairness or the choice of a voting method
in Arrovian social choice theory. In the case of social choice theory, different voting
methods satisfy different sets of Arrow’s conditions on democratic choice, though it
is impossible that they all be satisfied. The choice of a voting method within any
given voting context will typically depend upon which conditions are appropriate
within that specific context ; for instance, it may be appropriate to give each person
veto power over some alternative pair in a committee meeting, but not in a na-
tional presidential election. These questions, unlike the aspects of my model that I
presented in the previous two sections, are not technical in nature. And although
formal proofs might show the logical consequences of adopting some set of condi-
tions on a voting theory, they cannot answer the basic question of which conditions
should be satisfied.
I have utilized a social choice method that normalized and then averaged indi-
vidual utility scales. This method is responsive to the relative stability of preferences
within each individual preference set, but is not responsive to overall differences in
preference stability between individuals. I also introduced a second social choice
method that merely translated individual utility scales, such that they were aligned,
before finding average social utility values. This method is sensitive to both dif-
ferences in stability within individual preference sets as well as overall differences
between individuals. These two methods rely upon different, though related, norma-
tive assumptions about what constitutes a good social choice method. translate and
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average relies upon Expert Preference whereas normalize and average relies upon
Special Interests and Overall Fairness, which I introduced in section 5.2.
Any use of public opinion that instantiates the general will must satisfy some-
thing like the Overall Fairness condition. A condition of basic equality exists be-
tween citizens within the deliberative setting that helps constitute the general will :
the arguments of all are given weight only according to the merits of their con-
tent and in eventual decisions all individuals are given equal vote. Any violation of
Overall Fairness requires the representative to judge the merits of an individual’s
opinion, determining definitively that the opinions of one individual are more worthy
of consideration than the opinions of others. For instance, a representative might
give greater weight (in the fashion of translate and average) to those individuals
who exhibit more stable opinions. But given that the measured patterns of individ-
ual opinions leave ambiguous the precise psychological process that brought about
those opinions, any attempt to make the more detailed interpretation of opinion
information would require that seemingly inadmissible information be brought into
the analysis. Referencing the attitude model I introduced in figure 4.2 on page 116
will aid in seeing this. Systematic differences in the stabilities of different individu-
als’ opinions arise in two primary ways. First, individuals may differ in how many
considerations they generally entertain about the issues. Given similar probability
distributions that determine which set of considerations are brought under consid-
eration in any given instance of choice and similar proportions of considerations in
favor of each alternative, a larger set of considerations will result in more stable
responses. Some may be tempted to say that those who come to decisions after
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entertaining more considerations should have more overall influence on social deci-
sions. However, given the opinion data alone, it is impossible to determine whether
two individuals differ in the number of considerations they entertain or rather the
distribution over those considerations. It might be possible to independently deter-
mine the number of considerations an individual is utilizing in her decision but I
think that even if this could be done, meaning that the precise structure of her at-
titude is transparent, it would not be consistent with the general will. This requires
that the opinions of some individuals are favored over others, based upon judgments
by representatives about the general merit of those individuals as sources of opinion.
It is instructive to see how Special Interests may be compatible with the general
will in ways that Expert Preference is not. The core feature of Special Interests is its
responsiveness to opinion strength relative to an individual’s pattern of responses.
By referencing the deliberative interpretation of the general will that I have consid-
ered here, it can be seen why the general will should be responsive in this manner.
There are two primary ways in which greater opinion strength would seem to matter
in a deliberative setting. First, it may signal to others a greater degree of expertise
or consideration of an issue, especially if it appears that the strength of opinion has
arisen from a resilience of the opinion to factors of the questioning not relevant to the
issue. If those “expert” respondents direct their policy judgments at what is in the
common good, as have said public opinion responses should, then their preferences
will tend to better track what is in the common good than the preferences of those
with less expertise. However, as I described above, the source of stability is typically
ambiguous, therefore it must also be appropriate to use more stable opinions that
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arise from stronger opinions. This is relevant to the general will in its effect on what
the common good truly is, at which deliberation that determines the general will
is directed. The satisfaction of a genuine concern about some issue seems to have
some relevance to what is in the common good, because it is (all things considered)
better for people be satisfied than for them not to be. In the deliberative setting, it
would seem that the expression of great concern from some minority, even a small
one, should have a significant effect on the resultant social decision. Therefore, it is
reasonable that greater concern of some subgroups is reflected in the social decision.
I have not intended this to be a complete defense of normalize and average, but
only the basic outline of how such a defense might go. However, I do think that
this outline provides reason to think that a reasonable normative argument could
be given for the acceptance of this decision method, or something like it.
This finishes the main argument that I began in chapter 3: the model I have
presented in this dissertation shows how political representatives can balance mea-
sures of public opinion with those of their constituents’ interests. In the next chapter,
I will show how the model of cardinal public opinion can be integrated into the de-
cision model I introduced in figure 3.1, on pg. 68. I also address some implications
of the model I have presented, particularly for public opinion survey methodology,
deliberative democratic theory, and social choice theory.
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Chapter 6: A Complete Model of Policy Decision
I have presented a model of policy choice by public officials that demonstrates
how they can act according to their duties to respect public opinion. I argued
that this duty has particular significance for political representatives, who are a
special class of political officials tasked with integrating the will of the people into
public decisions. In the last two sections, I demonstrated that a coherent concept of
public opinion can be developed, and that it is also possible to measure it. But this
still leaves plenty of questions about how exactly political representatives should
act given that representative democracies require decisions to be made through
deliberation. Governance is a complex process, and it is difficult to see immediately
how the decision-theoretic framework I have developed can be integrated into a more
realistic normative theory of governance. Such a normative theory should provide
representatives with a better understanding of how they should act, if they are to
act in accordance with their duties.
In this chapter, I will present a larger picture of how public opinion might be
integrated into the decisions of political representatives, and how that integration
fits into the systems of governance that are common in modern democracies. This
picture will present a number of implications for modern democratic theory. This
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is a formal model of an informal process that representatives use to decide what
policy alternatives to pursue. The actual process they use to decide how to act will
be far less precise and is unlikely to resemble the decision model itself. Rather,
the model is useful in determining whether the decision process used by a repre-
sentative diverges significantly from what is required for a representative to respect
public opinion. First, I will present the “balancing procedure” in a slightly more
complex form, showing how different criteria of policy choice might be integrated
into an all-things-considered choice. I think that although the details of how differ-
ent criteria are integrated may be difficult to determine, the basic structure of such
an integration seems rather unproblematic. However, a far more puzzling problem
emerges when these aggregative criteria are integrated into a deliberative decision
process. Modern representative democracies are typically characterized by being
deliberative, which is often thought to be vital for the rationality of public decision
making.1 This produces a conflict between two types of decision processes: those
that are aggregative and those that are deliberative. I take the distinction between
these decision methods to be one of the central rifts in democratic theory; in chapter
2, I argued that both of these types of decision procedures are needed in an instan-
tiation of the general will, but it is not obvious how they might be meaningfully
integrated into a single decision procedure. Here I begin an answer to this question,
for which I nonetheless do not think that I have an entirely adequate response. I
argue that this is a problem for democratic theory in general and not just for the
view I have presented here, and that the precision with which I have presented the
1See Pettit (1997) and Cohen (1989).
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aggregative decision process through the balancing procedure gives a clearer picture
of the basic conflict between aggregation and deliberation. This will become clearer
after the consideration of an example.
6.1 The weighing procedure
Consider the policy choice example I began in section 4.4. Some political
representative has a constituency containing three individuals or groups {I1, I2, I3},
individuated by their opinions toward a set of public policies under consideration
Fi:
x Nationalized health care system
y Free health clinics for the poor
z Subsidies for full private health insurance for the poor
a Subsidies for catastrophic health insurance for the poor
b More tax deductions for health care costs
c Status quo
The aggregate opinion of this constituency can be represented as the cardinal
utility function obtained using normalize and average from figure 5.10, pg. 167. I
reproduce this utility function below:
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ϕ x y z a b c
avg(Ut) −0.31 −0.03 0.07 0.30 0.13 −0.16
One of the purposes for finding such a function is to permit the balancing
between a quantification of opinion and a measure of welfare (or the common good).
But it is not entirely straightfoward how such a comparison might be made.
‘Welfare’ itself is likely composed of different components, and therefore for-
mulating an appropriate welfare measure will be no simple matter. And “welfare”
is just something I am using to stand in for the concept of the “common good.” It
is reasonable to think that representatives with different political ideologies would
conceive of welfare in different ways, and so I will first consider how two representa-
tives with different conceptions of welfare and/or different estimations of the effects
on welfare of various policies might use public opinion of identical constituencies in
their policy decision making. Consider two representatives RC and RL, who have
ideologies that might best be described as “American Conservative” and “American
Liberal” respectively. Assume that each individual assigns estimations of “welfare”
that will be produced by each policy, shown in figure 6.1; it will be initially unclear
what these values might stand for, but I will explain this further in a subsequent
example.
The values of the numerical representations in RC and RL are symetrical with
one another, and it may be possible to infer significance of the 0-point, such that
negative values represent expected “losses” and positive values represent expected
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x −1 1 −0.55 0.55 −0.56
y −0.8 0.8 −0.35 0.35 −0.05
z −0.9 0.9 −0.45 0.45 0.13
a −0.2 0.2 0.25 −0.25 0.54
b 0.1 −0.1 0.55 −0.55 0.23
c 0 0 0.45 −0.45 −0.29
Figure 6.1: Welfare estimations by RC and RL
“gains.” However, I have not presented any underlying theory for how measure-
ments of welfare might be given this significance, so it is unlikely at this point that
such an interpretation could be justified. The model does not require that welfare
estimates be meaningfully compared between representatives, but it does require
that there is a meaningful way to make comparisons between each individual’s esti-
mates of welfare and the measurement of public opinion; without such comparisons,
the balancing procedure cannot make use of cardinal information. This would make
the results of the balancing procedure arbitrary. One simple way to make such a
comparision is to match the ranges of the scales that are to be compared. Without
any theoretical rationale for interpreting criteria in a particular way, there is no basis
for any transformations beyond simple features of the data itself. For instance, in
figure 6.1 avg(Ut)
∗ is a transformation of the results of the normalize and average
procedure (from figure 5.10 on pg. 167) that matches the ranges of RL and RC .
R∗C and R
∗
L are then translations of those measures of welfare such that their means
match the mean public opinion value found in avg(Ut)




∗ using only basic statistical information of the scales, and
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not any substantive assumptions about the sources of the scales.2
With simplifying assumptions in place, one can see what a weighing procedure
might look like, and how the estimates of welfare might change the policy a repre-
sentative should pursue. For instance, if equal weights are applied to opinion and
welfare, then the utility function that results from an averaging balancing procedure
can be seen in columns R∗C and R
∗




Weight on welfare → 2 1 1/4 2 1 1/4
x -0.83 -0.55 -0.35 0.27 0.00 -0.21
y -0.38 -0.20 -0.07 0.32 0.15 0.02
z -0.39 -0.16 0.01 0.51 0.29 0.12
a 0.52 0.40 0.30 0.02 0.15 0.24
b 0.66 0.39 0.19 -0.43 -0.16 0.05
c 0.30 0.08 -0.09 -0.59 -0.40 -0.20
Figure 6.2: All things considered utilities for R∗C and R
∗
L
A weighted average can represent a balancing procedure that weighs one cri-
terion greater than another. There are many reasons why a representative might
apply specific weights to public opinion and her estimates of welfare; some of these
reasons may be stable while others may vary depending upon the issue at hand. For
instance, representatives may give more weight to public opinion for policy issues
that are moral at their core than those that seem to require a deep understanding
of economics. This can obviously have an effect on the way in which representatives
ultimately rank the alternatives. For instance, the following different rankings result
from the different weights on estimates of welfare:
2I do not think that that I have given anywhere near an adequate justification for the use of this




2 b  a  c  y  z  x
1 a  b  c  z ∼ y  x
1/4 a  b  z  y  c  x
R∗L
2 z  y  x  a  b  c
1 z  y  a  x ∼ b  c
1/4 a  z  b  y  c  x
It is not entirely clear what should be made of such formal representations.
Every element seems rather arbitrary, from the utility values that represent welfare
to the weights of welfare against public opinion. The assessment by representatives
of the welfare ordering of alternatives is likely not arbitrary, but it is unclear how the
cardinal values themselves are produced. If I am to provide even a rough outline of a
decision model by representatives then I need to say something about how cardinal
utility values for welfare might be found. I have already presented welfare as the
element of a complete choice model in figure 3.1 on pg. 68. Figure 6.3 (pg. 180)
shows an example of the expected utility involving the set of alternatives Fi.
The numerical values of outcomes (on) could stand for many different quan-
tities relevant to welfare; for instance, thousands of lives or dollars saved over the
status quo. Or these outcomes could be composite values derived from a set of
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Figure 6.3: Policy choice model
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welfare criteria. However the outcomes are determined, they are then multiplied by
their probabilities to find the expected utility of each alternative policy. What I
give here is a simplistic example, but in the full model the utilities for outcomes are
multiplied by the probability distribution over those outcomes to find the expected
utility.3 I will presume that representatives should use some standard measure of
expected welfare in their weighing of their estimates of welfare against public opin-
ion, though this may not be the case. There is some reason why one might, for
instance, prefer a maximin rule or one that weighs negative outcomes greater than
positive ones.
In the example I give in figure 6.3, a scale that seems naturally comparable to
the public opinion scale can be easily derived from the values; dividing the expected
values by 100 produces a scale in the -0.1:1 interval, which is similar to the interval
containing the public opinion scale. Because a weight is simply the multiplication
of some scale value, if a representative is to respect public opinion by weighing it
roughly equal to her estimates of welfare then she must also transform any mea-
surement of welfare such that it is on a similar scale as public opinion. Again,
this process seems quite arbitrary and perhaps poorly describes how representatives
likely make decisions. Certainly a complete model of the balancing procedure would
require a better picture of how this can be done non-arbitrarily. It is not within the
scope of this dissertation to provide such a model. However, I there is good rea-
son to think that something like this model can explain disagreement on normative
3It should be noted that finding the expected utility of some choice is far from trivial, and how
precisely this should be done is likely to be controversial. For instance, one could have different
views about how future utility should be discounted, or whether it should be discounted at all.
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issues in many different types of multidimensional choice. For instance, if officials
are debating about what sort of bridge should be built across a river, there may be
several dimensions relevant to the choice. The first natural step in such a decision
will be to reduce as many factors to purely monetary values as possible. This might
work for the effects of a bridge on business as well as its initial and recurring costs.
However, aesthetic and environmental impacts of the bridge, along with effects like
commute times might only be completely reduced to monetary values with great
difficulty and at the risk of losing contact with what is being measured. Therefore,
such non-monetary criteria must be part of the decision, though likely not part of
any formal cost-benefit analysis.4 It makes sense for someone to say that, for in-
stance, the impact of a particular bridge on the aesthetic appeal of a city is not
being given enough weight in a public decision process. The fact that a bridge is
ugly has weight in a decision of whether to build it beyond the monetary impacts
of that ugliness, but such a fact can be outweighed by the fact that the bridge will
be exceptionally beneficial to the local economy. And it would be unreasonable to
think that such a weighing procedure should be impacted by the economic unit,
whether they be pesos or dollars. It is similarly clear that decisions about such
weights have real impact on the overall decision. The weights given to aesthetics
by officials in Paris will likely be greater than those by officials in Houston, and
this has a significant impact on the way decisions are made. The decision of what
weights should be used when determining the overall impact on welfare of some
4In fact, such criteria are often included in cost-benefit analyses through monetary proxies, such
as impacts on tourism and destruction of monetarily quantified environmental resources, but these
proxies do not exhaust the inclusion of these criteria in the decision.
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policy is primarily normative, but one that certainly plays a role in public decisions
that involve composite measures of public welfare.
Returning to the example, it can be seen how a decision process modeled
after the balancing procedure might function using a cardinal measure of public
opinion, cardinal values of outcomes, and probability distributions over all of the
outcomes for each policy alternative. The result of balancing can be best seen when
there is some conflict between the representative and public opinion. Consider RL,
and its translated form R∗L from 6.2. When this is balanced against the translated
measure of public opinion (avg(Ut)
∗), the resulting ordering is shifted from the
representative’s estimates of welfare, toward the measurement of public opinion.
This is especially obvious in the case of the representative’s ranking of z. In both of
the representative’s welfare estimates and the measure of public opinion, z is ranked
near the middle, but it is elevated to the highest ranked alternative when those are
balanced against one another. A closer examination of the cardinal values in these
rankings reveals that RL assigns a relatively high value to z, and the public opinion
assigns it a value just above that scale’s mean value. However, there is a quite a bit
of conflict about the values of y and a, and this results in these alternatives being
ranked below z. This simple averaging procedure is just one way of balancing public
opinion with representative estimates of welfare, and there may be advantages to
other types of procedures.
Of course, if representatives are free to choose any weights, then it is possible
for the representative’s own welfare estimates to dictate what policies she pursues;
clearly something must be said about what sorts of weight representatives must give
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public opinion. I think a presumption of rough equality of weights is a natural
starting point. It seems that this pays respect to the judgments of the public
while at the same time recognizing that the representative is in an elevated position
of judgment in relation to the public. Though this initial weighing is simply a
presumption, and can be adjusted depending upon the representative’s assessment
of the competence and reasonableness with which members of the public made their
judgments, any adjustments to the weights must be reasonably justifiable to the
public. This, I think, arises quite naturally from the respect that must be given to
public opinion.
6.2 Implications
With the policy decision model completed, it is easier to understand some
implications of the model. Consideration of these implications will also reveal the
complications for any public decision procedure of this sort that I have presented.
These implications and complications fall into three primary categories: the mea-
surement of public opinion, the integration of aggregative and deliberative decision
methods, and social choice theoretic models of phenomena other than public opinion.
In the rest of this chapter I will consider each of these in turn.
6.2.1 The realistic measurements of public opinion
In this dissertation I have provided a model of public opinion. I have described
this model in measurement theoretic terms, though I must now reiterate that the
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subject matter of this dissertation has not been a method of measuring public
opinion; this is not a work of survey methodology. Rather, what I have presented is
model of what the phenomenon of public opinion is, and especially its characteristics
that might be relevant to its measurement and use by political representatives. This
is meant as a response to the view that no public opinion relevant to policy choice
exists. The provision of such a model of public opinion is important because it
shows that public opinion could possibly have a significant role in the decisions by
political representatives in democracies. Although the fact that public opinion could
be measured is important to its structure, I do not intend the model itself to be
taken as a description of a measurement method.
According to the model, a direct measurement of public opinion would require
that every individual in the population be asked to compare every alternative over
some large number of trials. For large populations this requirement is almost cer-
tainly impossible to satisfy, at least if it is assumed that most human activities are
not devoted to measuring public opinion. The requirement that attitudes be formed
by repeated pair-wise comparisons of all alternatives is also likely impractical in
many cases. Although similar measurement methods with large numbers of trials
are common in the pyschophysical research, especially in the study of the human
perceptual system, those studies typically require very few participants (often fewer
than 20) to adequately study their phenomena of interest.5 It may, however, be
possible to approximate this direct measure of public opinion if other simplifying
5For an idea of typical sample sizes in such psychophysical research, see some recent articles
in The Journal of Vision, which almost exclusively publishes research that use these standard
psychophysical methods.
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assumptions are made. One set of assumptions is necessary to specify the rela-
tionship between a population and a sample of that population. Such a sampling
model is necessary for pretty much all measurement in science, though it requires
certain assumptions about the basic structure of opinions in the population, which
are not required in standard social choice models. I will argue that such a model
can probably be applied to public opinion measurements. An additional strategy
for making public opinion measurements is to estimate a measurement of cardinal
public opinion without employing a cardinal scaling technique on each individual
attitude set. One set of methods, used by Thurstone in his early studies of public
opinion, collect cardinal public opinion information directly without first collecting
individual cardinal attitude information. I think that these methods have promise
for providing a cardinal measure of public opinion, though they are unable to pro-
vide information about individual differences in opinion strength. A second type
of method uses purely ordinal measures of public opinion, such as the Likert scale,
plus assumptions about the distribution of opinions in the public to infer cardinal
public opinion information. I think that these additional assumptions are typically
implausible, and so I do not think that such Likert-type measurement methods show
promise in providing cardinal public opinion information. As I will describe, I am
unsure about the plausibility of any of the assumptions behind these simplification
methods. However, I think that this is one important question in need of empir-
ical investigation. If my arguments in this dissertation have been successful, then
the ability of standard public opinion measures to inform political representatives
of public opinion hinges on the ability of those measures to approximate cardinal
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public opinion.
I will consider several simplification strategies for measuring public opinion,
but first I must specify the sort of public opinion research that I will be concerned
with. There are several distinct goals that public opinion polling can have. I will
focus on three major goals: the prediction of election results, the discovery of indi-
vidual characteristics that co-vary with opinion, and the content of public opinion
itself. For the first two types of goals, the content of public opinion is merely in-
strumental to the true end of the research. A large proportion of polls are of these
first two types. For instance, much of the opinion “tracking” polling done during
election campaigns is attempting to predict the eventual election outcome.6 One
hallmark of such polls is the concern with the composition of the sample; because
some individuals in the electorate are more likely to vote than others, a good predic-
tion of the election outcomes relies upon an accurate prediction of who will vote. A
poll that accurately captures that opinion of the entire electorate toward the candi-
dates might nonetheless fail to predict the winner if those who vote are significantly
different in their attitudes than those who do not vote. Although the most direct
questions for the purposes of prediction ask something like “If the election were held
today, would you vote for Barack Obama or Mitt Romney?”, other questions might
also be useful in prediction. For instance, if a poll shows that people approve of
items in one candidate’s platform more than another’s platform, this may bode well
for the first candidate’s prospects. Such polls can also be used by candidates to de-
cide what parts of their platforms to emphasize in a campaign or the content of the
6One prominent example is the Gallup tracking poll.
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platform itself. Nonetheless, this is all done to maximize the candidate’s chances of
winning the election. If it is discovered by a candidate that those who are unlikely
to vote prefer some policy alternative x whereas those who are likely to vote prefer
policy y, then it would be prudent for the candidate to publicly advocate policy y.
Those interested in public opinion for this purpose need not be concerned with rep-
resenting public opinion in its full richness (i.e. cardinally) unless it is likely to aid
in the prediction of election outcomes. And because I have not presented a theory
to link public opinion and election behaviors, I have not provided those interested
in predicting elections reason to prefer richer representations of public opinion.
Polling by academic researchers is aimed at another goal besides the prediction
of elections. Rather, they are concerned with the determinants (or correlates) of
certain types of attitudes. Public opinions are analyzed in the hope of understanding
how and why people (and groups) come to have the attitudes they do. A great deal
of important work in political science is of this sort. For instance, Converse’s use
of public opinion in “The nature of belief systems in mass publics” was limited to
general facts about public opinion, and specifically its instability for most types of
policy questions. A more recent example is Andrew Berinsky’s In Time of War ,
which investigates the common patterns of public opinion formation during several
American wars. Berinsky shows that the party identification and political knowledge
of individuals are highly correlated with public opinion. Others have found that
individual policy opinions are greatly affected by individual demographics, such as
race, sex, class, and income.7 This work is not directed at finding the content of
7For useful summaries of some of this literature see The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior
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public opinion itself at any given moment in time or for any specific constituency,
but rather only general patterns of public opinion. Similarly to the predictive use
of public opinion, I have not provided good reason for such researchers to prefer
cardinal representations of public opinion.
I am concerned with a third use of public opinion polling that attempts to
measure the content of public opinion at particular times and in particular con-
stituencies. More specifically, I am interested in its use in decisions by political
representatives. As I have argued in this dissertation, public opinion measurements
with this as an aim must take into account the cardinal structure of public opinion
in order to be adequate. The next question is whether it might be possible to obtain
cardinal information about public opinion using methods more easily implemented
than the idealized Thurstonian method I have presented. I will first consider as-
sumptions that would permit the use of sampling methods to measure the public
opinion of some population. I think these assumptions are plausible, and are re-
quired by any implementable method of public opinion measurement. I will then
consider a number of methods that further simplify measurement by relying upon
assumptions about the structure of public opinion (collective attitudes) in societies,
rather than the assumptions about individual attitudes that I have made in my own
model. As I have already said, I am less sure about the veracity of these methods.
I will first consider whether the opinion from a random sample of a con-
stituency can be used to measure the public opinion of the entire constituency.
This is crucial for any practical measurement method of public opinion, because
(2007), chapters 24-27.
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it is almost never possible to measure the attitudes of all members of the public.
However, if one measures a large enough random sample of the public, then the mea-
sured opinion of the sample should approximate that of the public. This is based
upon very general statistical principles. If a random variable is distributed normally
throughout a population, then the mean of a random sample approximates the mean
of the population, and converges to that mean as the size of the sample increases.
However, public opinion measurements may not satisfy the necessary statistical as-
sumptions. Without a theory showing why actual opinions within the public will
tend to be normally distributed there is little reason to think that the measured
opinion of a sample will adequately approximate the entire public opinion. How-
ever, this statistical justification for sampling is often subordinated to a normative
justification. Random sampling in survey methodology has often been said to give
all individuals an equal opportunity of being included within the sample, though the
measurement of the opinion of any given sample is not guaranteed to approximate
the true public opinion (that of the entire population).8 Such a view contends that
a sampling procedure is legitimated by being part of a democratic procedure rather
than because of its ability to accurately measure public opinion
The “democratic” justification for sampling in public opinion surveys has been
prevalent since their earliest uses, but it is a far less natural justification for sam-
pling than one based upon accurate measurement.9 Sampling for the measurement
of public opinion must have the goal of accurate measurement rather than being
8See Althaus (2003), chapter 7 for a discussion of sampling in public opinion survey methodol-
ogy.
9Perhaps one of the earliest examples of the “democratic” justification for sampling is given by
George Gallup (1940).
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an appropriately democratic procedure, because otherwise the content of the entire
public’s policy attitudes may not be reflected in the representative’s decisions. Only
the members of the sample would be properly represented. Therefore, I think that
only an accurate measure of public opinion is appropriate to serve the role in public
decisions that I have described in this dissertation. The problem, given the like-
lihood that individual attitudes are not normally distributed in populations, is to
determine what makes some sample of individuals a “good” sample with respect to
public opinion. One common method is to construct a “representative” sample of
the public by matching certain demographic (socio-economic status, race, sex, etc.)
features of the sample to those of the public, and in so doing descriptively represent
the population within the sample. Descriptive representation, unlike random sam-
pling, specifies the features that individuals within a sample should possess. Some
sample is descriptively representative if it matches some general description of the
population.10 Although in a trivial sense this description could just be the aggregate
opinion of the population, that is an unhelpful description when the public opinion
itself is unknown. Rather, the relevant features within the population must already
be known and tend to co-vary with public opinion in order for them to play any role
in the evaluation of the adequacy of the sample. A match between the sample and
the population with respect to these descriptive characteristics may then bode well
for a match with respect to public opinion.
It is well known that certain demographic characteristics are correlated with
10See Pitkin (1967), chapter 4 for an influential discussion of descriptive representation.
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individual attitudes about many policy issues.11 Such demographic characteristics of
a sample are often used to make adjustments to results of public opinion surveys in
order to estimate the results that would be obtained from a sample well matched to
a population’s demographic characteristics. These characteristics provide one way
of defining how a sample should descriptively represent the population. However,
one might worry that given the modest character of these correlations, it is not
obvious that demographic representativeness can guarantee that a sample’s opinion
will approximate the opinion of the entire population. I think this worry sets the
standard too high. Public opinion surveys need only approximate the public opinion
substantially better than the other available methods. And although methods such
as personal communication with constituents and town hall meetings have long
been used by public officials to understand public opinion, samples formed using
these methods are well-known to substantially differ in both their demographic
characteristics and policy opinions from those of the populations they supposedly
represent (Verba, 1995). Such bias is even more apparent in the sample of the
electorate that chooses to vote in any given election; in fact, the nature of this bias
is sometimes crucial in determining many election outcomes.12 At issue is whether
public opinion surveys using samples can make important contributions to public
decision making, and I think that they clearly can. Such samples descriptively
represent the population better than other methods, and so it would seem that
public opinion surveys using samples can improve representatives’ understanding of
11See Page and Shapiro (1992), chapter 7 for a summary of some of this research.
12The bias introduced by voter turnout is an important and constantly changing factor in the
determination of election outcomes. For example, voter turnout in the 2008 and 2012 presidential
elections likely had a major impact on the results (Frey, 2013).
192
the content of public opinion.
My argument then can be stated as follows: a sample’s aggregate opinion
is capable of approximating the public opinion insofar as the sample descriptively
represents the population in the ways that are relevant to attitude formation. Ad-
ditionally, if such a sample is able to approximate public opinion better than other
standard methods, then sampling methods are useful tools for the measurement of
public opinion. I do not think that I have adequately defended this argument here; it
requires that several empirical assumptions be true, and I have not provided enough
empirical evidence to know whether this is the case. However, I have suggested how
the aggregate opinion of a sample might adequately measure the public opinion of
an entire population.
The possibility that sampling methods might approximate a measurement of
public opinion does not eliminate the demandingness of the measurement task I have
presented here. Each individual in the sample must provide pair-wise choices for
each alternative pair numerous times. In order to make it impossible for individuals
to remember and repeat past responses, this method will likely require that the in-
dividuals are asked about each pair using many different questions or during several
sessions. Although possible to implement, such a method would be costly. Also, it
may be unnecessary; in his studies of attitudes, Thurstone himself typically used a
simplified method that only requires each individual to make a single comparison
for each alternative pair.13 Using this method the aggregate attitude measure is
13See Thurstone (1959), chapter 7 for an example of finding public attitude scales for the per-
ceived seriousness of crimes and a related scaling method in chapter 11 used to find public attitudes
toward various ethnic groups.
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formed by finding the percentages of choices (P -values) for each alternative in each
pair across individuals and then producing a scale from those percentages in much
the same way as I did in section 4.3 with individual responses. Each individual is
only asked to compare each alternative once, and so the demands on individuals are
greatly reduced. It also eliminates the need to formulate many different questions
that compare the same two alternatives, because there is no risk of a single individ-
ual remembering and repeating her responses to identical comparisons. However,
this changes the subject of the measurement. In my model, individual attitudes
are measured and then aggregated to form a public opinion. When using the sim-
plified method, Thurstone measured public opinion directly by obtaining pair-wise
comparisons from a sample of the population. If it is assumed that each individ-
ual evaluation of an alternative (in terms of the utility value that determines their
pair-wise choices) is a sample from the population of evaluations distributed about a
mean, then the mean evaluation of that sample approximates the evaluation by the
population — this is the public opinion. In statistics, such a measurement method
is said to use a between-subjects design, whereas the model I have presented uses
a within-subjects design.14 The advantage of a within-subjects design is its ability
to utilize information about each individual’s response (or error) tendencies in the
analysis of responses. For a between-subjects design, individual information cannot
be used in this manner.
For the between-subjects variant of Thurstone’s method, there is no means
14I provide a short discussion of the differences between between-subjects and within-subjects
designs in section 5.1, starting in the paragraph before figure 5.1, pg. 145.
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of representing individual or group differences of attitude strength. In fact, if such
differences are pervasive in the population, it may undermine the analysis entirely.
However, one apparent benefit of this method is the way it avoids explicit interper-
sonal comparisons of attitude strengths altogether. The only measurements that
are compared across individuals are their responses to pair-wise choices between
alternatives. The proportion of choices are then calculated for the entire population
and scale values are calculated from them. This ignores all information about dif-
ferences in individual attitude strength, but it may provide an important estimate
of cardinal public opinion, especially if individual attitudes are well structured in
the population. Although such an assumption is required, it does offer substantial
benefit over the purely ordinal methods of measuring public opinion.
The between-subjects Thurstonian method is still more involved than what
most attitude researchers would find practical. But there are a number of other
psychophysical techniques that may be used to make estimations of Thurstonian
scale values.15 And it should be noted that Thurstone most often made use of such
estimates for his studies of attitudes; although he considered the pair-wise method
to be the gold-standard that he was approximating, the practical requirements of
measurement often called for only estimates of scale values. Probably the most im-
portant of these methods is the Method of Equal-Appearing Intervals. This requires
the construction of a cardinal measurement scale by a set of “judges” who evaluate
a set of evaluative terms according to their favorability, with each attempting to
15For an introduction to some of these techniques see Eagly and Chaiken (1993), chapter 2,
especially pp. 30-44.
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create a scale with equal scale intervals between all terms. Scale values for all these
terms are then calculated from these estimates, and a measurement scale is formed
using only terms that were judged as being separated by equal intervals.16 This scale
is then used by subjects (who are distinct from the judges) in the sample to rate
the items of interest. Judges are responsible for providing cardinal scale values for
the terms used by the sample to evaluate the alternatives, and the subjects evaluate
the alternatives using those terms. For instance, if four terms (‘unhappy’, ‘indiffer-
ent’,‘support’, and ‘overjoyed’) are used to evaluate some set of policy alternatives
x, y, z, then judges first assign integer values to those terms from some predeter-
mined range and the subjects assign one of the terms to each policy alternative
(perhaps ‘unhappy’ toward x, ‘indifferent’ toward y and z). When a larger number
of terms are rated in this way, it permits a range of cardinal values to be represented
by qualitative terms in opinion surveys. If it is assumed that the value assignments
of the judges have cardinal significance, and the subjects use those terms in a similar
fashion as the judges, then this should provide cardinal assignments of value to the
policies.
It is unclear what to think about the Method of Equal-Appearing Intervals.
In this method, judges attempt to make equal intervals between the terms, and
this is supposed to produce a scale of value for the terms that does have equal
intervals between the terms. This requires that the judges themselves be capable
of estimating the equal intervals, and for scales to be comparable across judges;
16Because scale values assigned by the judges will differ, the median scale value from the judges’
value assignments is used for each term in the analysis of opinion.
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or at least it requires that differences in the ways in which judges make estimates
of these intervals be normally distributed. It also requires that the intervals of
value assigned to the terms by the judges match those that would be assigned by
the subjects. Only then can the process of judgment be capable of producing scale
values for the terms as they are used. None of these assumptions are required by the
method of direct pair-wise comparisons of the alternatives. When a cardinal scale is
derived from a set of pair-wise choices, there is no need for any individual to access
her own estimates of scale intervals; those intervals are derived from behaviors alone
plus a stochastic model of how those behaviors are produced from a set of attitudes
toward the alternatives. Some concern of subjectivity can be eliminated by use of
the Method of Successive Intervals (rather than Equal-Appearing Intervals), which
finds scale values of the terms from the proportions of judges rating the various
alternatives either better than or worse than the other terms. Therefore, judges
need not make numerical assignments of value to the terms. This only requires that
judges form orders of the terms according to their approval of them and does not
assume that judges are able to place terms along a scale of equal intervals. Rather
it finds the intervals from the attempts of judges to place terms along such a scale.
This then eliminates the requirement that judges are able to correctly produce scales
of equal intervals, but does not eliminate the need for the judges’ estimates of values
to match those that would be obtained from the population. If there is a great deal
of agreement in society about the value associated with different evaluative terms
then this method is promising, but it is unclear whether that is generally the case.
I have said nothing in this section so far about the Likert Scale, which is to-
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day by far the most common method of scaling survey items. Its dominance spans
multiple disciplines, from personality tests to public opinion surveys. And yet in
section 3.3.3 I argued that Likert scales offer only ordinal information about pref-
erences and therefore are of little use to political representatives. This is actually
a matter of great controversy; Renis Likert himself thought that his scale could re-
place Thurstone’s techniques and produce an estimate of a cardinal attitude scale.17
The Likert scale avoids the need for judges to form an interval scale from the set of
evaluative terms, because subjects rate each alternative directly from the scale the
judges use in the Thurstonian method to rate evaluative terms. Likert argued that
his scaling method matches the reliability and validity of the Thurstonian methods,
while being much simpler to implement. Although Likert’s method seems to have
won the day, there is evidence that it is not as suitable to replace the Thurstonian
scaling method as Likert thought.18 However, it is possible that Likert scales may
be adequate regardless of whether they are able to measure cardinal public opinion;
cardinal information may instead be inferred from ordinal opinion information. If
the right assumptions are made about the distribution of attitudes in the public,
then it may be possible to infer this cardinal information without using a method
that measures the information directly.
Consider a set of policy alternatives x, y, z, each of which is assigned an integer
scale value by each individual, with high numbers representing greater approval. So
if x, y, z are assigned the values 5, 4, 2 respectively by some individual, then that
17This is the subject of Likert’s 1932 PhD thesis, A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes.
18For instance, see Roberts et al. (1999) and Drasgow et al. (2010).
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individual ranks the alternatives x  y  z. This makes no assumption that the
intervals between the values are significant. Next assume that the percentages of
individuals making each numerical assignment are (some variant of) normally dis-
tributed about some mode value for each alternative. For example, the percentages
in figure 6.4 may come from the aggregate of individual responses. In this example,
the distributions of assignments of values are skewed-normal. Given that this is only
ordinal information, it is not possible to find a mean value for each alternative, but
an analysis of the distributions does provide some information that is relevant to the
public rankings of the alternatives; the form that this analysis must take given the
lack of cardinal information is instructive. The social ordering x  y  z seems to
be a reasonable inference from the data. This is supported by the observation that
a majority of respondents rate x as better than 3 (80%), y better than 2 (70%), and
z worse or equal to 2 (75%). This interpretation would be even better supported
by unambiguous labels of the scale values (such as strongly approve, approve, indif-
ferent, disapprove, strongly disapprove); such labels would provide a further basis
for interpreting the results in support the ordering x  y  z. With such labels
it seems reasonable to say that a majority approve (or strongly approve) of x, a
majority is either indifferent to or disapproves of y, and a majority disapproves of
z.
This reasoning runs into trouble if public opinion is taken to be an aggregate
of cardinal individual attitudes, which is the view that I have advanced in this dis-





5 30% 15% 1%
4 25% 20% 4%
3 20% 40% 20%
2 15% 20% 50%
1 10% 5% 25%
Figure 6.4: Percentages of Likert scale value assignments
a number of different sets of individual cardinal attitudes. Consequently, we can-
not definitively infer the structure of underlying cardinal attitudes. First consider
attitude scale differences between the alternatives. From the distribution of percent-
ages, it appears that u(x)− u(y) > u(y)− u(z). A similar style of interpretation —
and right now I want to emphasize the informal nature of these intuitive assessments
— might yield an ordering on the utility values as well: u(x) > u(y) > u(z). Both
of these statements seem to intuitively follow from the information in figure 6.4,
but they require substantive assumptions about how the aggregate opinion strength
is connected to the percentage of individuals responding with a given value. More
specifically, and described statistically, they assume that there is a clear relation-
ship between the modes of the percentage information and the mean utility value
for each alternative. There are plausible counterexamples to this assumption. Con-
sider some minority group, which composes 15% of the total sample, with extremely
strong positive attitudes toward y, just as strong negative attitudes towards z, and
nearly as strong attitudes against x. That group’s percentages are shown in figure






5 0% 15% 0%
4 0% 0% 0%
3 0% 0% 0%
2 5% 0% 0%
1 10% 0% 15%
Figure 6.5: Percentages of Likert scale




5 30% 0% 1%
4 25% 20% 4%
3 20% 40% 20%
2 10% 20% 50%
1 0% 5% 10%
Figure 6.6: Percentages of Likert scale
value assignments by the Majority
Next assume that the minority’s positive attitude toward y is far stronger
than anyone’s positive attitude (in the majority) toward x. Given that a measure
of public opinion should take into account such differences in attitude strength, the
real possibility of samples with complex opinion structures should call into question
the statements about utility differences and values that I give above. The lack of
information about differences in attitude strength should also further support skep-
ticism about whether any information about attitude strength gleaned from Likert
scales is significant. Different subgroups in the sample may use the Likert scale
differently from other parts of the sample, and if those subgroups have different dis-
tributions of responses from the entire sample (as the minority group in figure 6.6),
then a measurement of public opinion using only Likert scales would not represent
the underlying cardinal attitude scale.
Lastly, I will consider a public opinion survey procedure that captures cardinal
public opinion information by making use of a normalization procedure similar to
what I used in section 5.2 to make individual cardinal attitude scales comparable.
For instance, unbounded numerical assignments to the set of alternatives could
be collected from each individual, which could be immediately taken as individual
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cardinal attitude scales. Those scales could then be normalized and aggregated
with one of the methods I introduced in this dissertation. Such a method would
not require the pair-wise Thurstonian procedure, and as a result would be much
simpler to collect. This is another way of asking about the precise value of the
pair-wise method. As I have already argued in section 4.2, I think the pair-wise
method is crucial for the proper measurement of cardinal individual attitudes. The
pair-wise method only requires that alternative choices be based in some process
that has a relatively simple form, similar to the attitude model shown in figure 4.4
(pg. 123). That model shows how an underlying cardinal attitude structure can
produce a pattern of pair-wise choices. A direct measurement of the attitude scale
would require that an individual is able to consciously access and reproduce the full
cardinal structure of her attitude set. Though an individual may have conscious
access to the full ordinal structure of her attitude scale, as well as the choice she
would make between two alternatives, I find it highly unlikely that an individual
would be able to consciously access and reproduce the full cardinal structure.19. It
is not enough then to employ some normalization procedure to cardinally measure
public opinion; the pair-wise scaling method for individual attitudes is also crucial.
I have intended this to be a short investigation of how a measure of public
opinion might be estimated, even though a complete measurement of cardinal public
opinion may never be possible for large populations. Given the demandingness of
the scaling method I have presented in this dissertation, it is not suitable for the
actual measurement of public opinion. Utilizing sampling procedures to estimate
19I provide a more detailed argument of this form in section 4.2.
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the public opinion of a large population is likely unproblematic. However, between-
subjects Thurstonian methods may only provide adequate estimations of cardinal
public opinion in populations with relatively normally distributed opinion profiles.
Standard Likert scales likely require such assumptions to be satisfied even to measure
ordinal information about public opinion, if it is thought (as I have argued) that the
underlying individual attitudes contain cardinal information. I have few definitive
answers about what survey methodologists should conclude from this. However,
when the purpose of public opinion information is to inform political representatives
about the popular will, it should be remembered that the thing being measured has
a cardinal structure. Insofar as public opinion surveys attempt to be informative
in this way, survey methodologists should be concerned about how well the survey
instruments actually take account of this underlying cardinal structure.
6.2.2 Decisions within deliberative institutions
Those systems of government recognized as democratic today are also typically
deliberative. Most decisions in legislatures and other parts of government occur only
after a substantive deliberative debate, followed by some voting procedure that pro-
vides closure to the decision. Such debates take place at multiple levels. The level
that has probably received the most attention in the deliberative democratic lit-
erature is within the government, and especially the legislature.20 However, other
20Although the legislature is often seen as the primary location of deliberation within govern-
ment, deliberation that takes place within the bureaucracy of a government and between the
bureaucracy and the legislature is also of importance. For instance, see Henry Richardson’s (2002)
recent discussion of the deliberative process both within the legislature, within the administrative
bureaucracy, and between them.
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levels of deliberation are also important to democratic theory. Deliberation among
the people, either in formal “town-hall” type meetings or informally in cafes, bars
or bowling alleys (to name a few), has been a part of the democratic traditions of
many societies as well as democratic theory.21 Equally important is a tradition of
deliberation between the people and their representatives and public officials, again
both formally and informally. Although I have already shown that such deliberative
activity, a species of direct communications, cannot be counted as properly com-
municating public opinion to political representatives, it still plays an important
function within modern democracies. These types of deliberation serve as the cen-
terpiece of some versions of democracy. It would be good, therefore, to determine
whether all of these types of deliberation are compatible with any representative
decision process that I have proposed in this dissertation.
Legislatures are forced to combine aggregative and deliberative procedures
when making policy decisions. It is not at all obvious how this can be done. Delib-
erative Democrats typically claim that decisions are ideally made through a rational
consideration of all of the best arguments for the various courses of action. These
arguments must be acceptable to all, leaving out consideration of purely private
goods. Under this conception of political decision, it would seem that representa-
tives should set aside the wishes of their constituents unless those wishes could be
backed by arguments that are acceptable to all. Public opinion according to this
view is not the aggregative conception I have presented here, but rather is a set of
21For instance, both Cohen and Fung’s (2004) “Radical Democracy,” which is a massively de-
liberative view of democracy, and Christiano’s (1996) two step view of democracy that divides the
labor between the citizens and the legislators, take the process by which the public deliberates
about and forms opinions about policy issues to be central to democracy.
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reasons for adoption of various policies that are presented by the public for evalua-
tion by the deliberative body of the legislature. I do not think this respects public
opinion as a set of considered judgments of the people. Rather, it demands that the
judgments by the people be made transparent such that the reasons underlying them
may enter into and be judged by the deliberative process within the legislature. And
it is unclear how an appropriately deliberative process could function in any other
way. It would seem that if representatives make use of opinion information itself,
they must ignore their judgments about what the best arguments are or refuse to
be moved by those arguments.
One reaction to the restriction of deliberation to reasoned argumentation is to
expand the primary setting of deliberation to include all of society. This inverts the
typical pattern of deliberation, such that many social decisions are made by citizens
in local deliberative bodies. Under such a view, the role of elected officials may
be reduced to introducing matters for consideration (for instance, Cohen and Fung
(2004)) or guiding the deliberation Fishkin (2009). This is a radical reformation
of the democratic systems that are common today, and on the face of it there is
reason to doubt that such a system could adequately govern. However, it is not my
purpose here to argue directly against such views, but just to show that it is not
necessary to resort to such radical measures. There is a significant way in which
political representatives can respect public opinion while at the same time respond
to deliberative pressures within a legislative body.
I see public opinion as having two primary influences on rational deliberation
within legislatures. First, political representatives have reasons to pursue arguments
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in favor of alternatives endorsed by public opinion. The fact that a representative’s
constituents judge an alternative as being worth pursuing should provide reasons
to a representative who respects their opinion; this opinion is derived from their
judgments about what it is best to do, and if a representative does not currently
understand why a certain alternative is worth pursuing, then she should attempt
to understand this. An understanding of public opinion by a representative may
arise through deliberation between the representative and her constituents. Opinion
information itself should also sometimes be directly integrated into a representative’s
decision about how to vote after the deliberative process within the legislature has
finished, especially when there is a strong opinion in favor of (or against) some
alternative and the risks of adopting such a policy are not large. This arises from
the balancing procedure I discuss in this dissertation, which treats public opinion as
a set of deliberative judgments in themselves — a view that is bolstered by strong
deliberative settings existing at the citizen-level.
In a healthy democracy, deliberation occurs both in the legislature as well
as among the people. Deliberation allows the deliberators to better understand
the rational basis for their policy opinions, and to revise them when appropriate.
Without any sort of deliberation, it is far more difficult for individuals to understand
possible opposing views, the arguments that support them, and consequently how
to evaluate all the available positions and arguments. This is especially important
if policy opinions should be directed at the common good, rather than simply each
individual’s (or group’s) private good; it can be difficult to know the content of the
common good if one does not understand the interests and viewpoints of others.
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Of course, deliberation varies widely in quality, and this is especially the case in
the distributed and informal deliberation that takes place within the public. If
deliberative groups are internally homogenous enough, deliberation can succumb to
various biases, including “groupthink,” which tend to divert the deliberative process
away from a careful analysis of all arguments on their merits.22 Therefore, just as
with deliberation among representatives, deliberation among citizens should include
individuals with diverse political views and structured deliberative settings so that
they deliberate in a way that promotes the rational consideration of all arguments.
It cannot be expected that this deliberation will rise to the quality within well-
functioning legislatures and bureaus, but a formal program of public deliberation
may improve to some degree the quality of deliberation that takes place within the
public.23
A third type of deliberation occurs between a representative and her con-
stituents. This is importantly characterized as being asymmetric; the representa-
tive is in a position of authority, and consequently her views and arguments are
provided an elevated position within the deliberation. Given the asymmetry, this
type of deliberation might also be thought of as “education” of the public rather
than pure deliberation. However, given that constituents typically collectively have
the power to persuade a representative, I do not think that an education analogy is
entirely appropriate. The degree to which representatives and others in leadership
22For instance, see Janis’ (1982) classic analyses of groupthink biases in various group decision
settings.
23Fishkin (2009), for instance, has conducted extensive research on the effects of deliberative
sessions among average citizens of extremely varied backgrounds, showing some positive results on
the extent to which citizens involved in the deliberations understand one another’s concerns and
arguments.
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positions affect public opinion has been intensively studied by political scientists.
For instance, see Berinsky (2009) for his analysis of the effects of leader attitudes on
changes in citizen attitudes toward American wars. He finds the policy attitudes of
leaders has little effect on those with little interest in policy issues and a very large
effect on those who have great interest. Therefore, political leaders are often opin-
ion leaders to those who look to them for political information. This echoes Zaller’s
(1992) more general claim that political elites significantly influence the policy opin-
ions of the public about a number of topics. However, there is still significant room
for public opinion to influence policy making, and a good deal of evidence that the
public both acts as a constraint on the set of policies considered by representatives
as well as a direct pressure on those policy decisions.24 Leaders can have significant
effect on public opinion, though needn’t always, and are themselves susceptible to
changes in public opinion that originate in the public itself. The causal link between
a representative’s and her constituents’ opinions is bidirectional.
All three types of deliberation are compatible with, and likely required by,
the Duty of Political Responsiveness. This is most easily seen when this duty is
justified by its ability to permit self-governance. In order for the public to fully
govern themselves, both their judgments and the reasons behind them must provide
guidance to the deliberative and decision process. If political representatives failed to
be responsive to either of these, they would be leaving their constituents out of some
critical aspect of the decision process. As I argued in section 2.1.3, representatives
24See Jacobs et al. (1999). This is also similar to the view expressed by Page and Shapiro (1992)
in their argument that public opinion is generally informed and rational.
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cannot simply be responsive to the arguments or reasons of their constituents for
their decisions to be suitably democratic. They must also respect the final judgments
of their constituents. This is the balancing that I think is well represented in the
general will, and which is behind the balancing decision procedure I defend in this
dissertation. The existence of all three types of deliberation is therefore important
for the instantiation of the Duty of Political Responsiveness.
There are many instances when knowing the reason for a constituent’s opinion
can help a representative determine how to use that opinion, and more concretely
how to weigh it. Generally, a representative should weigh an opinion more when it
seems backed by valid arguments, and when the point of disagreement between the
constituency and the representative can be located in premises about which reason-
able people could disagree. In such a case the representative can understand why
her constituents made the judgments they did. In other cases, the representative
may be able to locate clear instances of fallacious reasoning that are crucial to her
constituent’s judgments. Alternatively, the constituency may fall victim to collec-
tive irrationality, such as the discursive dilemma, in which sets of rational individual
judgments may form an irrational set of judgments when aggregated (Kornhauser
and Sager, 1993). These cases of explicit constituent irrationality should cause a
representative to discount public opinion; in terms of the decision model, this means
giving it much less weight. The most difficult cases are those in which the represen-
tative does not fully understand the reasoning behind her constituents’ opinions, or
thinks that they have unreasonable beliefs that have led them to some particular
public opinion. However, in this case it is difficult for the representative to locate
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a clear point of irrationality. Belief formation is a complex process, and it is of-
ten difficult to determine whether another’s belief (or even our own) was arrived
at through a reasonable process. Such opinions still require the representative’s re-
spect, and therefore should receive some weight, though likely less than in the first
case I describe and more than in the second.
Deliberative theory plays a crucial role in understanding how political repre-
sentatives should act to make democratic choices. I think that I have provided some
insight into just what this role might be.
6.2.3 Implications for other areas of social choice theory
Before ending this chapter, I will point out some possible general implications
that the method I have employed here has for social choice theory. In this disser-
tation, I have interpreted preferences and utility in a very specific way, but social
choice theory provides very general results that do not require specific interpreta-
tions of preferences, individuals, utility, or its other elements. This interpretation
neutrality is typically seen as a substantial benefit of the theory, because it makes its
findings applicable within many different theoretical contexts. But I will argue that
this generality comes at a cost. It often makes social choice theory unable to ade-
quately answer certain types of questions in philosophy and the social sciences. For
example, William Riker’s (1982) now classic criticism of populism within political
philosophy is based upon such a general analysis; he uses various results from social
choice theory to show that voting behavior cannot possibly express some “popular
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will” for the choice of candidates. Here I will cast doubt on the use of this sort of
social choice theoretic analyses to come to such conclusions. In this dissertation I
have presented a context-specific strategy for representing public opinion. Notice
that this has a subject matter distinct from Riker’s investigation; you might think
that public opinion exists but not think that it is possible for any election result to
reflect the preferences the public has for the candidates. The concept of public opin-
ion that I have developed here is passive, such that it must be measured. However,
it might be that voting behaviors instantiate the expression of a popular will of a
different sort, a type that is active rather than passive. The fact that a government
is backed by the active will of the people may be important for its legitimacy. I
do not know whether this is the case, but its possibility provides reason to take
seriously Riker’s denial that such an active will exists.
I think that a general strategy related to what I have done in this dissertation
has much promise in social choice theory, and in this section I will provide a more
general framework for understanding it. In doing this I will discuss some other
context-specific social choice models that have recently been proposed. Of particu-
lar interest is the work of Michael Regenwetter and his colleagues (2006), who have
argued that the Arrovian problem of majority cycles in (ordinal) voting theory can
be avoided by making statistical assumptions about electorates.25 This circumvents
25A majority cycle in some triple occurs when there is no Condorcet winner in that triple. A
Condorcet-winning alternative is one that wins a majority of votes in every pair-wise comparison
with other alternatives. The majoritarian voting method finds a social ordering by first determining
all pair-wise winners and then forming an ordering such that all alternatives are Condorcet winners
against all alternatives ranked below them. A preference cycle, or a case of intransitive preferences,
occurs when for some triple of alternatives x, y, z, all of the following pair-wise relations obtain:
x  y, y  z, and z  x. Thus no Condorcet winner exists, and no social ordering can be found.
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the sort of worries that are behind Riker’s rejection of populism. This strategy is
similar in kind to my own; by moving the social choice analysis into specific theo-
retical contexts, problems that are typically considered intractable in the standard
(interpretation-neutral) social choice framework can often be solved. Therefore, our
work points to an alternative view of social choice theory, and gives reason to be
skeptical of many conclusions of context-general analyses.
Substantive theoretical assumptions are common in most of the sciences. These
are used to set the basic theoretical background within which analyses can take place.
I will argue that such assumptions are also often indispensable in social choice the-
ory. It will first be helpful to distinguish between several types of assumptions,
some shared by both context-free and context-specific social choice models, and
others possessed only by context-specific models. All standard social choice mod-
els have both structural assumptions and normative assumptions.26 The structural
assumptions specify the appropriate subject of analysis, which for many theories
means the basic rules that determine which preferences are admissible into a model
and what counts as a situation covered by it; this is a standard use of the term
“structural condition” in social choice theory (Fishburn, 1973).27 In Arrovian social
choice theory, the structural assumptions state the proper domain of a social welfare
function and the output requirements of that function. Specifically, the theory re-
26Although the identity of the model is defined extensionally, by the set of functions that the
model takes under consideration, these models are typically characterized intensionally, by the set
of assumptions that constrain the set of functions under consideration. Therefore, even though the
assumptions that I will discuss do not themselves define social choice models, they are required
for any actual description and application of those models.
27Note that I use the word ‘assumption’ instead of ‘condition’, which is more common in social
choice theory, though I use them equivalently.
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quires that there be a society with at least two individuals who all have weak orders
over three or more alternatives. Additionally, a social welfare function (the output)
must be a weak order.28 An alternative social choice model might only require that
a “social choice function” be found, such that the output is just a set of the winning
alternative(s).29 But this is a different social choice method.
It is useful to classify other assumptions as normative because they posit cer-
tain requirements on an acceptable social decision, but are not basic to the subject
matter of analysis. For instance, Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
requires that the social ranking of any two alternatives with respect to one an-
other should not be affected by the ranking of some third alternative. Those who
support the inclusion of this condition typically take a decision that is affected by
such “irrelevant” third alternatives to be perverse in some way.30 Other standard
Arrovian normative assumptions include some version of a Pareto Principle and
Non-Dictatorship. Notice that it is possible to conceptualize these conditions as
28x is weakly preferred ‘’ to y iff x is preferred at least as much as y. This is similar to a ‘≥’
relation for numerical values.
29See Sen and Pattanaik (1969). In this paper, I will primarily use the term “social choice
function” in its more general sense, to refer to any function satisfying the requirements of social
choice theory, including “social welfare” and “social choice” functions.
30Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is one of the central findings of social choice theory. It shows
that no aggregation procedure (or voting method) guarantees a coherent social ordering (or rank-
ing) of alternatives if it is assumed that individuals may have any possible individual orderings of
the alternatives and that the aggregation procedure must satisfy a set of reasonable conditions on
democratic choice. These conditions are (where x and y are two alternatives):
Weak Pareto Efficiency If all individuals rank x above y, then the social ordering must rank
x above y.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives The social ranking of any two alternatives x and y
should only depend upon the pair-wise ranking of those alternatives. The relative ranking
of other alternatives is irrelevant to the social ranking of x and y.
Non-Dictatorship There is no individual i, such that no matter how other individuals rank x
and y, the ranking of x and y by i becomes the social ranking.
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structural, but doing so strains the limits of what would generally be considered the
basic structure of the theory. The reason why Non-Dictatorship is an important
assumption in the theory is not because it is integral to the basic problem of social
decision, but rather because any social decision rule that did not satisfy it would
fail to be democratic. Normative assumptions specify how decision rules should be
selected, given some basic social choice theoretic framework. This permits a nor-
mative debate about which decision rules are properly democratic once the basic
theory parameters are specified through a set of structural assumptions.
A common assumption in social choice theory that nicely illustrates the distinc-
tion between structural and normative assumptions is the restriction of the choice
domain.31 This is a restriction on the preference profiles that are admissible into
the social welfare function. It is more naturally a structural assumption, because it
restricts the possible inputs to the social decision, which changes the social choice
problem itself. One might instead think of such domain restrictions as primarily
normative in nature, but it is doubtful that such a normative assumption could
be justified. Generally, it is thought that individuals should be able to have any
preferences whatsoever. Therefore, a normatively justified domain restriction would
require a rationale that makes use of particular normative features of a theoretical
context, such that it would be permissible within the context to restrict the pref-
erences of some individuals because they do not conform to the domain restriction.
Because such normative justifications are not obvious within most contexts, it seems
31See Black (1958) and Sen and Pattanaik (1969) for classic presentations of domain restrictions.
Also see Le Breton and Weymark (2010) for a summary of such restrictions compatible with
economic goods, and Gaertner (2006) for restrictions in collective choice and voting theory.
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unlikely that domain restrictions could be justified through context-free or context-
specific normative grounds. The theoretical context under consideration sometimes
gives reason for thinking that certain preference profiles will not (or are unlikely
to) arise, but does not provide reasons why some profiles should be ignored even if
they do arise. Domain restrictions then should be conceived of as context-specific
structural assumptions.
Though most work in social choice theory is relevant to a number of different
contexts, that does not eliminate a role for numerous competing social choice models,
some of which might perform better in some contexts than others. However, a key
feature of context-free social choice models is their independence from any particular
interpretation of the entities in question. Context-specific models, on the other hand,
require a particular interpretation of the model elements to justify the assumptions
within the theory. Allowing a social choice model to be restricted to some particular
context in this way opens up a possibility of reasonable context-specific structural
and normative assumptions in addition to, or in place of, context-free assumptions.
Context-free social choice models tend to produce more skeptical results than
context-specific ones due to the relative austerity of context-free assumptions. For
instance, context-free social choice models have generally supported political theo-
ries in political science that are skeptical of popular democratic rule. Perhaps most
famously, William Riker (1982) argues that several results from social choice theory
show that the populist theory of democracy is unworkable, because there can be
no coherent “popular will” that populist theories require public decisions to track.
This strong result arises from several related findings of context-free social choice
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theory, showing that no voting rule could possibly satisfy the requirements of demo-
cratic choice (Arrow’s Theorem), that every election is subject to strategic voting
(Gibbard – Satterthwaite Theorem), and that control over the agenda of an election
has significant effects on its result. The plausibility of Riker’s argument rests on the
applicability of the context-free assumptions of social choice theory, and only those
assumptions, to the particular theoretical context of democratic decision making
within large societies.
Given that widespread applicability is one of the strengths of such context-free
theories, it seems reasonable that context-free social choice theory should be able
to support substantive findings like Riker’s. However, the austerity of context-free
assumptions in standard social choice theory makes skeptical findings more likely.
Therefore, the findings Riker cites represent the worst-case scenario for democracy,
not a likely one. But moving beyond austere context-free assumptions requires a
different type of argument — one that is reliant upon particular features of the
phenomena of interest in addition to the general principles upon which context-free
social choice models are based. In this dissertation I have provided a social choice
theoretic framework that permits interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility scales
when those scales represent attitudes. The assumptions I made about the underlying
attitudes those utility scales represent were necessary for those comparisons. I will
also examine recent work by Regenwetter et al. (2006) on the subject of how social
decisions are possible in large-scale elections. In both of these contexts (large-scale
elections and cardinal public opinion measurement) context-free social choice models
come to incorrect skeptical conclusions, whereas context-specific models do not.
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Cyclic social preferences are possible when using the majoritarian voting method
(aka. The Condorcet Method), which is the only voting method satisfying Arrow’s
(normative) conditions on democratic choice. In the standard Arrovian social choice
model, such cycles are highly likely as the number of alternatives and/or individu-
als becomes large, approaching 1 as they approach infinity (Riker, 1982, pg. 122).
Regenwetter et al.’s model relies upon statistical assumptions related to restrictions
on the domain of the social aggregation function, and they argue that actual voting
patterns (voting profiles) from real-world electorates are structured in ways that
should be characterized within the social choice model. When these assumptions
about the structure of electoral preferences are made, majority cycles are extremely
unlikely, even over large sets of alternatives and in large electorates. Importantly,
the assumptions about the voting patterns of the electorate are empirical in nature,
and are only plausible given the truth of certain empirical claims.
The context-specific assumptions of Regenwetter et al. (2006) are empirical in
nature, but this need not be the case within all contexts or for all assumptions. In
fact, a simpler domain restriction than what Regenwetter et al. consider within the
context of scientific theory selection has recently been suggested that may overcome
any Arrovian problems based purely upon conceptual relationships between different
scientific merits.32 Arrow’s theorem applies in nearly any case of multidimensional
choice, even in the selection of best scientific theories using various scientific merits
(Okasha, 2011). For instance, if three scientific merits are used to rank alternative
theories (logical strength, generality, and fit to the data), then Arrow’s theorem
32See Morreau (2013).
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shows that there is no adequate method to find an aggregate ranking of theories.
However, if relationships can be found between the scientific merits, then the domain
of such a theory choice method might be restricted, making a majority decision rule
possible. This constitutes a conceptual structural assumption that is included in the
context-specific model for theory selection. For example, the logical strength and
fit to the data of a scientific theory are often construed such that they form inverse
rankings of the alternative theories (Morreau, 2013). Therefore, if the theories
x, y, z are ranked x  y  z by logical strength, then those theories must be ranked
z  y  x in terms of how well they fit the data. This places increased structure on
the domain of the aggregation function, which makes a majority preference cycle less
likely. In fact, if it is assumed that there is only one additional scientific merit besides
logical strength and fit, then this restriction on the domain satisfies Sen’s Value
Restriction (Sen and Pattanaik, 1969), which is a sufficient condition of guaranteeing
that a majority cycle is avoided. Value restriction is also a structural assumption
important to Regenwetter et al.’s (2006) argument that large-scale elections are not
typically susceptible to majority cycles.
Regenwetter et al. (2006) claim that real-world electorates generally conform
to a statistical variant of Sen’s Value Restriction condition, and thus it is extremely
unlikely that any given election will end in a majority cycle. Sen’s solution to the
problem of majority cycles is to drop Arrow’s requirement of Universal Domain on
the set of possible preference profiles. Sen’s Value Restriction requires that, within
every triple of alternatives, there is consensus on what rank some alternative does
not have. Therefore, within each triple, there is some alternative that satisfies one
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of the following conditions: never ranked first, never ranked middle, or never ranked
last. This condition is sufficient for a profile of weak orders to avoid a majority
cycle, and is necessary and sufficient for a profile of strict orders to guarantee the
avoidance of a majority cycle; importantly, these guarantees apply to the profile
regardless of whether some individuals are duplicated or eliminated. I will return
to this last point, because it is important for distinguishing Sen’s Value Restriction
from Regewetter et al.’s assumptions. Regenwetter et al. show that Value Re-
striction is rarely satisfied for real-world electorates, and therefore is not a suitable
structural assumption for voting contexts. However, they revise Sen’s Value Restric-
tion assumption, replacing it with a statistical assumption over possible preference
profiles. This revised statistical assumption is supported by the available empirical
evidence, though it only assures that majority cycles are highly unlikely rather than
impossible.
According to Regenwetter et al. (2006), two separate arguments show the
unlikelihood of majority preference cycles in real elections. First they note that
the worst-case scenario for determining the composition of preference profiles is a
uniform distribution, or what is called an “impartial culture” over possible individual
preference orderings. This is precisely what Riker assumes when he makes his well-
known calculations showing that majority cycles are extremely likely in all except
very small electorates (Riker, 1982, pg. 122). Regenwetter et al. show that if it is
simply assumed that some preference orderings are more likely than others, without
even claiming anything specific about what that new probability distribution is,
then majority cycles are not as likely as Riker claims. The plausibility of this
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denial of impartial culture can be intuitively seen in typical national elections. For
example, in the 2008 American presidential election (including both primary and
general elections), it would have been more likely for someone to rank the candidates
Obama  Clinton  McCain than Obama  McCain  Clinton. This gets to the
core of the context-specific strategy; a denial of impartial culture in the case of
elections requires that there are certain regularities in individual preferences over
the candidates. It is obvious that this is the case in most elections, but such an
assumption would not be defensible were the social choice model not restricted to
this particular theoretical context.
Next Regenwetter et al. argue that even if the culture is impartial, some-
thing that is likely not true, a statistical assumption about the distribution over
possible preference profiles makes majority preference cycles very unlikely. They
present empirical evidence that their statistical variant of Value Restriction is sat-
isfied for many real-world electorates, and this allows them to argue that real-world
electorates have only small probabilities of producing majority cycles. They call
this assumption Net Value Restriction. This restriction is distinct from Sen’s Value
Restriction in two primary ways. First, and most importantly, it is a restriction on
profiles rather than combinations of orders that are instantiated within particular
profiles. Sen’s Value Restriction, therefore, can fail to be satisfied by an infinite
number of possible profiles that nonetheless do not lead to majority cycles. For
example, the following profile does not satisfy Value Restriction, but does not lead
to a majority cycle:
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x  y  z
y  z  x
z  x  y
z  x  y
z  x  y
The order z  x  y receives a majority and thus there is no majority cycle.
This fails Value Restriction, because there is some subset of the profile (the first
three orders) in which no alternative is never ranked first, never ranked middle, or
never ranked last. Of course, the profile in which z  x  y obtains a majority is
a somewhat trivial case of avoiding a majority cycle, but makes it easy to see why
assumptions about which individual profiles are likely (or unlikely) provide greater
analytic power than those that do not. Regenwetter et al.’s Net Value Restriction
assumes such a distribution over the space of profiles themselves, and consequently
they are able to make claims about the probability of various profiles that would
not be possible if only the sets of possible orders (rather than profiles themselves)
were subject to restriction.
The second way in which Regenwetter et al.’s Net Value Restriction differs
from Sen’s Value Restriction is in its statistical formulation. Whereas Value Re-
striction provides a sufficient condition on there being a social ordering, such that
a social ordering will certainly be possible if the condition is satisfied, Regenwetter
et al.’s condition only claims that a majority cycle has some low probability of aris-
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ing from a profile exhibiting Net Value Restriction. Furthermore, their empirical
evidence only permits them to say that there is some high probability of Net Value
Restriction being satisfied in real-world electorates. The relative weakness of this
claim, for instance as compared to those I describe above from theory selection, is
a result of the empirical rather than conceptual context-specific structural assump-
tions. Whereas the merits of scientific theories may possess certain relations that
allow for non-statistical assumptions such as Value Restriction, empirical phenom-
ena typically do not. Therefore, any social choice model of elections that makes
use of what is known about the electorate will typically only be able to come to
conclusions that have certain (high) probabilities of being true. This is a deficit of a
social choice model only in the way that similar probabilistic findings are deficits of
models in biology, psychology, or economics. And it dramatically changes the basic
method of social choice theory, and results in a scientific extension of the purely
formal methods found in context-free social choice models. This also gives an in-
dication of why Value Restriction may be successful in the case of theory selection
but unsuccessful for elections. Whereas the phenomenon of theory selection may
be well described by purely abstract a priori assumptions, this is not the case for
voting behaviors. The patterns of preferences typically held by specific electorates
can only adequately be known by reference to empirical data, which dooms any use
of standard domain restrictions within the theoretical context of elections.
I have discussed how the use of context-specific social choice models can more
adequately address a number of classic problems in social choice theory and related
fields. The upshot of this discussion is that social choice theorists often make fewer
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assumptions about the underlying phenomena they are modeling than they are
entitled to; this sometimes leads to overly skeptical conclusions. I have presented
two primary examples of context-specific social choice models, one from the political
science literature and another that is novel. They both allow for the avoidance of
skeptical findings within particular theoretical contexts. First, I presented recent
work by Regenwetter et al. (2006) that shows how the likelihood of a majority social
preference cycle can be minimized if a number of statistical assumptions are made.
They argue that these assumptions are likely satisfied by most real-world electorates.
I then presented a similar strategy to resolve problems in utility theory surrounding
the interpersonal comparison of cardinal utilities, at least when those utilities are
used to represent attitudes.
The example of interpersonal comparisons of utility that I have given in this
dissertation is particularly useful for understanding what benefits can be obtained
from context-specific models. These benefits lie primarily in shifting the focus of
social-choice theoretic questions to a more concrete theoretical context; this then
fills in the abstract structure of findings in context-free social choice theory, showing
what follows from its general principles given particular interpretations. The formal
problem of making interpersonal comparisons of utility is, in many ways, intractable
without the move to a particular context. Context-free social choice and utility
theories provide the formal constraints on the debate, but not enough to arrive
at firm conclusions. For instance, the types of interpersonal comparisons and how
they relate to the measureability of individual scales are both necessary antecedents
to any context-specific model of those comparisons, but context-free utility theory
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says little about whether interpersonal comparisons are possible within any given
situation. Therefore, many substantive debates must take place within particular
contexts.
I have suggested two main types of assumptions that can be made within the-
oretical contexts: structural and normative. These are also the two main areas of
debate within theoretical contexts. Referencing my own example of interpersonal
comparisons of cardinal attitudes, one might disagree with the assumption that sta-
ble attitudes are connected in the manner I presented to pair-wise choices between
public policies; perhaps responses are almost entirely the result of factors external
to a person’s psychology. This would render unfounded the individual utility scaling
technique I employ. One might also object to the structural assumptions that permit
interpretations of individual utility scales and subsequent interpersonal comparisons
of attitudes. It is plausible that one might, for instance, deny that individual dis-
positions can be characterized by variants of the normal distribution. Alternately,
one might deny that it makes sense to make any dispositional claims about individ-
ual utility assignments within the context of attitude measurement. The resolution
of that question would likely require an investigation into how individual attitudes
arise from underlying psychological processes, which would require a predominantly
empirical investigation. It makes little sense for any of these debates to take place
outside of a particular theoretical context.
Normative assumptions invite debate over how utility and social choice the-
oretic information should be used, rather than about the basic structure of the
phenomena being represented. In the case I consider in this dissertation, where
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public opinion is used to inform the decisions of political officials, the commitment
to one set of normative assumptions requires further commitments to particular
views about political representation and the roles of fairness and responsiveness in
democratic decisions. I pursued these normative questions in chapters 2 and 3. I
have claimed that if public opinion is to be used by political representatives, for
instance legislators, then two normative assumptions should likely guide its use:
Overall Fairness and Special Interests. Notice that an argument for this must take
place within the current constraints of political philosophy, which would in part




I have argued in this dissertation that political representatives have duties
to be responsive to public opinion in their public policy decisions. How exactly
they do this is often complex, and can vary depending upon the exact situation,
but the guidance offered by this duty is more obvious in some cases than others.
Consider the example of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that I began with in the
Introduction. For many political representatives, it will be difficult to determine
whether a vote for or against the act constitutes a violation of that representative’s
duty to respect public opinion. This just reflects the complexity of the cases involved.
Policy decisions are often difficult for both the public and representatives, with
the motives of the various actors involved obscured and important facts sometimes
impossible to sufficiently verify. But I think there are some clear cut examples that
show how the Duty of Political Responsiveness might be used to guide and evaluate
the acts of representatives in instances of real-world policy making. .
Consider a Democratic U.S. Senator A from a conservative state, who is faced
with a decision of whether to vote for the ACA. Imagine that there has been ex-
tensive opinion polling done in her state, and she concludes that a large majority is
strongly opposed to the passage of the ACA. Although in this historical case, the
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public opinion polling information likely fails to meet the standards that I have set
in this dissertation, for the purposes of this discussion it might be assumed that the
polling information is either of extraordinary quality or that the opinions that are
measured are unambiguous. For instance, there may be so few people who support
the ACA that their cardinal opinions could not possibly overcome the opinions of
those opposed in any defensible aggregation function (like normalize and average).
In the above case, it is clear that certain considerations should be excluded
from A’s deliberations about her decision. First, she should not include consid-
erations of pure party loyalty unless she thinks that loyalty significantly furthers
the common good. Similarly, she must also exclude considerations of personal ad-
vancement within the Senate. The exclusion of these considerations will likely be
recommended by many theories of political representation, but some others are
particular to my own view. For instance, A should generally not take electoral
outcomes as conveying a “mandate” to govern according to her electoral platform.
As I have argued, elections results are not capable of conveying this support for a
representative’s electoral platform; public opinion survey information provides bet-
ter information than election results. A’s view about what is the best policy to
pursue must be weighed in her decision according to her estimation of the extent
of negative or positive results of pursuing that policy, along with how sure she is
of that estimation; this should reduce the importance of purely ideological policy
commitments that the representative has little independent reason to hold.
The Duty of Political Responsiveness sometimes allows for public opinion to be
largely ignored when the representative has good reason to think that acting accord-
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ing to public opinion could produce extremely negative consequences for the public.
Consider Representative B, who is deciding whether to support the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. This bill provided financial aid to distressed
banks during the American financial crisis of that year. B is a Democrat whose
constituents are overwhelmingly against the law; she receives numerous phone calls
and emails from constituents, many of who say that it is wrong to let banks off
“scot-free” while making the middle class foot the bill. More formal public opinion
surveys convey a similar message. Most of her constituents do not seem to think
that more serious harm will befall the economy if banks are left without any assis-
tance. However, she has had an opportunity to sit in a number of meetings with
experts in economics and banking, and those experts were in agreement that if the
law were not passed then there would likely be serious negative repercussions on the
American economy. That convinces her that she must vote for the bill. Her choice
is consistent with The Duty of Political Responsiveness, because her decision takes
into account public opinion though puts less weight on it. She only rejects the choice
advocated by the opinion of her constituents upon realizing the significant risk of
not approving the bill and the degree to which it seems that the public does not
significantly take into account this risk when its members formulate their opinions.
Another case will show the importance of the cardinal conception of public
opinion. Governor C, who is a Republican, is determining whether she should
expand her state’s Medicaid system to include those individuals just above the
poverty line. She is inclined to deny the expansion of this program, because she is
suspicious of more Federal involvement in her state’s finances and because it would
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improve her image among party leaders and donors. There is also opinion polling
information showing a slight majority of her constituents are also against expanding
Medicaid. However, this polling information, along with her experience speaking
to various groups of citizens, leads her to believe that a significant minority in her
state strongly favor the expansion of Medicaid; this minority includes both those who
are directly affected by the potential policy change as well as those who are aware
of and sympathetic to those directly affected. This is evidence that the strength of
preference of those who are against the expansion of Medicaid is far weaker than the
strength of preference for those who favor it, even though there are more people who
are against it than who favor it. The Duty of Political Responsiveness may require
C to consider expanding Medicaid even though most of her constituents do not want
the policy to be implemented and she is also inclined against it. This relies upon the
relative weakness of both her own disfavor towards it as well the weak preferences
of those in her constituency against it. If however she, for instance, has good reason
to think that expanding Medicaid would be harmful to her state’s budget then this
might provide more strength to her belief that it would harm her constituents. This
might then be enough to resist the stronger opinions of the minority who favors the
policy.
Finally, it is important to see how the duty I argue exists will sometimes
require decisions that run contrary to the institutional incentives that provide rep-
resentatives with pragmatic reasons to act in particular ways. State Senator D is a
Republican from a district with two distinct populations. 60% of her constituents
live in a more urban area and are relatively young, poor, and liberal. The other 40%
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of her constituents live in a suburban area and are relatively old, rich, and conserva-
tive. However, those in the suburban part of her district tend to vote at much higher
rates than those who live in the urban part of her district; this is compounded by the
fact that all of her state elections occur in non-Presidential election years, when the
turnout is especially low for those living in her urban districts. Because D is con-
cerned about a primary challenge, and relatively unconcerned about a challenge in a
general election, she tends to support especially conservative policies, even though a
majority of her constituents typically support more liberal policies. In this case, D
is acting to maximize her chances of being reelected, and the particular institutional
incentives in place make it (pragmatically) rational for her to support conservative
policies that most of her constituents do not. This fails to act according to the Duty
of Political Responsiveness, which is especially easy to see given the generality of
her tendency to ignore public opinion.
The wrongness of D’s decision procedure makes clearer the relationship be-
tween what I have done in this dissertation and the work in political theory about
institutional design. Much of the concern in political theory is (rightly, I think)
concerned with designing institutions that make desirable actions rational for the
agents within those institutions. This dissertation has been concerned with the
rightness and wrongness of decisions by political representatives without regard to
other institutional pressures those representatives face. I find it uncontroversial
that some of our duties will sometimes (and perhaps often) require actions to the
contrary of the various incentives that are relevant to our decisions. This occurs
with political representatives as well. However, the existence of the duty, especially
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one so central to political representation, gives some guidance to how institutions
should be designed. Better political institutions will tend to incentivize the sort of
behaviors that are consistent with the duties possessed by political officials. Just as
political institutions should be designed to limit corruption by public officials, they
should also be designed to give representatives incentives to properly represent their
constituents.
In this dissertation I have argued that political representatives have duties to
respect public opinion. Showing what constitutes “respect” and “public opinion”
required formal models of both political decision making and public opinion. These
allowed me to show that there is nothing deeply wrong with the concept of public
opinion that renders it impossible to either measure or include in public opinion in
public decision making. Additionally, I showed how public opinion can be modeled
as a cardinal utility scale, such that it is possible to weigh it against other factors in
decision making; most important of these factors is a representative’s estimation of
the likely effects of the policy, which is often modeled using cost-benefit analysis or
other cardinal metrics of welfare. This I think provides a framework for evaluating
the actions of political representatives.
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